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Abstract
Numerous empirical studies have shown the difficulties associated with the transmission
of knowledge and the limitations of its diffusion process. What are the implications of
these difficulties and limitations to international economics? This dissertation deals with
this question by looking at how productive knowledge plays a role in the evolution of
the comparative advantage of nations and the international expansion of multinational
corporations. The first chapter finds that a country is 65% more likely to start exporting a
good that is being exported by any of its geographic neighbors, consistently with evidence
on the limited geographic patterns of knowledge diffusion. The second chapter finds
that migrants, serving as carriers of productive knowledge, play a role in explaining the
appearances of new export industries in both their sending and receiving countries. In
particular, in terms of their ability to induce exports in the average country, an increase of
only 65,000 people in the stock of migrants is associated with about 15% increase in the
likelihood of adding a new product to a country’s export basket. The figure becomes 15,000
for skilled migrants. The third chapter looks at how the barriers to knowledge transmission
within the firm limit the horizontal expansion of multinational corporations. The findings
suggest that multinational corporations are, on average, about 12% less likely to horizontally
expand a sector that is one standard deviation above the mean in the knowledge intensity
scale.
iii
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Introduction
About half of cross-country income variation can be explained by differences in productivity
levels (Caselli 2005, Hall and Jones 1999). Such an important stylized fact begs the question:
what is productivity? Moses Abramovitz (1956) described productivity as “some sort of
measure of our ignorance.” Being productive can also be defined as knowing how to do
more and better with the same resources. Why, then, is the knowledge that is available in
some places is not available in others? For instance, why do some farmers know how to
deal with adverse climate conditions, while other farmers in a similar region do not? Why
do some countries know how to set up the proper institutional frameworks for economic
growth and others just can’t? Why is it that firms know how to manufacture a product
much more efficiently than other firms do, even within the same country? These are just
few examples of very important but yet unanswered questions economist have studied for
decades.
A general answer to all these question is that, certainly, knowledge is not fully mobile.
While sometimes knowledge can be easily codifiable (i.e. in an instruction manual, or a
textbook), most often it cannot. This hard-to-codify knowledge can sometimes be embedded
in goods: one who owns a calculator does not need to know how to add or subtract. Yet,
there is still a lot of knowledge that cannot be written down nor embedded in goods (i.e.,
how to recognize a face, how to ride a bicycle or how to be a good soccer player). This type
of knowledge is what Polanyi (1966) referred to as tacit.
A lot of what makes us productive is, in fact, the tacit knowledge we have accumulated.
We gain this tacit knowledge through experience and learning and not in school or by
1
reading. That is precisely what makes its transferability and diffusion so difficult. As
Kenneth Arrow (1969) pointed out, the channels for knowledge transmission are limited to
human interaction rather than written words.
How do the limitations on the transmission and diffusion of knowledge affect economic
processes? This dissertation documents the ways in which these barriers play a role
in international economics, touching upon topics such as the evolution of comparative
advantage of nations and the international expansion of multinational corporations.
The first chapter of the dissertation asks what are the implications of the documented
geographic local character of knowledge diffusion on the comparative advantage of nations?
My co-authors and I document that the probability a product is added to a country’s export
basket is, on average, 65% larger if a neighboring country is a successful exporter of that
same product. For existing products, growth of exports in a country is 1.5 percent higher
per annum if it has a neighbor with comparative advantage in these products. The main
contribution of this study is that, using exports as a measure of knowledge acquisition,
we document patterns in the evolution of the comparative advantage of nations that are
consistent with the widely documented localized character of knowledge diffusion.
The second chapter asks, to what extent are migrants a source of evolution of the
comparative advantage of both their sending and receiving countries? The main finding is
that migration is a strong and robust driver of productive knowledge diffusion. In terms
of their ability to induce exports, we find that an increase of only 65,000 people in the
stock of migrants for the average country, is associated with about 15% increase in the
likelihood of adding a new product to a country’s export basket. We also find that, in terms
of expanding the export basket of countries, a migrant is worth about US $30,000 of foreign
direct investment. For skilled migrants these same figures become 15,000 people and US
$160,000. The main contribution of this chapter is that it presents robust evidence that
migrants, as carriers of tacit knowledge, can shape the comparative advantage of nations by
inducing exports from their receiving and sending countries to the rest of the world.
Finally, the third chapter of this dissertation asks, to what extent do barriers to knowledge
2
transmission influence a firm’s decision to expand? Using a worldwide dataset on foreign
subsidiaries, I show that multinational corporations are, on average, about 12% less likely to
horizontally expand a sector that is one standard deviation above the mean in the knowledge
intensity scale. In addition, I present evidence showing that when firms do expand their
knowledge-intensive activities they tend to do so at shorter geographic distances. Finally, I
also find that locating a foreign subsidiary in the same time zone as its headquarters tends
to reduce barriers to knowledge transmission by easing communication and effectively
reducing the distance between them by, on average, 3500 Km. The chapter also includes a
conceptual framework that builds on Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) to formalize the
empirical findings. The contribution of this chapter is that it rationalizes the ways in which
the cost of knowledge transmission for firms engaged in foreign direct investment affects
the mechanisms of the proximity-concentration hypothesis.
3
Chapter 1
Neighbors and the Evolution of the
Comparative Advantage of Nations:
Evidence of International Knowledge
Diffusion?1
1.1 Introduction
Knowledge has become central to modern theories of growth. Knowledge is embodied
in goods that are then shipped around at a cost. When these goods are imported, they
accelerate productivity growth in the recipient country (e.g. Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1990;
Coe and Helpman, 1993; Coe et. al., 2009). However, significant parts of knowledge are
disembodied or tacit (Polanyi, 1962) and its diffusion requires more direct forms of human
interaction, which inevitably limits its scope to more localized or idiosyncratic settings
(Arrow, 1969).
Previous research has documented the rapid decay of knowledge diffusion with geo-
1Co-authored with Ricardo Hausmann and Cesar Hidalgo, published in the Journal of International
Economics (Volume 92, Issue 1, January 2014, Pages 111–123)
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graphic distance. This literature looked at the impact of distance on the patterns of patent
citation (e.g. Jaffe et. al., 1993), of R&D and patent output (e.g. Branstetter, 2001; Bottazzi
and Peri, 2003), of R&D and productivity (Keller, 2002), and on the sales of subsidiaries of
multinational corporations (Keller and Yeaple, 2013). Keller (2002, 2004) has shown that
foreign sources of technology account for up to 90% of domestic productivity growth and
that the impact is highly localized.
What are the implications of rapid geographic decay of knowledge diffusion for the
patterns of comparative advantage of countries? Ricardian models of trade argue that trade
patterns are the reflection of productivity differences: countries export the goods in which
they are relatively more productive - i.e. goods in which they exhibit comparative advantage.
In this framework, countries become exporters of new goods or increase their market share
in existing goods because they become more productive in them. If knowledge drives
productivity and diffuses at short distances, then telltale signs should be observable in the
geographic patterns of comparative advantage both statically and dynamically. In particular,
neighboring countries should share more knowledge and hence have more similar static
patterns of comparative advantage, in which case they should exhibit a geographically
correlated pattern of product adoption and export growth.
In this paper, we use a novel setting to explore the diffusion of industry-specific produc-
tivity increases: the export baskets of countries. The key assumption is that, controlling for
product-specific shifts in global demand, firms in a country will be able to incorporate a new
good into their export basket only after they have become productive enough to compete in
global markets. Additionally, in order to increase their market share, firms will also need to
become more productive. If knowledge diffusion decays strongly with distance, countries
with the relevant knowledge should induce shifts in productivity in their neighbors—we
explore this in both a static and a dynamic setting. We study both the intensive and the
extensive margin of exports, exploring whether neighbors matter in affecting the ability of a
country to gain market share or to become productive enough to export a product for the
first time. As has been shown, the extensive margin accounts for a significant fraction of the
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growth of global trade in the last decades (Zahler, 2007; Kehoe and Ruhl, 2013). We therefore
also explore the intensive margin, looking at the impact of neighbors in the evolution of a
country’s market share.
From a static perspective, we find that the export baskets of neighbors are remarkably
similar, even after controlling for similarity in size, level of development, culture, institu-
tional setting and factor endowments, among other controls: sharing a border and a region
makes countries two standard deviations more similar than the average. From a dynamic
perspective, we find that—after controlling for all time-varying sources of aggregate similar-
ity between pairs of countries, for time varying product characteristics and for a country’s
own predisposition to adopt a product—countries are 65% more likely to start exporting a
product which was being exported with comparative advantage by one of its geographic
neighbors at the beginning of the period.
This result is not obvious. After all, gravity models have shown that, ceteris paribus, trade
is more intense at short distances (Tinbergen, 1963; Bergstrand, 1985; Leamer & Levinshohn,
1995; Frankel 1997). Hence, we should expect neighbors to specialize in different industries
in order to exploit their comparative advantage and benefit from the gains of trade. The
higher intensity of trade at short distances should force specialization and differentiation,
whether—as pointed out by Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001)—the differences causing
specialization arise as a result of an Armington structure of demand (e.g. Anderson, 1979;
Bergstrand, 1985; Deardorff, 1998), economies of scale (e.g. Helpman and Krugman, 1985;
Bergstrand, 1989), technological differences across countries (e.g. Davis, 1995; Eaton and
Kortum, 1997), differences in factor endowments (e.g. Deardorff,1998); or whether they
arise from reciprocal dumping in models of homogeneous goods, imperfect competition
and segmented markets (e.g. Brander, 1981; Brander and Krugman, 1983; Venables, 1985).
We can understand our results in the context of an endogenous Ricardian framework,
where comparative advantage evolves with the progressive acquisition of knowledge or
technologies which diffuse geographically2. However, under such a Ricardian framework, a
2Alvarez et. al. (2012) provides a useful framework to think about this. In their model, technology diffuses
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reasonable question to ask is, what aspects of technology have limited tradability so that
geography could be a defining factor in its diffusion pattern? Clearly, the technology that is
embodied in machines and tradable goods and services should diffuse more broadly: after
all, cell phones are available everywhere. However, tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1962)—knowl-
edge that is disembodied and hard to codify and teach because it cannot be captured by
blueprints or instruction manuals—should diffuse with more difficulty. How does tacit
knowledge diffuse? As mentioned above, Kenneth Arrow argued that knowledge diffusion
requires more direct forms of human interaction, which limits its scope to more localized or
idiosyncratic settings (Arrow, 1969). Furthermore, the emerging consensus in the literature
of knowledge diffusion is that diffusion occurs predominantly within a fairly short range
(e.g. Jaffe et al. 1993; Branstetter, 2001; Keller, 2002; Bottazzi & Peri, 2003), an observation
that is attributed to the characteristics of tacit knowledge. Hence, if indeed knowledge
diffusion translates into productivity shifts that can shape the export basket of countries,
then, in a world in which knowledge diffuses preferentially at short ranges, a country’s
export basket—as well as its evolution—will be shaped by the knowledge available in its
neighborhood.
The localized nature of knowledge diffusion should generate the observables that we
document in this paper. In particular, if knowledge has been homogenized preferentially at
shorter distances, a snapshot view of the export basket of countries (a realization of their
comparative advantage) should resemble that of their neighbors. Dynamically, we should
also observe a geographically correlated pattern of adoption of new export goods and of
changes in market shares. In this interpretation, there is a causal link between the presence
of productive knowledge in a country and its diffusion to a neighbor. However, there is
always the possibility that these correlated events may be caused by a third factor that
is common to neighboring countries and that explains both the static similarity and the
through the interaction of domestic and foreign business partners and competitors. Although they do not
discuss the geographic implications of this assumption, one could expect this effect to be stronger at short
distances as suggested by Keller and Yeaple (2013) in the context of multinational corporations and their foreign
subsidiaries.
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time-lapsed pattern of adoption without there being a causal link between the two. We will
try to control, as best we can, for these alternative channels but we do not claim to have
ruled them out completely. We discuss this more in detail in the body of the paper.
Until now, the burgeoning literature on international knowledge diffusion has relied
on three main indicators to measure knowledge acquisition: patent citations (e.g. Jaffe et
al. 1993), patent output (e.g. Bottazzi & Peri, 2003; Branstetter, 2006) and changes in total
factor productivity (e.g. Coe & Helpman, 1995; Keller, 2002; Keller & Yeaple, 2009). One
contribution of this paper consists in bringing to the literature a more tangible measure
of knowledge acquisition: the ability of a country to achieve or improve its comparative
advantage in the export of goods.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss our sample and present
a set of stylized facts based on the static export similarity between countries. In Section 3
we study the dynamics of this process. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 presents
concluding remarks.
1.2 Data and Stylized Facts
1.2.1 Data
Data on exports in the period 1962-2000 comes from the World Trade Flows (WTF) Dataset
(Feenstra et al. 2005) and was extended until 2008 using data from the UN COMTRADE
website by Hausmann et. al. (2011). This data contains the total export value for 1005
products using the SITC 4-digit (rev. 2) classification.
We exclude countries with less than 1.2 million citizens and with total trade below
USD $1 billion in 2008. Also excluded are countries with poor data on exports such as
Iraq, Chad and Macau. This cut of the data accounts for 99% of World trade, 97% of
World total GDP and 95% of World population (Hausmann et al. 2011). We use time
varying national variables from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010). In
addition, we use data on conventionally measured factors of production (stock of physical
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capital, human capital and land) from UNCTAD (Shirotori et al. 2010). Bilateral data, such
as distance between the most populated cities, common continent or region, territorial
contiguity, common colonizer and colonizer-colony relationship, are from CEPII’s GeoDist
dataset (Mayer & Zignago, 2011).
In the static analysis, for which we use a cross-country data of the year 2000,3 the base
sample consists of 123 countries (7503 country pairs)4. For the dynamic analysis, the list of
countries is reduced to 100, given the exclusion of countries with no geographic neighbors
from the sample and those that belonged to the Former Soviet Union (FSU). We exclude
FSU countries from the dynamic analysis given that their data is non-existent prior to 1990
and sparse and scattered until 1995.
1.2.2 Exploring Static Similarity
As a descriptive exercise, we first study the correlation between geographic proximity and
the similarity in exports of countries. To do so, we measure the intensity with which a
country exports each product by computing its Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA)
(Balassa, 1965). The RCA that a country has in a product is defined as the ratio between
the share of total exports that the product represents in the country’s export basket and the
product’s share of global trade. For example, in the year 2000, "aircrafts (between 2 and
15 tons)" represented 4.5% of Brazil’s exports, but accounted only for 0.23% of total world
trade. Hence, Brazil’s RCA in aircrafts for that year was RCABRA,Aircra f ts = 4.5/0.23 = 19.56,
indicating that aircrafts are about 20 times more prevalent in Brazil’s export basket than in
that of the world. A product is over-represented in a country’s export basket if its RCA is
above 1. Formally, if expc,p is equal to the dollar exports of country c in product p, then the
RCA of country c in product p is defined as:
3We limit the analysis to one period (year 2000) in order to avoid artificially low standard errors given that
most variables that will be used in the static analysis are fixed in time.
4When we include data on factor endowments in our analysis, the dataset is limited to 105 countries.
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RCAc,p ≡
expc,p/∑p expc,p
∑c expc,p/∑c ∑p expc,p
(1.1)
To create a measure of similarity in the export structure of a pair of countries c and c’
we define the Export Similarity Index (Sc,c’) as the Pearson correlation between the logarithm
of the RCA vectors of the two countries. The Export Similarity Index is defined as:
Sc,c′ ≡
∑p(rc,p − r¯c)(rc′,p − r¯c′)√
∑p(rc,p − r¯c)2 ∑p(rc′,p − r¯c′)2
(1.2)
where rc,p = ln(RCAc,p + ε) and r¯c is the average of rc,p over all products for country
c. We chose a log form to prevent the correlation from being driven by the few products
that countries export with very high RCA and we add ε, defined as 0.1, to assign a value to
the zeroes, while also preventing the correlation being driven by similarities in the RCA of
products that countries export very little of or not at all5.
Sc,c’ is larger than zero for pairs of countries that tend to export a similar set of goods
with similar intensities, and negative for pairs of countries exporting different sets of goods.
This feature of our index differs from the Finger & Kreinin (F&K) Export Similarity Index
(Finger & Kreinin, 1979), which is calculated as the sum of the minimums of the export
shares of each pair of countries. We prefer our measure as it distinguishes between products
that are exported by one country and not the other from those that are exported by neither.
Also, we use RCA, which gives equal weights to all products, while the F&K measure
privileges products with large global markets. Nevertheless, our analysis is robust to using
the F&K similarity index and other variations of our own similarity index (see Section A.3.3
of the web appendix).
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for our base sample which contains bilateral
country-level data for the year 2000. Note that data on factor endowments is limited to
fewer countries.
5We test that our results are not driven by the choice of ε. See section A.3.1 of the web appendix for
robustness checks of this exercise using different values of ε for constructing Sc,c′ . Also, section A.3.2 of the web
appendix present robust results with an alternative Sc,c′ that does not require a log-transformation.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics (Year 2000)
Variable N Mean sd
Similarity Index 7503 0.169 0.137
Similarity Index (NPRB) 7503 0.148 0.132
Simple Distance (Km) 7503 7338.655 4389.738
Ln Simple Distance (Km) 7503 8.649 0.817
Share a Border 7503 0.025 0.155
Same Language 7503 0.103 0.305
Have/Had Colonial Relationship 7503 0.015 0.123
Common Colonizer 7503 0.062 0.241
Log Total Bilateral Trade (Imp + Exp) 7503 8.854 8.580
Abs. Dif. Ln GDP Per Capita (PPP) 7503 1.424 1.006
Abs. Dif. Ln Population 7503 1.572 1.211
Abs. Dif. Ln Pysical Capital Per Worker 5460 1.649 1.214
Abs. Dif. Ln Human Capital Per Worker 5460 0.446 0.369
Abs. Dif. Ln Land Per Worker 5460 0.609 0.728
Mean Within
N Mean Same Region
Same Region 7503 0.1501 -
East Asia 7503 0.0160 0.1066
Eastern Europe 7503 0.0400 0.2664
Western and Central Europe 7503 0.0181 0.1208
Latin America and Caribbean 7503 0.0253 0.1687
Middle East and North Africa 7503 0.0160 0.1066
North America 7503 0.0001 0.0009
South Asia 7503 0.0008 0.0053
Sub-Saharan Africa 7503 0.0337 0.2247
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Figure 1.1: Export Similarity Index (Year 2000)
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The left panel of the figure shows the histogram, with a fitted pdf, of the Export Similarity Index in year 2000
for All (not neighbors) Country Pairs, and for Neighbors Pairs only. The right panel shows the average Export
Similarity Index for country pairs in each bracket of distance between 250 km. to 5000 km.
The left panel of Figure 1.1 contains histograms for the Export Similarity (Sc,c’ ) in year
2000 for neighboring countries (unfilled) to all other country pairs (filled). The continuous
lines are empirically fitted probability distribution functions for the two samples based on
the histograms. The figure shows that countries sharing a border have export baskets that
are, on average, twice as similar as pairs of countries that do not share a border. The average
Sc,c′ for border sharing geographic neighbors (i.e. share a border) is 0.40, compared to 0.16
for non-neighbors6. In the right panel of the same figure, we show that export similarity
decays exponentially with distance.
Export similarity, however, can be the consequence of shared geology or climate, which
6This difference in means is statistically significant, with t=−24.16.
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Table 1.2: Lall Classification
Lall Classification # Products
Gold 1
Primary Products 193
Resource Based Manufactures 1 (agro-based products) 130
Resource Based Manufactures 2 (others non-agro based products) 108
Low Technology Manufacture 1 (textiles, garments and footwear) 100
Low Technology Manufacture 2 (others) 97
Medium Technology Manufacture 1 (automotive) 15
Medium Technology Manufacture 2 (process) 109
Medium Technology Manufacture 3 (engineering) 135
High Technology Manufacture 1 (electronic and electrical) 49
High Technology Manufacture (others) 34
Special 12
Unclassified 22
is more likely to be the case for geographic neighbors. To control for this fact, we exclude
products from the sample that are confined by geography. We do this by using the tech-
nological classification suggested by Lall (2000) that divides products into the categories
presented in Table 1.2.
Lall’s classification is used to create two categories of products: Primary and Resource
Based (PRB) products and Non-Primary or Non-Resource Based (NPRB) products. We
consider PRB products as those that are classified as Gold, Primary Products and Resource
Based Manufactures (categories 1 thru 4 in Table 1.2), whereas NPRB products are those
contained in all other categories.
Figure 1.2 reproduces Figure 1.1 using NPRB products only. In this case, the mean
Export Similarity Index of neighboring country-pairs is also significantly larger than in
the non-neighbors sample of country-pairs7, and the negative relationship between export
similarity and geographical distance is equally strong, suggesting that the observed export
similarity among neighbors is not driven solely by primary and resource based products.
We include more controls in this analysis next.
7The difference in means between neighbors and non-neighbors is statistically different with t = −26.38.
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Figure 1.2: Export Similarity Index NPRB Products (Year 2000)
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The left panel of the figure shows the distribution (in year 2000) of the Export Similarity Index for All (not
neighbors) Country Pairs, and for Neighbors Pairs only. The right panel shows the average Export Similarity
Index for country pairs in each bracket of distance between 250 km to 5000 km. This figure uses the Export
Similarity Index for NPRB Products only.
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1.2.3 The Correlates of Export Similarity
The fact that, beyond geology and climate, export similarity decays with distance could
be due to a number of different reasons. We study the correlates of the Export Similarity
Index through an adapted “gravity model” (Zipf, 1946; Tinbergen, 1963). We do so in order
to understand whether the role of geographic proximity is actually driven by similarity in
other dimensions such as income, size, factor endowments, institutions and culture, among
others. Our adapted gravity model follows the functional form:
Sc,c′ = α+ β× dc,c′ + zc,c′γ+ lc,c′θ + bc,c′δ+ µc + µc′ + εc,c′ (1.3)
where dc,c’ is the distance between countries c and c’ (in logs), zc,c’ is a set of two
binary variables related to geographical closeness between c and c’: sharing a border and
being in the same geographical region (i.e. continent). lc,c′ is a set of binary variables
representing cultural and institutional closeness between c and c’, which include speaking a
common official language, having had the same colonizer or having had a colony-colonizer
relationship. bc,c′ is a set of continuous regressors which measure differentials in quantifiable
attributes between countries c and c’ such as gaps in income per capita, population and
factor endowments. bc,c′ also includes total bilateral trade (imports plus exports) between
each pair of countries. Finally, µc and µc′ are country dummies capturing any individual
country characteristic for countries c and c’ respectively (analogous to the multilateral
resistance dummies from Anderson and Van Wincoop (2001)). εc,c′ represents the error term.
The results of this regression are presented in table 1.3. For easier interpretative purposes,
we use a normalized version of Sc,c′ as the dependent variable, with mean zero and unit
standard deviation.
The first three columns of table 1.3 correspond to the results with the (normalized)
Export Similarity Index computed with all products, while the last three columns uses a
version of the Export Similarity Index computed with NPRB products only. The base dataset
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contains 123 countries, which sum up to 7503 unique country pairs in year 20008. Columns
3 and 6 include factor endowments data, which reduces the sample to 5460 unique country
pairs (105 countries).
Column 1 shows a negative correlation between similarity in exports and distance: the
estimated coefficient implies that a pair of countries separated by twice the average distance
are expected to have a similarity index that is 0.55 standard deviations below the mean.
Column 4 repeats the same equation using only NPRB products and finds a slightly higher
coefficient, with similarity declining in 0.59 standard deviations from the mean. This result
is always robust to the several tests we run in section A.3 of the web appendix. Columns 2
and 5 include two variables that represent alternative measures of geographic proximity and
are highly correlated with distance: sharing a border and being in the same region. Sharing
a border is associated with an export similarity index that is, on average, 0.8 standard
deviations above the mean for all products and 0.9 for NPRB goods. We can add to this
another 0.4 or 0.35 standard deviations respectively if the two countries are in the same
geographical region. This means that we could expect neighboring countries in the same
region to have, on average, a similarity index roughly 1.2 standard deviations above the
mean relative to non-neighbors from different regions for all goods and 1.25 for NPRB
products—this does not take into account the fact that neighbors are a shorter distance apart
than the average pair of countries. These variables are always strongly significant in all our
robustness checks. This motivates our use of neighboring countries in our dynamic analysis
in the next section.
In columns 3 and 6 we include a full set of other controls. These reduce the coefficient
on the three distance variables by about a third, although they remain strongly significant
in all robustness checks. Coefficients for same language, and colonial relationship are not
statistically significant when other controls are included. The table also shows that, as
expected, differences in income levels, size and factor endowments are associated with
lower levels of similarity in exports. Total bilateral trade is also negatively associated with
8 123×122
2 .
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similarity in exports: countries that trade more among themselves are less similar in their
export baskets, as would be expected.
These figures suggest that geographic neighbors have similar export baskets, even when
accounting for country fixed effects, common characteristics on culture and institutions
(through the inclusion of data on colonial history and language), trade between them and
differences in their income, populations and factor endowments. The measures of difference
in factor endowments (physical capital, human capital and land) have the negative coefficient
that would be expected from a Hecksher-Ohlin (HO) model, but they do not crowd out the
economic or statistical significance of the geography regressors.
The similarity of the results between the three first columns and the last three columns
of Table 1.3, which use as the dependent variable the (normalized) NPRB Export Similarity
Index, suggests that climate and geology are not the central players in the impact of
geographic proximity on export similarity.
However, the similarity in the composition of NPRB exports among neighbors might
be driven by other factors, such as similarity in preferences. Following the Linder Trade
Hypothesis (Linder, 1961), countries with similar preferences and hence demand structure,
are likely to trade more, which in a Helpman-Krugman interpretation is due to the fact that
they enjoy different varieties of similar products (Helpman & Krugman, 1985). Moreover,
in a world with integrated supply chains, the similarity in exports could be a result of
neighboring countries trading inputs that are classified in the data in the same category as
the outputs themselves. Since neighbors trade more intensively, then similarity in bilateral
trade may be driving our results. We check for this by comparing the similarity index Sc,c′
of the bilateral exports of neighbors with the similarity index of their exports to the rest of
the world. To do this, we construct a similarity index for each pair of countries based on
bilateral exports between each pair of countries, and a similarity index based on each pair’s
exports compared to the rest of the world (excluding the bilateral exports). Figure 1.3 plots
the two measures using data from 2000 and neighboring country pairs only. As Figure 1.3
shows, neighbors are remarkably more similar in terms of what they export to the rest of
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Figure 1.3: Neighbor Similarity (on bilateral exports vis-á-vis ROW exports)
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This figure uses data from year 2000. It shows a scatterplot, where every observation is a country-pair. The
horizontal axis measures the Similarity Index on Rest-of-the-World Exports (a measure of how similar a pair
of countries is in terms of their exports to the rest of the world, excluding bilateral exports). The vertical axis
measures the Similarity Index on Bilateral Exports (a measure of how similar a pair of countries is in terms of
their bilateral exports to each other).
the world than what they trade between themselves. This implies that export similarity is
not driven by the composition of bilateral trade between neighbors.
An alternative exercise to explore this point consists of repeating the estimation of model
(1.3), using the similarity index of their exports to the rest of the world as the dependent
variable. The result is presented in Table 1.4. The relationship with distance—taken to mean
sharing a border and being in the same region—holds when considering only exports to
the rest of the world as the basis for similarity between all pairs of countries. Moreover, the
last column on this table includes the bilateral similarity index as a regressor, although its
inclusion does not qualitatively change the results. Section A.2 in the appendix presents
further analysis.
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Table 1.4: Correlates of the ROW Export Similarity Index (Year 2000)
ROW ROW ROW ROW
Ln Simple Distance (Km) -0.5863 -0.3664 -0.3593 -0.3325
(0.018)*** (0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)***
Share a Border 0.9325 0.8089 0.6868
(0.093)*** (0.096)*** (0.091)***
Same Region 0.3390 0.0906 0.0949
(0.041)*** (0.048)* (0.046)**
Same Language 0.0755 0.0869
(0.046) (0.045)*
Have/Had Colonial Relationship 0.1095 0.0929
(0.097) (0.089)
Common Colonizer -0.0422 -0.0251
(0.054) (0.053)
Abs. Dif. Ln GDP Per Capita (PPP) -0.3214 -0.2985
(0.028)*** (0.027)***
Abs. Dif. Ln Population -0.0655 -0.0730
(0.012)*** (0.012)***
Log Total Bilateral Trade (Imp + Exp) -0.0215 -0.0216
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
Abs. Dif. Ln Pysical Capital Per Worker -0.0253 -0.0284
(0.025) (0.025)
Abs. Dif. Ln Human Capital Per Worker -0.3472 -0.3400
(0.050)*** (0.049)***
Abs. Dif. Ln Land Per Worker -0.2991 -0.2831
(0.036)*** (0.035)***
Bilateral Exp. Sim. Index (standardized) 0.1397
(0.016)***
N 7260 7260 5356 5356
r2 0.33 0.35 0.47 0.49
The dependent variable in this table is the normalized Export Similarity Index, based on exports to the rest of
the world, with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Columns 1-3 estimates model (1.3) with the Export
Similarity Index computed using all products.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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In sum, even when we look at NPRB products and we exclude bilateral trade, geographic
proximity plays a role in explaining export similarity. This is a puzzle not easily explained
by traditional frameworks that predict greater differentiation among countries that face
lower transportation costs (i.e. shorter distances). In the next section, we turn our attention
to the dynamics underlying this process.
1.3 Dynamics of Export Similarity
The previous section established that neighbors have more similar NPRB export baskets, even
after controlling for similarities in size, income levels, cultural and institutional measures,
factor endowments and taste. Is this a static bequest of history or the consequence of a
dynamic process presently active?
To explore this issue, we use a dynamic analysis to study the role neighbors play in
the ability of countries to add a particular good to their export basket or to expand their
comparative advantage in a product. We start by discussing the extensive margin. More
specifically, we study the probability that a country will add a product to its export basket in
period T (i.e. "jump" to the product) if it has at least one neighbor that is already exporting
that product in period t (with T > t). For this task, we use the dataset described in Section
1.2.1, with 100 countries9. We divide our sample into four periods: 1970-1980, 1980-1990,
1990-2000 and 2001-200810. For each period, we eliminate all products that were not exported
by any country and all countries that did not export any product. The total number of
countries in the dataset is 100, and the total number of products is 777.
We define a "jump" as a tenfold or more increase in the RCA of country c in product
p, from RCAc,p ≤ 0.1 to RCAc,p ≥ 1 within a ten year period11. This setting allows us
9Since our main focus will be on geographic neighbors, we eliminate all islands. Also, given that this is a
dynamic setting, we eliminate all Former Soviet Union countries, because their export data is non-existent prior
to 1990 and sparse and scattered until 1995.
10Since the original Feenstra data runs up to year 2000, and since 2001 and on was extended by the authors,
we prefer to start the last period in 2001 to avoid discrepancies in the data.
11With the exception of our last period which is seven years long (2001-2008)
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to explore the extensive margin of exports. We are interested in studying the probability
of a product being exported in the next period, given that it was not being exported (or
exported only in very small quantities) at the beginning of the current period. Furthermore,
we are interested in products that achieve an RCA above 1, implying significant gains in
comparative advantage and increases in its share of world trade12.
To avoid noise, we restrict jumps to two conditions: first, a jump needs to keep RCA
above 1 for four years after the end of the period, year T (the forward condition); second,
we restrict jumps to products that had an RCA below 0.1 for two years before the beginning
of the period (the backward condition)13. These two conditions help rule out the possibility
of “temporary jumps” in the data driven by noise, errors, shocks in commodity prices or
other exogenous reasons14.
Table 1.5 presents the ten NPRB and PRB products with the largest frequency of "jumps"
in our dataset. For instance, the NPRB product with the largest number of appearances in
the data (i.e. with RCA going from less than 0.1 to above 1 in ten years) is SITC 8441 (men’s
undershirts), in the period 1980-1990. SITC 8441 had 6 occurrences (denoted by O) out of
the 74 countries that had an RCA<0.1 in 1980 (denoted by B) . This means that 8% of the
eligible countries acquired RCA>1 for SITC 8441 over that period (denoted by P). Seven
out of the top ten products for the NPRB categories are garments and textiles in the period
1980-1990.
Table 1.6 presents the ten countries with the largest number of product appearances
in our dataset, classified by NPRB and PRB products. When looking at the ranking based
on NPRB products, all countries in the list are developing countries, besides Germany,
mostly located in Southeast Asia. China, at the top of the list, added 17 NPRB products
to its export basket in the period 1980-1990, or 7% of the 234 products that, at the time,
12In section A.5 of the web appendix we replicate the results using different thresholds to test robustness.
We present results by defining jumps as achieving an RCAc,p ≥ 2 and an RCAc,p ≥ 5.
13In section A.5 of the web appendix we present robustness checks that limit the sample to observations for
which RCA is equal to zero at the beginning of the period.
14For the last period (2001-2008) we eliminate the forward condition due to data limitations.
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Table 1.5: Frequency of Jumps by Product
SITC4 Product Name Period O B P
NPRB Products
8441 Men’s undershirt 1980-1990 6 74 0.08
8439 Other women outerwear 1980-1990 5 70 0.07
6781 Iron pipes 2001-2008 5 60 0.08
5913 Herbicides 1980-1990 4 83 0.05
5721 Prepared explosives 2001-2008 4 43 0.09
6521 Unbleached cotton woven fabrics 1980-1990 4 40 0.10
8459 Other knitted outerwear 1980-1990 4 64 0.06
8423 Men’s trousers 1980-1990 4 65 0.06
8452 Knitted women’s suits & dresses 1980-1990 4 72 0.06
8442 Men’s underwear 1980-1990 4 83 0.05
PRB Products
812 Bran, sharps & other cereal residues 1990-2000 5 58 0.09
342 Frozen fish, excluding fillets 1980-1990 4 72 0.06
3415 Coal & water gases 2001-2008 4 73 0.05
3344 1980-1990 4 33 0.12
611 Raw sugar beet & cane 1980-1990 4 66 0.06
9710 Gold, non-monetary 2001-2008 4 40 0.10
723 Cocoa butter & paste 1970-1980 3 72 0.04
344 Frozen fish fillets 1990-2000 3 49 0.06
3510 Electric current 2001-2008 3 61 0.05
6861 Unwrought zinc & alloys 2001-2008 3 70 0.04
This table presents statistics on the SITC4 products with the largest amount of "jumps" in the data.
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Table 1.6: Frequency of Jumps by Country
ISO3 Period O B P
NPRB Products
China 1980-1990 17 234 0.07
Germany 1990-2000 13 111 0.12
Malaysia 1980-1990 11 307 0.04
Syrian Arab Republic 2001-2008 11 315 0.03
Bangladesh 1980-1990 11 382 0.03
Vietnam 1990-2000 11 364 0.03
Tanzania 2001-2008 10 358 0.03
Cambodia 1990-2000 10 422 0.02
Lao PDR 1990-2000 9 412 0.02
Guatemala 1980-1990 9 331 0.03
PRB Products
Germany 1990-2000 25 236 0.11
Syrian Arab Republic 2001-2008 12 251 0.05
Tanzania 2001-2008 11 208 0.05
Mozambique 2001-2008 9 258 0.03
Malawi 2001-2008 8 268 0.03
Lao PDR 2001-2008 8 287 0.03
Botswana 2001-2008 8 304 0.03
Namibia 2001-2008 8 211 0.04
Turkey 1970-1980 7 199 0.04
Uruguay 2001-2008 7 207 0.03
This table presents statistics on the countries with the largest amount of "jumps" in the data.
were being exported with an RCA below 0.1. The bottom list, based on PRB products,
shows the repeated appearance of many countries from the top list, but also includes many
African countries. The presence of Germany in the list is surprising, given that it is the only
developed country that appears. However, its high ranking in the period 1990-2000 mgiht
well be due to classification errors associated with the reunification of the country 15.
To test our hypothesis regarding the importance of the RCA of neighbors in the evolution
of the extensive margin of exports, we estimate the following empirical specification:
Jc,p,t→T = α+ βln(RCAcN ,p,t) + controlsc,p,t + ϕp,t + µc,cN ,t + εc,p,t (1.4)
15To avoid this classification problem we have removed all former Soviet Union countries from the data.
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where Jc,p,t→T is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when there was a “jump”
between year t and T in product p and country c. The variable of interest, ln(RCAcN ,p,t),
is the natural logarithm of the RCA of the neighbor with the largest RCA in product p
for country of c (we name this neighbor cN). We also include a set of control variables at
the country-product level. This includes the baseline RCA of country c in product p to
account for differences in the probability of future exports for products that were larger at
the beginning of the period. We also include the average annual growth rate of the RCA in
the previous ten year period in order to control for parallel trends in comparative advantage
for neighboring countries16. To correct for undefined growth rates caused by zeros in the
denominator, we compute the growth rate using RCA+0.1 for all observations, thus pairing
down the rate of growth for very low RCA products. To control for our own correction,
we also add a dummy variable indicating whether the RCA was zero at the initial year of
the computed growth rate used in the right hand side of the specifications, which are the
observations more likely to be distorted. We also control for the “density” of the country
in the product at the beginning of the period. The variable “density”, which distributes
between 0 and 1, was developed by Hausmann and Klinger (2006) and used in Hidalgo
et. al. (2007). It measures the intensity with which a country exports products that are
strongly co-exported by other countries who also export the product under consideration.
In other words, the density of a product proxies for the existence of other exports that
share similar technologies or inputs (as measured by their co-occurrence across countries).
Density strongly affects the likelihood that a country adds the product to its export basket
(Hausmann & Klinger, 2007; C. A. Hidalgo et al. 2007). We use density to control for
the likelihood that a country would jump to a product given the initial composition of
its export basket17. ϕp,t are product-year fixed effects which control for any time-varying
product characteristic such as global demand, price or productivity shocks, particular to
16For the first period 1970-1980 we used the previous eight year average annual growth rate (1962-1970) due
to data limitations.
17All results are robust to the exclusion of this variable. In fact, the inclusion of this variable reduces the size
of our estimator of interest.
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product p. µc,cN ,t are country-neighbor-year fixed effects, which use the neighbor with
the largest RCA in that product. By adding µc,cN ,t we control for time-varying country-
neighbor aggregate characteristics such as similarity in institutions, geography, climate,
culture, history, productivity, economic development, population, initial factor endowments,
inflation, bilateral exchange rates, etc. 18.
Following the seminal work of Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), we created a
control group for our sample in order to test the economic significance of our results. In the
control dataset we replace a country’s real neighbors with an equal number of randomly
chosen countries. For instance, if South Africa has four neighbors: Botswana, Mozambique,
Namibia and Zimbabwe, in our randomization, South Africa will still have four neighbors,
but these are chosen randomly. We iterate this randomization 500 times, and average the
largest RCA in the neighborhood of each country for every product across all iterations.
We compare the results of our dataset with those achieved using the control dataset. We
expect that, if neighbors play a role in determining the ability of a country to become more
productive in a good, the magnitude of β will be larger in the estimation using the real
dataset than when using the control dataset. Our randomizations yield similar means for
the RCA of neighbors in the overall sample.
Table 1.7 shows the summary statistics of the data used for this exercise, in which each
observation is at the country-product-period level. Our sample includes only observations
which are “eligible to jump”, that is, all observations in our dataset for which RCAc,p,t ≤ 0.1
at the beginning of the period. Our sample has almost 175,000 observations when using
all products, and around 90,000 when restricting the sample to NPRB products only. The
left-hand side variable in our specifications is "New Product (10 years)", which has a mean
value of 0.015 in the overall sample (or 0.016 in the sample restricted to NPRB products).
18In robustness tests we added as a control the total bilateral imports of product p from country c’ at time
t, to study whether the likelihood of jumping is partly explained by importing that same good. The variable
added very little to the specifications, and in most cases was not significant (though with a negative sign: the
more you import from that good the less likely you are to export it). Given its poor performance, and the fact
that determining the channels behind the results is out of the scope of this paper, we decided to exclude that
variable from our controls.
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Table 1.7: Summary Statistics Dynamics of Export Similarity (1970-2008)
All NPRB
Variable N Mean sd N Mean sd
New Product (10 Years) 173433 0.015 0.123 90811 0.016 0.125
Baseline Ln RCA 173433 -2.227 0.157 90811 -2.224 0.159
Baseline Density 173433 0.087 0.087 90811 0.073 0.077
Growth Rate RCA 173433 3.105 9.873 90811 3.171 9.408
Zero RCA 173433 0.650 0.477 90811 0.631 0.483
Baseline bilateral imports (p) 173433 0.827 2.215 90811 0.829 2.190
Max RCA Neighbors 173433 2.290 31.057 90811 0.814 4.643
Ln Max RCA Neighbors 173433 -1.256 1.436 90811 -1.397 1.228
Neighbor Exports 173433 0.172 0.377 90811 0.137 0.344
That is, the unconditional probability of "jumping" is 1.5% (or 1.6% for NPRB products only).
In the right-hand side, there are two variables of interest that we will use interchangeably.
First, the continuous variable "Ln Maximum RCA [of] Neighbors", which is the natural
logarithm of RCAcN ,p,t (being cN the neighbor of c with the largest RCA for each product p
in time t). Second, the binary variable "Neighbor Exports", which is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if the country has a neighbor with RCAcN ,p,t ≥ 1 in that product.
Our results are presented in Table 1.8. Panel A estimates the model (1.4) with the "Ln
Maximum RCA [of] Neighbors" variable as the regressor of interest, while Panel B estimates
the same model with the “Neighbor Exports” binary variable. The first two columns in
both panels present the results from our original sample. The last two columns in both
panels use the control sample with randomly assigned neighbors—as previously explained.
Our variables of interests, in both their continuous and binary form, are economically and
statistically significant in columns 1 and 2 (which estimate the model with the real sample)
and neither economically nor statistically significant in columns 3 and 4 (using the control
sample). The economic significance of this result is the following: a doubling in the export
intensity of a product by a geographic neighbor (i.e. RCA) at the beginning of the period is
associated, on average,with a 0.4 percentage points increase in the likelihood of a country
adding that product to its export basket. This is roughly a 25% increase (based on the
unconditional probability of “jumping” of 1.5%). Panel B of Table 1.8 estimates that if
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a country has one neighbor who already exports product p with an RCA above 1 at the
beginning of the period, then the chance that the country “jumps” to that product increases
by 1 percentage point. This represents an increase of roughly 65% for the average product
in the probability of “jumping” (from 1.5% to 2.5%) 19.
We look now at the intensive margin of trade, asking whether having neighbors with
higher RCA in the initial year is associated with faster growth in RCA in the next period.
Table 1.9 replaces the dependent variable of specification (1.4) with the compound average
annual growth rate of RCA for the same time periods as before. In this exercise we use all
the observations in the dataset without the low RCA restriction we used for the extensive
margin. The intention is to estimate future growth in exports for a particular product in
which a geographic neighbor has revealed comparative advantage, instead of focusing on
new appearances. The main difference between the two approaches is that, by looking at
the intensive margin, we include products that are already being exported by the country
under consideration, and do not limit the sample to non-exported products.
The results in Table 1.9 are organized in the same way as those in Table 1.8. The upper
panel estimates the model using the "Ln Maximum RCA [of] Neighbors" variable as the
regressor of interest, while the lower panel estimates the same model with the “Neighbor
Exports” binary variable. The results in Panel A show a strong positive association between
a country’s increase in future product RCA growth and the highest RCA of a neighboring
country in that product at the beginning of the period. Panel B shows that having a neighbor
with RCA>1 is associated with a future annual growth of RCA of 1.5%-1.7% for that product
in the next ten year period (or 16 - 18% cumulative). Table A.8 in section A.5 of the web
appendix shows that this result is robust to the use of export growth as the dependent
variable, rather than RCA growth.
We repeat this analysis for different regions, periods and types of products, to understand
whether there are differential effects across any of these dimensions. That is, we are
19See section A.5 of the web appendix for a number of robustness checks of these results, varying the
definition of the LHS variable, the method, the sample used and the dataset. All tests show full robustness with
the results presented here.
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Table 1.8: Dynamics of Exports Similarity
Panel A: Continous Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Ln Max RCA Neighbors 0.0037 0.0040 -0.0019 -0.0060
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.003) (0.007)
Baseline Ln RCA 0.0073 -0.0035 0.0091 -0.0042
(0.004)** (0.005) (0.004)** (0.006)
Baseline Density 0.1302 0.2266 0.1557 0.2536
(0.034)*** (0.076)*** (0.033)*** (0.075)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.0062 0.0078 0.0056 0.0073
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)***
N 173433 90811 173433 90811
r2 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11
Panel B: Binary Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Neighbor Exports 0.0106 0.0103 0.0008 -0.0002
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.002)
Baseline Ln RCA 0.0082 -0.0029 0.0091 -0.0042
(0.004)** (0.005) (0.004)** (0.006)
Baseline Density 0.1389 0.2343 0.1555 0.2523
(0.034)*** (0.076)*** (0.033)*** (0.075)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.0060 0.0077 0.0056 0.0072
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)***
N 173433 90811 173433 90811
r2 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.11
Panel A uses the maximum RCA among all geographic neighbors of a country for a
particular product, in natural logarithm, as the independent variable. Panel B uses a
dummy variable which takes the value 1 if at least one of the neighbors of a country have
an RCA above 1 in the product under consideration. The control group uses a generated
dataset in which neighbors are randomly assigned to countries, keeping constant the
ammount of neighbors per country. All regressions include country-neighbor-by-year and
product-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-neighbor level.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Dynamics of Exports Similarity (RCA Growth)
Panel A: Continous Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Ln Max RCA Neighbors 0.7334 0.7113 -0.7788 -0.4180
(0.045)*** (0.069)*** (0.383)** (0.586)
Baseline Ln RCA -3.9685 -5.0351 -3.8515 -4.9510
(0.113)*** (0.186)*** (0.119)*** (0.191)***
Baseline Density 23.0227 29.3487 28.1252 33.7179
(2.444)*** (3.740)*** (2.731)*** (3.817)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0381 -0.0002 -0.0397 -0.0010
(0.007)*** (0.012) (0.008)*** (0.013)
Zero RCA (t-1) -1.0230 -0.7455 -1.1853 -0.8229
(0.133)*** (0.183)*** (0.142)*** (0.197)***
N 262017 136929 262017 136929
r2 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.25
Panel B: Binary Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Neighbor Exports 1.7851 1.5242 0.0092 0.1153
(0.119)*** (0.160)*** (0.112) (0.139)
Baseline Ln RCA -3.8980 -4.9979 -3.8311 -4.9397
(0.112)*** (0.186)*** (0.116)*** (0.189)***
Baseline Density 24.2354 30.3715 28.0300 33.6793
(2.451)*** (3.715)*** (2.739)*** (3.819)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0387 0.0001 -0.0395 -0.0009
(0.007)*** (0.012) (0.008)*** (0.013)
Zero RCA (t-1) -1.1038 -0.7782 -1.1845 -0.8211
(0.132)*** (0.183)*** (0.142)*** (0.197)***
N 262017 136929 262017 136929
r2 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.25
This table presents results using the Compound Average Annual Growth for RCA in
the next period as the dependent variable. Panel A uses the maximum RCA among all
geographic neighbors of a country for a particular product, in natural logarithm, as the
independent variable. Panel B uses a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if at least
one of the neighbors of a country have an RCA above 1 in the product under consideration.
The control group uses a generated dataset in which neighbors are randomly assigned to
countries, keeping constant the ammount of neighbors per country. All regressions include
country-neighbor-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the country-neighbor level.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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interested in understanding which set of observations in the sample are driving the observed
results. Table 1.10 summarizes this exercise by presenting results for a different cut of the
data in each row.
The left panel of Table 1.10 uses the maximum log RCA of neighboring countries, and
the right panel uses the dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a country has a neighbor
with RCA>1 in that product (at the beginning of the period). The left and right panels are
analogous to the upper and lower panels of Tables 1.8-1.9 respectively. For instance, the first
row considers all observations eligible to “jump” (i.e. with a baseline RCA below 0.1). Of
these, 2.52% achieved an RCA above 1 in the following ten years if they had a neighbor with
an RCA in that same product in the top 25% of the distribution. The same number drops to
1.2% if the best neighboring exporter had an RCA in the bottom 75% of the distribution. The
ratio of these two numbers indicates that the first group was 2.1 times more likely to “jump”.
The table also presents the 95% confidence interval for the estimate of the coefficient on the
neighbor RCA variable in model (1.4). The first row is analogous to the results presented in
Table 1.8, but every row recalculates the coefficient for each cut of the data.
From Table 1.10 we find that our results are in fact dominated mostly by developing
countries, given that, both in the left and right panel, the estimator for β is statistically
significant only for non OECD countries. When we divide the world into regions we see the
same pattern. The “neighbor effect” is statistically significant for East Asia & the Pacific,
Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, in both specifications.
When we look at different time periods, the confidence intervals of both panels show
that the estimated coefficients are significant and stable across all periods.
Finally, we divide the sample into ten product groups based on the first digit SITC
code. For all product categories the odds ratios are above 1.5 and often above 2, but the
95% confidence intervals for β are statistically significant in crude materials, food and live
animals, minerals fuels and several manufacturing categories.
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1.4 Interpretation of the results
As was argued in the introduction, literature on knowledge diffusion documents the rapid
deterioration of knowledge with distance. If this assertion is true, neighboring countries
should share knowledge than more distant countries. If product-specific knowledge is a
fundamental component of product-level productivity, then a Ricardian model of trade
would predict that knowledge similarity between neighbors should correlate with similarity
in the patterns of comparative advantage, and that this similarity should decay with distance.
Our results are compatible with this logic. In fact, our results are what the literature on
knowledge diffusion would predict regarding the geographic evolution of both the extensive
and the intensive margins of trade. In order to become globally competitive in a new
product, or to improve its productivity in an existing product, a country’s firms would have
to acquire the relevant knowledge. If there are significant obstacles to the geographic spread
of that knowledge, products whose technology exists nearby will be favored.
Our static results show just this: neighboring countries have very similar export baskets,
even when only looking only at goods not pinned down by geology or climate (NPRB)
and after taking into account similarities in income, factor endowments, common language
and history and a set of other controls. The estimated effects are large: considering only
NPRB products, sharing a region and a border makes a pair of countries between 1.3 and 2
standard deviations more similar. These results are not driven by bilateral trade, limiting
the explanatory power of interpretations based on similarity of demand.
By the same token, the diffusion of knowledge over time implies that knowledge
acquisition would occur preferentially in countries with neighbors in possession of that
knowledge. Our dynamic product-level results document that countries preferentially
become good at the products that their neighbors are already good at, both in the extensive
as well as in the intensive margin. This occurs even after controlling for product-year
fixed effects, which capture any product specific global demand or supply shock, and
after controlling for country-neighbor-year fixed effects, which control for any time-varying
similarity in aggregate bilateral characteristics.
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While our observations are what would be expected in a world where knowledge
diffusion decays strongly with distance, our results could be driven by factors other than
knowledge diffusion. The documented similarity of dynamics in the evolution of export
baskets between neighbors could be influenced by a common third factor that expresses
itself in the region, albeit not simultaneously—there could be both supply or demand stories.
On the supply side, for instance, countries may be on a similar development trajectory,
moving—for instance—from agriculture to light manufactures and into more complex
products, although one country is ahead of the other. Consequently, neighboring countries
become good at the same products, but with a time lag. We try to control for this with the
highly significant density variable—which captures a country’s own predisposition to move
into that product—and by the lagged growth rate of the product’s exports in the country.
On the demand side, countries could have similar preferences, but slightly different
levels of income. As they both become richer, they would express those preferences in
similar goods, but in a time-lagged fashion. This Linder-inspired hypothesis would be
more plausible if bilateral trade was an important component of the similarity between
countries. However, as we have shown, this is not the case: countries are much more similar
in what they export to third countries than in what they trade between themselves, while
neighboring countries that trade more intensely are less similar than those that do not.
In spite of our extensive list of controls—density, product-year and country-neighbor-
year fixed effects, initial RCA and lagged growth in RCA—it is difficult to be cerain that the
correlations we document are not caused by some other common third factor that would
explain the time-lagged appearance of products in neighboring countries and the dynamic
geographic patterns of comparative advantage. Any attempt at control is never perfect. But
the results we obtain are what we expect from the hypothesis—amply documented in the
literature—that knowledge diffusion decays very rapidly with distance.
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1.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has established that neighboring countries are very similar in their patterns of
comparative advantage, a similarity that decays with distance. In a classical Heckscher-
Ohlin model, this would reflect the similarity in factor endowments. But, after taking into
account a large set of controls, including similarity in incomes, sizes, conventional factor
endowments, culture and institutions, among others, and after excluding goods not pinned
down by geology or climate, the resemblance in the composition of the export baskets of
neighboring countries remains very strong. The factors causing the similarity we document
go beyond the classical ones: physical capital, human capital, labor and land, including
geology and climate.
Moreover, the similarity we document is not obvious—higher intensity trade at short
distances should incentivize neighboring countries to specialize in different rather than in
similar goods. In fact, our static results show that there is a negative correlation between
bilateral trade intensity and export similarity.
To make these observations compatible with a Ricardian model of trade, something
must cause a spatial correlation in the patterns of product-level productivity. Knowledge
diffusion is a potential candidate, given that previous research has documented its very
localized character.
This paper leaves open the question of what are the mechanisms behind the dynamic
similarity we document. Future research should be able to elucidate this. Clearly, trade,
foreign direct investment and migration are three prime suspects. On the trade front, Coe
and Helpman (1995) and Coe et. al. (2009) document that imports-weighted foreign R&D
investment at the aggregate level are correlated with total factor productivity growth. But
these results are not enough per se to account for our observations: we require product-level
similarity in productivity, not an aggregate one, and we require an interaction that decays
more rapidly with distance than imports, since imports tend to have a much longer diffusion
range than knowledge. Alvarez et. al. (2012) posit that the human interaction that occurs
through trade causes knowledge spillovers. If this is so, knowledge would be translated in
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a coevolution of comparative advantage trends fueled by the transferability of knowledge
from one to the another. Whether this occurs at the product level and what its geographic
range is remains to be studied.
Foreign direct investment is also a potential channel. Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee
(1998) document aggregate effects of FDI on growth. Aitken and Harrison (1999), using
plant level data, find limited spillovers from foreign to domestic firms in the same industry
using Venezuelan data. Haskel et. al. (2007) find more significant spillovers using data
on UK manufacturing plants. Branstetter (2006) finds evidence of spillovers between the
foreign direct investment of Japanese firms and US firms. Javorcik (2004) finds evidence
of an impact of FDI on the productivity of local upstream suppliers, using Lithuanian
data. Keller & Yeaple (2009) find strong evidence of inward FDI on the productivity of
US firms, especially in high-tech industries. Moreover, the literature on FDI using gravity
equations (Loungani et. al. 2002; Portes and Rey, 2005; Stein and Daude, 2007) consistently
shows a high elasticity of FDI with respect to distance and a strong additional border effect.
However, it remains to be seen what FDI contributes to the evidence on export similarity we
document in this paper.
Labor flows or migration could also be a channel for knowledge spillovers. If knowledge
resides in brains, it should move with them. If direct human interaction is key to knowledge
spillovers, as suggested by much of the literature quoted above, then people could be an
important source of knowledge transmission. For instance, Andersen and Dalgaard (2011)
show how the ease of travel can explain shifts in aggregate productivity. Other forms
of human interaction may also be involved, including the ease of physical and electronic
communication, as well as international ethnic/cultural links (e.g. Stein and Daude, 2007;
Giroud, 2012; Kerr, 2008). Whether these effects significantly contribute to the observed
product-level geographic correlations remains to be shown.
In this context, one contribution of this paper is that it proposes a new observable
with which to track knowledge diffusion: the export basket of countries. The comparative
advantage of countries evolves as they absorb new technologies. Absorption of product-
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specific knowledge increases the productivity with which a product can be made, inducing
more exports. In this paper we use this logic to provide additional evidence of the short
range of knowledge diffusion that has been reported using other observables, such as total
factor productivity, patent citations or patent productivity. But the use of this observable
opens up new areas of research in a field that has been hampered by effective measures.
Using export similarity it should be possible to study the impact of trade, FDI, migration,
ease of travel and other forms of human interaction on international knowledge diffusion.
However, limited geographic knowledge diffusion is an important observation in its own
right. This observvation may account for the lack of income convergence at the global level
and the fact that rich and poor countries tend to be geographically segregated. It implies
that countries are affected by the knowledge that exists in their neighborhood. Knowledge
diffusion is unquestionnably not an economically insignificant phenomenon. It is more than
a side effect. It can shape the evolution of the comparative advantage of nations.
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Chapter 2
Migration, Knowledge Diffusion and
the Comparative Advantage of
Nations1
2.1 Introduction
Franschhoek valley, a small town in the Western Cape province of South Africa, is known
today for its beautiful scenery and for its high-quality wineries. The town was founded in
the late 17th century by French Huguenot refugees, who settled there after being expelled
from France following King Louis XIV elimination of the Edict of Nantes. As of today, the
wineries in Franschhoek are among the main producers of South African wine exports.
Likewise, Saxenian (2006) relates the story of Dov Frohman, an Israeli scientist who in 1974
returned home after years of having worked in Intel Corporation in the United States. Upon
his return to Israel, Frohman founded in Haifa Intel’s first design center outside the United
States. As of today, Israel is an exporter of semiconductors related technologies. In this
paper we explore the role of migrants in developing the comparative advantage of both
their sending and receiving countries.
1This paper is a part of a larger research project in conjunction with Hillel Rapoport.
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Ricardian models of trade assume as given the exogenous productivity parameters that
define the export basket of countries which are generated in equilibrium. A large part of
the literature has focused on understanding the characteristics of this equilibrium and the
mechanisms through which it is conceived. However, a burgeoning literature has been
dealing with understanding the evolution of what defines these productivity parameters.
This paper contributes to this literature by documenting industry-specific productivity shifts
as explained by the variation in international factors movement with particular focus on
migration. We study productivity by exploiting changes in the export baskets of countries.
The key assumption is that, after controlling for product-specific shifts in demand, firms in
a country will be able to export a good only after they have become productive enough to
compete in global markets. Of all international factors flows, the results point to migration
as the strongest of those drivers. We find that migrants, and even more so, skilled migrants,
can explain variation in good-specific productivity as measured by the ability of countries
to the export those goods, for products that are intensively exported in the migrants’
home/destination countries. In particular we find that, on average, a stock of migrants
larger by 65,000 people is associated with a 15% increase in the likelihood of exporting a
new product for a given country, whereas the same figure for skilled migrants is reduced
to 15,000. Also, in terms of expanding the export basket of countries, a migrant is worth
about US $30,000 of foreign direct investment (FDI), while a skilled migrant is worth over
$160,000.
This differs from the previous approaches in the literature that look at the link between
international factor flows and changes in aggregate productivity, as opposed to industry-
specific productivity dynamics. That literature includes, for instance, the work of Coe and
Helpman (1993) and Coe et. al. (2009) who study changes in aggregate productivity as a
result of importing more from countries with higher R&D investment. Aitken & Harrison
(1999) and Javorcik (2004) are among the long list of studies trying to establish whether FDI
generates productivity spillovers on domestic firms, with no definite answer emerging from
all of them. Andersen and Dalgaard (2011) find a correlation between aggregate productivity
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and business travel flows.
We consider three alternative explanations on how migration could be associated to good-
specific productivity increases. First, if a given country c receives migrants from countries
exporters of a given product p, then there could be a local shift in demand for product p,
given the plausible shift in aggregate preferences. This could result in a demand-driven
productivity shift, which could become exports to either the migrants’ sending/receiving
country or global exports to the rest of the world, supplying the increase in global demand.2.
Second, migrant networks could generate lower transaction costs for bilateral trade in
specific goods, thus inducing bilateral exports between the sending and receiving country
of the migrants (Kugler and Rapoport 2011 ).
Finally, migrants can serve as a transmission vehicle of product-specific knowledge,
which could induce productivity shifts and in turn inducing global competition in certain
goods. The acquisition of industry-specific knowledge is an important input for the produc-
tivity dynamics of a firm: more knowledge (either through learning or experience) allows
economic agents to do more with the same resources. Then, the question remains: can
migrants induce exports through knowledge transmission? Bahar et. al. (2014) present
evidence suggesting that, after controlling for product-specific global demand, the evolution
of the export basket of a country, both in its extensive and intensive margin, could be
explained by the documented local geographic character of knowledge diffusion (e.g. Jaffe,
Trajtenberg and Henderson 1993; Bottazi and Peri 2003; Keller 2002; Keller 2004). They
attribute their result to the fact that knowledge is often non-easily transferrable, mostly
because a large component of it is "tacit" (Polanyi 1966). Polanyi explained tacit knowledge
by saying that we know more than we can tell, and Kenneth Arrow (1969) suggested that
the drivers for knowledge transmission are human minds rather than written words, also
when it comes to economic processes. Thus, intuitively, migration would be the natural
candidate among all international factor flows to serve as a driver of tacit knowledge and
2Linder (1961) suggests, in this case, country c will become a trade partner of the home countries of the
migrants.
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thus induce exports. This is, precisely, what this paper documents.
The paper uses a worldwide dataset that includes bilateral trade, FDI and migration
stock figures for years 1990 and 2000. From it, we construct a sample that includes for each
country, product and year the total exports to the rest of the world. The sample also includes
the computed total stocks of trade, FDI and migration (disaggregated in immigrants and
emigrants) to or from partner countries that export that each product in years 1990 and
2000.
The undertaken empirical exercise looks at how migration figures correlate with a
country’s extensive and intensive margin of trade. The extensive margin is measured by
looking at the future addition of a new product to a country’s export basket, while the
intensive margin refers to the future annual growth rate of a product that is already exported
by a country. We control for global demand of each good by adding product-year fixed
effects. We also add country-year fixed effects which would control for all country level
variables characteristics that would make a given country more likely to export and receive
migrants at the same time. We also calculate all of the specifications using an alteration of
the dependent variable, which measures exports to the rest of the world excluding flows to
countries where migrants are in or from. These controls, we argue, would rule out the first
two explanations discussed above.
We are left with the third explanation, which is our preferred one. Yet, endogeneity
concerns are present. They are reduced by adding proper controls and, also, by presenting
a set of results that instrument for migration stocks using geographic and cultural bilateral
variables between countries the sending and receiving countries of the migrants. The
instruments provide an exogenous variation to the number of migrants in/from countries.
They are based on the share of the migrants’ sending and receiving countries exporting the
product under consideration which have a common language, a common colonizer or a
(former) colony-colonizer relationship with the country under analysis.
The body of the paper discusses in detail all the data collection, the empirical strategies
and present the results. The paper is divided as follows. The next section describes the
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empirical strategy and the data. Section 2.3 presents the main results, and Section 2.4
discusses them. Section 3.6 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
2.2.1 Research Question and Empirical Challenges
The empirical strategy studies the relationship between international factor flows and the
dynamics in the export basket of the receiving and sending countries, with emphasis on
migration. In particular, the question is: can migrants induce product-specific productivity
shifts in their sending (destination) countries, on products already intensively exported in
their destination (sending) countries?
For the sake of better understanding, we use the following hypothetical example. Sup-
pose there are two countries in the world: Italy (a pizza exporter), and the US (a hamburger
exporter). The analogous question then becomes whether the presence of more Italians
in the US is associated with the ability of the US to export pizza, and, whether this same
presence is also associated with the ability of Italians to export hamburgers.
There are two main empirical challenges in studying the relationship between produc-
tivity and international factor flows (i.e. goods, capital and people). First, all flows are
highly correlated among themselves. Moreover, several empirical studies have shown that
migration networks are an important determinant of bilateral trade flows and bilateral FDI.3
Kugler and Rapoport (2011) even find evidence of complementarity between the three
types of flows. More specifically, the authors claim, migration generate links that lower
transaction costs inducing bilateral FDI and trade.
Hence, the positive correlation between international flows of capital, goods and labor is
a matter of consideration to any study of this kind. In fact, in the sample for year 2000, the
correlation matrices between total migration, FDI and trade across countries are all positive,
3e.g. Gould, 1994; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer, 2005; Iranzo and Peri 2009;
Felbermayr and Jung, 2009; Tong, 2005; Kugler and Rapoport, 2007, 2011; Javorcik et. al. 2011
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Table 2.1: Correlation Matrix International Flows (log)
Variables Migrants (log) FDI (log) Trade (log)
Migrants (log) 1.000
FDI (log) 0.455 1.000
Trade (log) 0.457 0.738 1.000
Table 2.2: Correlation Matrix International Flows (per capita)
Variables Migrants (p.c.) FDI (p.c.) Trade (p.c.)
Migrants (p.c.) 1.000
FDI (p.c.) 0.159 1.000
Trade (p.c.) 0.423 0.538 1.000
and above 0.4, with the exception of migration and FDI per capita (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2).
That is, countries that receive/send more FDI tend to also receive/send more migrants
and export/import in larger quantities. Hence, to deal with this challenge, the empirical
specification controls for all three factors simultaneously.
The second challenge refers to the risk of having biased estimates generated by endo-
geneity, even after controlling for all factor flows. For instance, migrants could relocate
themselves based on future potential of specific sectors of growing, or a third variable (i.e.
“openness” shock) could induce migration and induce exports at the same time (though not
necessarily of specific products). While the controls in the empirical specification intents to
deal with some of these problems, the identification problem remains. In order to further
reduce these concerns, we implement a number of instrumental variables, which exploit the
variation in migration stocks explained by bilateral cultural/historic characteristics between
the sending and receiving countries of these migrants.
2.2.2 Empirical Specification
The aim of the paper is to study the dynamics of the extensive and intensive margin of trade
(with exports to the rest of the world) given different levels of migration stocks, controlling
for FDI and trade stocks. The specification will disentangle between immigration and
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emigration, and between all vs. skilled migrants.
Throughout the paper we will use the concept of Revealed Comparative Advantage
(RCA) by Balassa (1965), which will be used to construct export-related variables both in the
left-hand-side and right-hand-side of the specification. RCA is defined as follows:
RCAc,p ≡
expc,p/∑
p
expc,p
∑
c
expc,p/∑
c
∑
p
expc,p
where expc,p is the exported value of product p by country c. This is a yearly measure.
For example, in the year 2000, soybeans represented 4% of Brazil’s exports, but accounted
only for 0.2% of total world trade. Hence, Brazil’s RCA in soybeans for that year was
RCABrazil,Soybeans = 4/0.2 = 20, indicating that soybeans are 20 times more prevalent in
Brazil’s export basket than in that of the world.
The empirical specification is defined as follows:
Yc,p,t→T = βim∑
c′
immigrantsc,c′ ,t × Rc′ ,p,t + βem∑
c′
emigrantsc,c′ ,t × Rc′ ,p,t
+ βFDI∑
c′
FDIc,c′ ,t × Rc′ ,p,t + βtrade∑
c′
tradec,c′ ,t × Rc′ ,p,t (2.1)
+ γControlsc,p,t + αc,t + ηp,t + εc,p,t
The definition of the dependent, or left hand side (LHS) variable, Yc,p,t→T, alternates
according to whether the specification is studying the intensive or the extensive margin of
trade for a specific product p and country c. When studying the extensive margin, Yc,p,t→T is
1 if country c achieved an RCA of 1 or more in product p in the period of time between t
and T (conditional on having an RCAc,p,t = 0. That is:
Yc,p,t→T = 1 if RCAc,p,t = 0 and RCAc,p,T ≥ 1
In addition, we also condition Yc,p,t→T = 1 to whether whether RCAc,p,t−1 = 0, where
t− 1 refers to the beginning of the previous period (i.e. for the period 2000-2010, it is 1990)4.
This eliminates cases in which the country was already exporting such product but for some
4For the period 1990-2000, t− 1 is 1985 given data limitations
44
reason they stopped doing so at the beginning of the period under consideration.
When studying the intensive margin, Yc,p,t→T is the annual (log) growth rate in the exports
value of product p, between years t and T, conditional on having exportsc,p,t > 0. That is:
Yc,p,t→T =
ln(exportsc,p,T + 1)− ln(exportsc,p,t + 1)
T − t if exportsc,p,t > 0
The independent variables include the following:
• The sum of the stock of immigrants and of emigrants (in logs) from and to other
countries (denoted by c’) at time t, weighted by a dummy Rc′,p,t which is 1 if RCAc′,p,t ≥
15.
• The sum of stock of FDI and stock of trade (in logs) according to the previous logic.
• A vector of controls of baseline variables (when applicable): the baseline level of
exports (in logs) for that same product; the average annual (logarithmic) growth rate
of the export value in the previous ten year period (in order to control for previous
trends in the export dynamics for that product); in order to correct for undefined
growth rates caused by zeros in the denominator, we compute the growth rate using
exportsc,p,t + 1 for all observations; in addition, to control for our own correction, we
also add as a control a dummy variable indicating whether exportsc,p,t = 0, which
correspond to the observations most likely to be distorted.
• Country-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects.
2.2.3 Data and Sample
Bilateral migration data comes from Docquier, Ozden and Perry (2010). The dataset consists
of total bilateral working age (25 to 65 years old) foreign born individuals in 1990 and 2000.
The data provide figures for skilled and non-skilled migrants at the bilateral level as well.
5In fact, we define several thresholds for Rc′ ,p,t = 1, which areRCAc′ ,p,t ≥ x where xe[1, 5]
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Figure 2.1: Cartogram Share of Migrants, Year 2000
Skilled migrants are considered to have completed some tertiary education at the time of
the census. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 represent the migration data in year 2000.
Bilateral FDI positions are from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics
(2012). It tracks FDI from and to to OECD members since 1985 until 2009. Using this data
we compute 10-year stocks of capital flows for each country in 1990 and 20006. Negative
FDI stocks are treated as zero7.
Bilateral trade data comes from Hausmann et. al. 2011, based on the UN Comtrade data
from 1984 to 2010. We use the trade dataset to construct two variables. First, total exports per
6For 1990 we use the stock from 1985 to 1990 due to limitations of the data.
7This follows the same methodology suggested by Kugler and Rapoport (2011)Kugler and Rapoport (2011).
Only 1.7% of the original dataset is affected by this.
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Figure 2.2: Cartogram of Migrants Per Capita, Year 2000
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product per country to the rest of the world, to be used to compute the dependent variable
in the empirical specifications, to study the intensive and extensive margin of trade. The list
of products is fairly disaggregated. An example of a product is "Knitted/Crocheted Fabrics
Elastic Or Rubberized” (SITC code 6553), or "Electrical Measuring, Checking, Analyzing
Instruments" (SITC code 8748). The words product, good and industry interchangeably
referring to the same concept throughout the paper. Similarly to FDI, we also compute
10-year stocks for bilateral trade (imports plus exports) to be used in the RHS. Both the
10-year Trade and FDI stocks are deflated using the US GDP deflator (base year 2000) from
the World Development Indicators by the World Bank.
Former Soviet Union countries are excluded from the sample given their poor trade data
in the period 1990-2000. The final sample consists of 136 countries and 781 products. We
define two 10-year periods for the analysis due to the limitations imposed by the bilateral
migration data, which are 1990-2000 and 2000-2010.
Furthermore, we incorporate variables from the GeoDist dataset from CEPII on bilateral
relationships such distance, common colonizer, colony-colonizer relationship, and common
language, to construct the instrumental variables (Mayer and Zignago 2011).
The summary statistics for the variables to be used in the analysis are in Table 2.3. Panel
A presents the summary statistics for the extensive margin sample, while Panel B does it
for the intensive margin sample. The left and right sides of both panels present the same
variables used in the RHS varying the threshold Rc′,p,t = 1, based on RCAc′,p,t ≥ 1 and
RCAc′,p,t ≥ 5, respectively. The variables that do not depend on this threshold are reported
in the left panel only.
From Panel A we see that the unconditional probability of achieving an RCA above 1
(starting with an none exports) for the average country-product is 3.5%. Similarly, from
Panel B , the average country-product exports value annual growth rate is close to zero
in the data. The tables also include the sum of immigrants and emigrants for the average
country and year from and in countries exporting a product with RCA above 1 (left) and
above 5 (right). It presents the same statistics for aggregated FDI and Trade figures in
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
RCA=1 RCA=5
Variable N Mean sd N Mean sd
Panel A: Extensive Margin Sample (exportsc,p,t = 0)
New Product (RCA>1) 83,397 0.035 0.185 - - -
Immigrants 83,397 14233.76 69694.14 83,397 3869.30 32469.86
Emigrants 83,397 49819.20 139403.55 83,397 6657.21 57416.82
Immigrants (HS) 83,397 1862.31 9711.80 83,397 450.21 4396.31
Emigrants (HS) 83,397 12818.14 36970.25 83,397 987.11 5668.17
FDI (total, mn USD) 83,397 59.26 1767.27 83,397 8.12 482.81
Trade (total, mn USD) 83,397 1256.47 4014.39 83,397 129.22 733.90
Panel B: Intensive Margin Sample (exportsc,p,t > 0)
Growth Exports 129,035 -0.003 0.349 - - -
Baseline Log Exports 129,035 13.259 3.723 - - -
Immigrants 129,035 169327.61 582922.35 129,035 32345.20 165795.17
Emigrants 129,035 189433.86 445525.94 129,035 16373.44 90889.80
Immigrants (HS) 129,035 48736.68 220836.55 129,035 7964.71 53017.41
Emigrants (HS) 129,035 55520.94 120329.89 129,035 3422.09 18897.87
FDI (total, mn USD) 129,035 14387.69 60995.89 129,035 644.94 6656.45
Trade (total, mn USD) 129,035 29353.97 67416.95 129,035 2152.64 9568.08
million USD, after the delation process explained above. Note that FDI and Trade variables
total inwards and outwards stock figures.
2.3 Results
Table 2.4 presents the estimation of specification (2.1) for all products in the dataset. The
upper panel estimates the extensive margin (measured by the likelihood of adding a new
product to a country’s export basket) while the lower panel estimates the intensive margin
(measured by the annual growth in exports of a product already in the country’s export
basket). It is important to notice that the dependent variables in both panels are computed
using exports from country c to product p to the rest of the world. The columns titled
"R1" indicate that the threshold used for constructing the RHS variables was RCAc′,p,t ≥ 1,
whereas the columns titled "R5" indicate the use of RCAc′,p,t ≥ 5, instead. The table also
presents results using all migrants (columns 1 and 3) and skilled migrants (columns 2 and 4)
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in the RHS. The upper panel of Table 2.4 uses country-product pairs which had zero exports
in the baseline years (1990 and 2000), which corresponds to almost 84,000 observations (thus,
baseline variables are not included because lack of variation).
The results in Panel A indicate that a country with 10% increase in its stock of immigrants
from nations exporters of product p, is associated with an increase of 0.4% in the likelihood
the receiving country will export product p with an RCA above 1 in the next ten years.8
Similarly, a 10% increase in the stock of emigrants residing in countries exporters of product
p, will tend to increase the same likelihood for country c by 1%. On average in the sample
these numbers amount to about 1,400 immigrants and 5,000 emigrants. The correspondent
correlation for an increase of 10% in the total stock of (incoming and outgoing) FDI is about
0.4%9. That is, a 3.5 times increase in the stock of FDI, which is about USD 210 million
based on the sample average, would account for the same marginal effect of a stock increase
of about 6500 migrants (both immigrants plus emigrants). In other words, each migrant is
worth about $30,000 of FDI in this context.
Column 2 in Table 2.4 limits the migration figures to skilled immigrants and emigrants
only. This significantly reduces the variation in the RHS, as can be seen in the summary
statistics. The results suggest that, in the case of immigration, the coefficient estimator is
almost doubled and statistically significant. This implies that the probability of a country
adding a new product p to its export basket is larger by 0.8% for each 10% increase its stock
of immigrants from countries exporters of p (about 200 people, on average). In terms of
skilled emigration, a 10% increase in the stock of emigrants in nations exporters of product p
(about 1300 people), is associated with an increase of 0.8% in the likelihood a given country
will start exporting p in the next 10 years. In total, the figures suggest that, on average, an
increase of 1500 in the stock of migrants in and from countries with comparative advantage
in p, is associated with a probability of exporting p larger by 1.6%. To achieve the same
8A 10% increase is associated with an increase in such likelihood of 0.015 percentage points, which based
on the unconditional probability of 3.5% (see Table 2.3), corresponds to a 0.4% increase.
9Or even zero, given that the estimator for the FDI coefficient is statistically insignificant.
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Table 2.4: Fixed Effects
Panel A: Extensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0015 0.0028 0.0005 0.0011
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.001)
Ln Emigrants 0.0032 0.0026 0.0019 0.0018
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Ln FDI, total 0.0015 0.0014 0.0001 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Ln Trade, total -0.0080 -0.0084 0.0014 0.0014
(0.004)* (0.004)* (0.001) (0.001)
N 83397 83397 83397 83397
r2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Panel B: Intensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0030 0.0043 0.0029 0.0021
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)**
Ln Emigrants 0.0069 -0.0006 0.0042 0.0043
(0.002)*** (0.002) (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Ln FDI, total -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Trade, total 0.0094 0.0165 0.0012 0.0021
(0.005)* (0.005)*** (0.001)* (0.001)***
Baseline Log Exports -0.0298 -0.0295 -0.0290 -0.0285
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Previous Exports Growth -0.1373 -0.1379 -0.1397 -0.1413
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
Previous Exports Zero -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0007 0.0001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
N 73193 73193 73193 73193
r2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
All specifications include country-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. SE clustered at
the country level presented in parenthesis
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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result with FDI would require a fourfold increase in FDI, which amounts to about USD 240
million. Using the same logic as above, this means that each skilled migrant is worth about
USD $160,000 in terms of expanding a country’s export basket in the ways studied by this
paper.10
Panel B of Table 2.4 uses the annual export value (logarithmic) growth rate as the
dependent variable, in order to study the intensive margin of trade. The number of
observations is different than the sample used for Panel A, because we are using all
products with export value above zero in the baseline year. The results present evidence that
both the presence of immigrants from and of emigrants in countries exporters of product p,
is associated with a larger future rate of growth in export value of product p in the country
under consideration. In particular, for a given product p, a 10% increase in the stock of
immigrants from countries exporting such product (about 17,000 people) is associated with
an increase in the future annual growth rate in export value for the receiving country of
about 0.03 points. Similarly, future annual growth in exports value of product p tends to be
0.07 percentage points higher with a 10% larger stock of emigrants in countries exporters of
the same product (about 19,000 people). That is, about 40,000 more migrants, on average, is
associated with a annual growth rate that is larger by 0.1 points. The coefficients in Column
2, which use skilled migration in the right hand side, are larger in magnitude in the case of
immigrants, though the coefficient for emigration becomes statistically insignificant for the
case of emigrants.
Columns 3 and 4 repeat the exercise of Columns 1 and 2 in both panels, but redefining
Rc′,p,t = 1 if RCAc′,p,t ≥ 5. This means that the right hand side variables are weighted by
whether the partner countries have a revealed comparative advantage that is 5 times the
world average in product p at time t. Intuitively, the average migrant from and/or in these
countries will have a higher likelihood of being exposed to the productive knowledge that
is required to efficiently produce (and thus, being able to export) product p. At the same
10The comparison of migrants with trade figures is not possible given that the estimated coefficients for trade
are negative. This is a natural result given that countries tend to trade less with other countries that export the
same goods.
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time, the variation for all variables is considerably less.
For this case, the results show no significant correlation with immigrants. However, the
results suggest that a 10% increase in the stock of emigrants, which amounts to about 660
people, is associated with a larger probability of achieving comparative advantage by 0.5%.
The same figure for skilled emigrants, which corresponds to about 100 people on average, is
also 0.5%. That is, less than 1000 emigrants, on average, in countries that export product
p with an RCA above 5, could increase the likelihood of their sending countries achieving
comparative advantage in the same product by 1%. In this case, the comparison with FDI
suggest that each emigrant is worth USD 800,000, or USD 900,000 of trade!
An interesting implication of the results is that FDI and Trade figures, in most cases,
seem not to correlate with the ability of countries to expand their the export baskets under
the studied context. That is, trading with countries which are exporters of a particular
product is not associated with the likelihood of gaining comparative advantage in that
same product. However, when it comes to the intensive margin of trade seem to positively
correlate with the future annual growth of export value. Precedents of this result tracks
to Coe and Helpman (1995), where they find evidence on how trade leads to increases in
aggregate productivity.
Based on valid concerns on how much of these results are being driven by good pinned
down by geology or climate conditions, we estimate specification (2.1) excluding those
products from the sample. The results are robust to their exclusion. See Section B.2.2 in the
Appendix for more details.
All the specifications presented above include product-by-year fixed effects and country-
by-year fixed effects. The former set of fixed effects would control for global demand for all
products. Given that we are looking at exports to the rest of the world, the shifts we identify
must be related to the supply side. The country-by-year fixed effects would control for time
invariant countries’ characteristics, as well as country-level aggregate demand and supply
shocks, that would rule out a country-level third factor that positively correlates with both
migrant figures and overall productivity, such as an openness shock.
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2.3.1 Increased productivity or lower bilateral trade costs?
A valid concern would be that the partial correlations we are observing are being driven
by bilateral trade: the country is exporting more of the product to those countries where
the migrants are from/in. This relates to the evidence presented by Kugler and Rapoport
(2011), who find that migrants facilitate the creation of business networks which induces
bilateral trade and capital flows. Under this possibility, it would be harder to attribute the
results to a gain in productivity, but to a decrease in trade costs. In order to deal with this
we estimate again the same specification, but we exclude from the dependent variable all
exports to countries where migrants are from/in. That is, we reconstruct the dataset such
that the export value to the rest of the world for each product and country combination,
excludes exports to nations that send or receive that same country’s migrants.
Of course, a critical caveat is that the exclusion requires defining a threshold on the
number of sending/receiving migrants. If one migrant is enough to activate this rule we
will probably clean all world trade, given that there is always one alien citizen of every
country in most developed nations, which generate the largest share of world trade. In
this sense, we define a number of arbitrary thresholds which are 500, 1000, 2500 and 5000
migrants. For example, let’s suppose we are looking at Canadian exports of television sets
to the rest of the world in year 1990. We will exclude from that figure exports of TV sets
from Canada to countries that (1) have a number X of Canadians migrants and (2) a number
Y of their citizens are migrants in Canada, as long as X+Y is larger than 500, 1000, 2500 and
5000. The assumption is that in order to create an effective business network one would
need more than 500, 1000, 2500 or 5000 migrants among the two countries.
In fact, Figure 2.3shows the magnitude of the reduction of total trade figures after
revising the exports figures as explained above. For instance, with the 500 threshold world
trade figures are reduced by about 92.5%; while using the 5000 threshold reduces total trade
figures by about 83%.
Nevertheless, despite the strong decline in the variation of the dependent variable, the
results show consistent patterns with the previous results. For instance, Table 2.5 shows
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Figure 2.3: Proportion of World Trade Left
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results using the 500 threshold (the most conservative one), while the tables using the
other thresholds are presented in the Appendix Section B.2.2. The results are qualitatively
the same as in Table 2.4. However, all in all, the observed correlation between migrant
stocks and increased exports is not explained by migration-induced lower trade costs, but
rather good-specific productivity increases. In fact, for Panel A, the estimates are similar in
magnitude than in Table 2.4. In Panel B, the results are less robust, but the correlation with
emigrants in countries with an RCA above 5 is consistent with the previous results.
In spite of having shown that the results are not driven by bilateral migrant networks
there is still room for endogeneity concerns, which keeps us from concluding anything
causal on the relationships we have found so far. The next subsection deals with this issue
and attempts to solve some of these concerns.
2.3.2 Instrumental variables approach
The documented correlations can be partly driven by endogeneity: migrants relocate
themselves following potential growth in products they are familiar with. In order to reduce
endogeneity concerns, we generate a number of instrumental variables that will serve as
exogenous variation to migration figures.
Given that there are two regressors we are interested in (immigrants and emigrants),
an instrumental variable approach would require at least two instruments. In the spirit of
Frankel & Romer (1999) we construct a number of instruments based on bilateral character-
istics of the country under consideration and the countries of its immigrants/emigrants,
using data from CEPII’s GeoDist database.
For each combination c, p (with RCA > 1) and t there is a defined set of countries c′
where immigrants are from and emigrants are in (i.e. ΘI and ΘE respectively). Based on this,
there are three pairs of instruments that are constructed. They are the share of countries ΘI
and ΘE that:
• speak a common language as c
• have the same current or historic colonizer as c
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Table 2.5: Fixed Effects, excluding bilateral exports (500 migrants threshold)
Panel A: Extensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0019 0.0030 0.0008 0.0008
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)** (0.001)
Ln Emigrants 0.0032 0.0023 0.0012 0.0008
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*
Ln FDI, total 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Trade, total -0.0063 -0.0063 0.0028 0.0029
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)** (0.001)**
N 119783 119783 119783 119783
r2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Panel B: Intensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants -0.0007 0.0019 0.0016 0.0012
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)* (0.001)
Ln Emigrants 0.0084 0.0012 0.0028 0.0024
(0.002)*** (0.003) (0.001)*** (0.001)*
Ln FDI, total -0.0009 -0.0008 0.0010 0.0010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)** (0.000)***
Ln Trade, total 0.0097 0.0147 0.0021 0.0027
(0.006) (0.006)** (0.001)** (0.001)***
Baseline Log Exports -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0029 -0.0026
(0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002) (0.002)
Previous Exports Growth -0.1077 -0.1073 -0.1103 -0.1114
(0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)***
Previous Exports Zero -0.0645 -0.0650 -0.0599 -0.0595
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)***
N 55580 55580 55580 55580
r2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
All specifications include country-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. The dependent
variable in all specifications is constructed using exports of country c to the whole world
excluding to countries c′ where total migration between c and c′ exceeds 500 people.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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• have/had a colony-colonizer relationship with c
For the instruments to be valid, the exclusion restriction must be that, product specific exports
to the the whole world are not correlated with common bilateral cultural/historic ties with its
migrants’ countries, once we control for country-year fixed effect. Furthermore, we assume
that countries do not engage into product specific export-inducing agreements based on their
cultural or historical ties, which are not captured via flows such as FDI or trade.
The assumptions above are not testable, and their validity -as any other exclusion
restriction- are not fully guaranteed. However, following previous literature, we believe the
assumptions are reasonable, and present the results using these instruments.
The relevance of the instrument is fully testable. For intuition purposes, figure 2.4
presents the analogous of a first stage in a one endogenous variable 2SLS regression, using
the United States and South Africa as examples. In both the left and right panels, each
observation is a product labeled with its SITC 4-digit code. The left panel uses the United
States in year 2000 as an example. The vertical axis measures the number of immigrants
(in logs) it has received from countries exporters of each product, while the horizontal axis
measures what share of those countries speak english. The right panel uses South Africa in
year 2000, and measures the same relationships through emigrants, rather than immigrants.
In both panels we see a strong positive correlation, which represents what would be a first
stage.
However, since the specification includes n>1 endogenous regressors, testing for the
relevance of the instruments is not straightforward. Stock and Yogo (2002) define critical
values on the a number of cases involving n>1 endogenous regressors, to be used with
the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic (when not assuming homoskedasticity). The critical value
is 15.72 for the case of 2 endogenous and 6 instruments. Being above this value implies
the bias caused by a weak instrument is lower than the OLS bias with 95% certainty. The
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic will be reported in all regressions.
Results using the instrumental variables through the generalized methods of moments
are presented in Table 2.6.
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Figure 2.4: First stage, common language
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Table 2.6: Instrumental Variables Estimation (GMM)
Panel A: Extensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants -0.0004 -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Ln Emigrants 0.0110 0.0154 0.0050 0.0082
(0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)***
Ln FDI, total -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Trade, total -0.0072 -0.0084 0.0003 0.0004
(0.005) (0.005)* (0.001) (0.001)
N 83396 83396 83396 83396
r2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14
KP F Stat 20.38 15.34 84.01 24.19
Panel B: Intensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0165 0.0224 -0.0022 -0.0033
(0.008)** (0.007)*** (0.004) (0.004)
Ln Emigrants -0.0074 -0.0193 0.0146 0.0162
(0.013) (0.014) (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Ln FDI, total -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.001)** (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Trade, total 0.0056 0.0098 -0.0002 0.0005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001)
Baseline Log Exports -0.0306 -0.0307 -0.0295 -0.0287
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)***
Previous Exports Growth -0.1270 -0.1284 -0.1328 -0.1330
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
Previous Exports Zero -0.0105 -0.0098 -0.0033 -0.0050
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
N 73193 73193 73193 73193
r2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
KP F Stat 3.95 7.60 15.33 14.50
All specifications include country-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. SE clustered at
the country level presented in parenthesis.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Note that in all specifications in Panel B, the Kleibergen-Paap F statistics reveal the
weakness of the instruments, so there is little we can say about the intensive margin of
trade according to these results. In Panel A, however, the instrument seems to have a strong
enough first stage (besides in Column 2), which allow us to draw conclusions.
First, immigration seems not to be correlated with the ability of countries to add new
goods to their export baskets. However, when it comes to emigration, the magnitude of
the coefficients are much larger, as compared to the ones in Table 2.4. For instance, based
on Columns 1, a 10% increase in the stock of emigrants (about 5000 people) increases the
likelihood of exporting a product exported in the receiving countries of these migrants
by 3% (or 0.11 percentage points). Column 2 shows that the same increase in the stock
of skilled emigrants (about 1300 people) could increase by 4% (or 0.15 percentage points)
the likelihood of including a new good to the export basket. Again, we see how skilled
emigrants have a much stronger correlation.
Columns 3 and 4 show a similar picture. While the magnitude of the estimators are
smaller, the variance in the number of emigrants using the RCA ≥ 5 threshold is also
lower. Thus, the effect is much larger when measuring according to the actual number of
emigrants that could boost the export basket of their sending countries. That is, only about
700 emigrants and 100 skilled emigrants residing in countries that export a particular good
with an RCA that is five times the world average, would increase the likelihood of exporting
that same good by 1.5% or 2.2%, respectively.
If the exclusion restrictions presented before are valid, and the results cannot be at-
tributed to a third uncontrolled for variable, then these results are particularly strong and a
solid contribution to the literature. The presence of migrants from or in nations that export
a particular good induce a productivity shift in the sending and receiving country of the
migrants, which results in the diversification of their export baskets.
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2.4 Discussion and Interpretation
The results in the previous section show through a variety of ways that migration, in both
directions, is a determinant of the evolution of the comparative advantage of nations. What
is the logic behind that?
If knowledge is tacit, and thus it requires human interaction for its transmission and
diffusion, then we could expect that migrants are a driver of such process, which results in
increased productivity of the particular sectors that are especially productive in the sending
and receiving countries of the migrants.11 The results are consistent with such hypothesis.
The idea that immigrants could bring productive knowledge is obvious. They are
physically present in their receiving country, and thus they interact with the local population
in ways that could lead to the diffusion of knowledge. But, why would we see a similar
pattern with emigrants? There are two possible mechanisms in place: return migration or
communication with their family and friends back home.
Return migration seems like a very plausible one. After all, estimates show that about
30% of emigrants return to their home countries after some period of time (e.g. Borjas and
Bratsberg, 1996). These migrants spend enough time in the foreign country to be part of the
labor force, which eventually could lead to generate industry-specific productivity shifts
back home. More recently, Choudhury (2014) shows how Indian return migrants induce
productivity improvements in their firm back home, after spending time in the multinational
corporation headquarters abroad.
The second mechanism relates to links and open communication channels between the
emigrants and their co-nationals back home. Thus, industry-specific knowledge diffusion
are more prevalent whenever these links between individuals across nations are open: more
communication, more short-term travel, etc. The identification of the exact mechanism,
however, is part of our future research agenda.
11Section B.1 of the Appendix outlines a simple model that formalizes this idea.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents evidence suggesting that migrants are a source of evolution for the
comparative advantage of nations; a relationship that has not been documented in the
literature thus far. The results contribute to the growing literature that aims to explain the
evolution of industry-specific productivity of countries, and to the literature of international
trade that aims to understand, in a Ricardian framework, dynamics of the comparative
advantage of nations. It also contributes to the literature of international knowledge diffusion
by studying the possible drivers of knowledge across borders, using the setting suggested
by Bahar et. al. 2014, which uses product-level exports figures as a measure of knowledge
acquisition, after controlling for global demand.
The main result in all these settings is that people matter: by serving as international
drivers of productive-knowledge, they can shape the comparative advantage of nations. In
all of the specifications we include controls for a set of variables that leave us with empirical
evidence suggestive that this is the mechanism in place. The instrumental variables approach
also reduces possible endogeneity concerns.
This finding is particularly important to understand some known characteristics of
knowledge diffusion. First, the short-ranged character of knowledge diffusion can be
explained by the fact that part of knowledge is embedded in people, that tend to move in a
more localized manner than goods or capital. Second, the fact that diffusion of knowledge
and technology is more widespread today than decades ago (i.e. the diffusion process has
accelerated over time) can be explained by the fact that people flows, such as migration or
short term travel, have also increased rapidly.
The results suggest a process that is observable. In fact, the sample contains examples
that are consistent with anecdotical evidence. For instance, the Tanzanian soap industry
which benefited from Kenyan migration12; as well as paper products exports from Chile
which occurred simultaneously to the presence of Chileans in Sweden during Chile’s military
12http://www.unitedworld-usa.com/usatoday/tanzania/interviews/hemal_shah.htm
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dictatorship.
The importance of these results, however, go beyond the pure relationship between
migration and exports. It serves as a proof of concept that mobility is a crucial element in
the evolution of the comparative advantage of countries and productivity, which is known
to be highly explanatory of income and growth.
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Chapter 3
Heavier than Air? Knowledge
Transmission within the
Multinational Firm
3.1 Introduction
About fifty percent of cross-country income variation is explained by differences in pro-
ductivity.1 This begs the question: if productivity-inducing knowledge2 is available in
some places, why isn’t it available in others? Arrow (1969) suggests that the transmission
of knowledge is difficult and costly. These difficulties arise because effective knowledge
transmission involves human interaction, which cannot be fully replaced with written
words3 (e.g., even in today’s world, business trips have not been fully replaced by emails).
A firm, as any other economic agent, also faces difficulties when transferring knowledge
among different divisions and affiliates. When a firm operates across borders, different time
1e.g., Caselli 2005, Hall and Jones 1999
2The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines knowledge as the set of information, understanding, and/or skills
that one gets from experience or education.
3Knowledge that resides in human minds is usually referred to as tacit (Polanyi 1966). Tacit knowledge is
information that cannot be easily explained, embedded or written down.
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zones, languages and cultures can raise knowledge transmission costs further. This study
contributes to the literature by addressing the effects of knowledge transmission costs on
the expansion of multinational corporations (MNCs).
This paper presents two main empirical findings and formalizes them in a theoretical
framework. First, MNCs are less likely to horizontally expand their knowledge intensive
activities to foreign locations, compared to non knowledge intensive industries. Second,
when they do expand, they tend to do so at a shorter geographic distance. Interestingly,
however, geographic distance becomes less relevant for horizontal expansion when a firm
and its subsidiary are located within the same time zone, and thus able to communicate in
real time.
These findings cannot be explained by most theoretical models on MNC fragmentation,
which implicitly or explicitly assume zero cost, or costs orthogonal to distance, of transferring
knowledge between headquarters and subsidiaries (i.e., Helpman 1984; Markusen 1984;
Brainard 1993; Markusen et. al. 1996; Markusen 1997; Carr et. al. 2001; Helpman, Melitz
and Yeaple 2004; Keller and Yeaple 2013). A number of empirical studies have tested the
validity of these models’ predictions, but there has been little or no emphasis on testing the
assumption that knowledge transmission is costless.4
Thus, to explain the results, I augment the model by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)
by incorporating the marginal cost of knowledge transfer faced by firms engaged in foreign
direct investment (FDI). The augmented model’s main assumption is the existence of a
marginal cost of knowledge transmission that increases with the level of knowledge intensity
and the distance between headquarters and subsidiary. This departs from the traditional
view, which assumes that the fixed costs of initial setup are the only costs incurred by
the headquarters when creating a foreign affiliate. In reality, the costs of maintaining and
interacting with a foreign subsidiary are present throughout the subsidiary’s lifetime, and
do not end the day the plant is built.
For the empirical analysis, I use a sample derived from the Worldbase dataset by Dun &
4e.g., Brainard 1997; Carr et. al. 2001; Markusen and Maskus 2002.
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Bradstreet,5 comprising more than 60,000 foreign subsidiaries of MNCs with information
on their physical location and primary economic activity, as defined by the 1987 Standard
Industry Classification (SIC). From this dataset, I identify those foreign subsidiaries that
represent a horizontal expansion of the associated MNC. Using geocoded location data, I
measure the precise distance between each foreign affiliate and its MNC global headquarters.
I then compute industry-specific knowledge intensity measures. These indicators reflect the
accumulated experience and training of workers in any given industry, using occupational
characteristics defined in the O*NET project dataset. I link these indicators to the industry
reported by each foreign subsidiary in the dataset. Finally, I exploit variation in the
knowledge intensity of subsidiaries to study the model’s predictions about the nature
of knowledge transmission for horizontal foreign subsidiaries as opposed to the MNC’s
domestic affiliates as well as non-horizontal foreign subsidiaries.
The data reveals that firms are less likely to have horizontal foreign subsidiaries produc-
ing knowledge intensive goods. This result controls for transportation costs, characteristics
of the host country relative to the headquarters country, and MNC fixed effects. More
specifically, manufacturing industries that are one standard deviation above the knowledge
intensity mean are, on average, about 3.6 percentage points less likely to be replicated
abroad as a horizontal foreign subsidiary, or 12% based on the actual proportion of foreign
affiliates in the sample. For example, a semiconductor manufacturing plant is about 30
percentage points less likely to be replicated abroad than a meat packing plant.
Using the whole portfolio of foreign subsidiaries of a firm, which include both horizontal
and non-horizontal subsidiaries, I find that horizontal subsidiaries are characterized by
being located at shorter geographic distances to the headquarters, a result that supports the
model’s assumption that the cost of transferring knowledge to horizontal foreign subsidiaries
increases with distance. In light of this result, I explore the relationship between distance
and knowledge intensity for horizontal subsidiaries. The assumptions of the model imply
5The dataset was privately acquired from D&B and is not publicly accessible. It has been previously used in
the literature by Lipsey (1978), and more recently by Harrison et. al. (2004), Black and Strahan (2002), Acemoglu,
Johnson & Mitton (2009), Alfaro and Charlton (2009), Alfaro and Chen (2012).
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that firms, in order to maximize profits, face a tradeoff that drives them to locate foreign
horizontal subsidiaries nearby—especially when they produce a knowledge intensive good.
This is supported by the data, which shows a negative partial correlation between knowledge
intensity and the distance between a headquarters and its horizontal foreign subsidiaries.
For instance, an American MNC with a meat packing horizontal subsidiary located in
Turkey would locate its horizontal semiconductors plant in Ireland.
Much of the literature would posit that these results are driven by transportation costs
of intermediate goods, which are assumed to be more prevalent for knowledge intensive
industries (Irrazabal et. al. 2013; Keller and Yeaple 2013).6 I find evidence in the data to rule
out this mechanism. More specifically, I find that when a headquarters and its subsidiaries
are located in the same time zone, distance losses relevance in a firm’s decision to expand
horizontally. This implies that real-time communication decreases the cost of transferring
knowledge by effectively “reducing” the distance between headquarters and subsidiary
by two thirds, or by 3500 Km. for the average foreign subsidiary. This suggests that the
cost of shipping intermediate goods (which would be just as relevant within the same time
zone, because north-south shipping is equally as expensive as east-west shipping), is not
the only factor driving a firm’s location decisions. Rather, the evidence suggests that the
cost of transferring knowledge plays an important role by incentivizing firms to locate their
knowledge intensive subsidiaries at shorter distances. Speaking a common language also
seems to effectively reduce distance between a headquarters and a subsidiary (though not as
much), while the existence of a non-stop commercial flight between a headquarters and its
subsidiary does not. This implies that real-time remote interaction and cultural similarities
are more important in lowering the cost of knowledge transfer than the ease of face-to-face
interaction.
The results show that the cost of knowledge transmission is a determinant of MNC
activity. These findings have larger implications for a number of yet-unanswered questions
6Keller and Yeaple (2013) assume that knowledge is substitutable with intermediate goods, inducing
intra-firm trade in knowledge intensive sectors and thus worsening the performance of distant foreign affiliates.
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in economics. For instance, high barriers to knowledge transmission may explain persistent
differences in productivity levels between countries and the divergence of their incomes over
time (e.g., Pritchett 1997, Hall and Jones 1999), because productivity-inducing knowledge
does not diffuse easily.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the related literature.
Section 3.3 outlines a theoretical framework that explores how knowledge transmission
can affect MNC decisions and provides guidance for the empirical analysis. Section 3.4
describes the dataset and the construction of relevant variables. Section 3.5 discusses the
empirical strategy and presents results and their interpretation, while Section 3.6 concludes
and addresses areas for future research regarding the role of knowledge in economic activity.
3.2 Related Literature
The determinants of MNC expansion and fragmentation have been explored in the literature
for years.7 Helpman (1984) suggests vertical fragmentation is motivated by differences in
factor abundance between the host and recipient country. Markusen (1984) models the
case when horizontal expansion can arise between two identical countries, based on the
assumption that a headquarters’ activities can be geographically distant from production
processes. Brainard (1993) modeled the “proximity-concentration hypothesis,” in which
both transportation costs and increasing returns play a role in international horizontal
expansion of MNCs.
Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) –building on Markusen et. al. (1996) and Markusen
(1997)– endogenize the vertical and horizontal decisions of firm in what is known as
the "knowledge capital model." The model is based on three critical assumptions. First,
knowledge-based assets may be fragmented from production; second, knowledge-based
assets are skilled labor intensive; and third, the services of knowledge-based assets are
(at least partially) joint inputs (i.e., homologous to a public good within the firm) into
7See Antras and Yeaple (2013) for recent review on this topic.
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multiple production facilities. In this model, vertical fragmentation arises from the first two
assumptions, while horizontal expansion is a result of the third one.
Papers such as Brainard (1997), Carr et. al. (2001), Markusen and Maskus (2002)
empirically test for the predictions of the above mentioned models, with little emphasis on
testing the validity of the zero-cost assumption concerning knowledge transmission.
In the literature on heterogenous firms, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) present
a model in which horizontal FDI substitutes for exports. In it, a firm’s potential profit
determines such tradeoff, based on fixed costs and transportation costs. More recently,
Keller and Yeaple (2013) augment this model by adding the knowledge component. In
their model, once the firm expands horizontally beyond its borders, it faces the tradeoff
between creating an upstream plant in that remote location (which locally provides the
knowledge) or, alternatively, shipping the knowledge-embedded intermediate good from the
headquarters’ site (being the main assumption that knowledge can be fully embedded into an
intermediate good). The model predicts that a firm will decide to do the latter for knowledge-
intensive products. Under this framework, the lower profitability that characterizes distant
subsidiaries active in more knowledge intensive industries is explained by intra-firm trade.
That is, firms face higher trade costs for knowledge intensive industries given their optimal
choice of importing the “ready-to-go” knowledge embedded in intermediate goods from its
headquarters. They present empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis.
I introduce tacit knowledge as an additional component to this discussion. Michael
Polanyi (1966) referred to tacit knowledge as information that is difficult to transfer: it
cannot be easily explained, embedded or written down.8 Firms possess tacit knowledge both
in their specific processes and in the minds of their employees (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992).
It is in the interest of the firm to transfer this knowledge, as efficiently as possible, to all of its
subsidiaries. However, the tacit character of this knowledge implies it cannot be embedded
in intermediate goods, and that there are difficulties associated with its transmission. If
8Others in the management and strategy literature have referred to this type of knowledge as “sticky
information” (e.g., Von Hippel 1994; Szulanski 1996, 2002).
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these difficulties are large enough, we would expect them to have an impact on the pattern
of MNCs’ decisions regarding foreign expansion.
Is it reasonable to think that such difficulties exist? In fact, the consensus in the existing
literature on the economics of knowledge is that the transmission of knowledge is not
immediate, and that knowledge diffusion strongly decays with distance. For instance, the
paper by Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) was among the first to make this claim,
showing that patent citations are more frequent within the same geographic area. Bottazi
and Peri (2003) followed up using European data. Along the same lines, Keller (2002)
showed that knowledge spillovers decrease with distance by looking at productivity changes
as explained by foreign R&D investment. He documents that the half-life of such spillovers
is 1200Km. More recently, Bahar et. al. (2014) show that a country is 65% more likely to add
a new product to its export basket whenever a geographic neighbor is a successful exporter
of the same good, a finding that is attributed to the local character of knowledge diffusion.9
In this context, this paper aims to contribute to the literature by presenting unexplored
evidence on the role tacit knowledge transmission plays in the activity of MNCs, focusing
on horizontal expansion.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
In this section I augment the model by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) – referred to as
HMY hereafter – by including a new parameter capturing the intra-firm cost of transmitting
knowledge between headquarters and foreign subsidiaries. This extension allows us to
understand how the cost of knowledge transmission faced by firms affects their decision to
serve foreign markets. First the common set-up is described and then the proper adaptation
is incorporated.
As in HMY, there are N countries producing H+1 sectors with labor as the only input
of production. H sectors (indexed 1, 2,...,H) produce a differentiated good, while the other
9See Keller (2004) for a review of this literature.
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sector (indexed 0) produces an homogenous good (which serves as the numeraire). In
any given country, individuals spend a share βh > 0 of their income on sector h, such
that ∑
0≤h≤H
βh = 1. Country i is endowed with Li units of labor and the wage rate in this
country is denoted by wi.
Consider now a particular differentiated sector, h. For simplicity of notation, the index h
is dropped in the next few paragraphs, but it is implicit that all sector specific variables may
vary across sectors.10 In order to enter the industry in country i a firm bears a fixed and
sunk cost fE denominated in units of labor. After bearing this cost, the potential entrant
learns its labor-per-unit cost, a, drawn from a common and known distribution G (a). Upon
observing this cost, the firm may choose not to enter, and thus bear no additional costs and
receive no revenues. If it chooses to produce, however, an additional cost of fD units of
labor is incurred. There are no other fixed costs if the firm chooses to produce and sell in
the local market only.
The firm can choose to serve a foreign market either by exporting or creating a foreign
subsidiary. If the firm chooses to export, it bears an additional cost of fX (per country it
exports to). If it chooses to create a foreign affiliate, it incurs an additional cost of f I for
every foreign market it chooses to serve this way. Similar to HMY, fX can be interpreted as
the cost of forming a local distribution and service network in the foreign market, and f I
includes all of these costs, as well as the cost of forming a subsidiary in the foreign country
and the overhead production costs embodied in fD. Hence, f I > fX > fD.
The homogenous good is freely traded at no cost.11 Differentiated goods that are
exported from country i to country j are subject to a “melting-iceberg” transport cost τ(t, dij)
which is an increasing function of the per unit shipping cost of the good (denoted by t, and
proxies for weight or other good specific characteristics) and the distance between countries
i and j (denoted by dij). It is assumed that that τ(t, dij) > 1. That is, a firm in country i has
10Some sector-specific variables are explicitly kept in the notation, such as t and k, since these variables will
be relevant in the empirical analysis.
11Thus, as long as the numeraire good is produced in all countries the wage rate is equalized.
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to ship τ units of a good for 1 unit to arrive in country j.
Analogously, serving a foreign market through an affiliate is subject to a marginal cost
κ(k, dij) related to the transfer of knowledge. κ(k, dij) is assumed to be an increasing function
of both the knowledge intensity of the good (represented by k) and distance (dij). The cost
of transferring knowledge includes resources and time used for communicating with foreign
affiliates to transmit proper knowledge required for efficient production. It is assumed that
τ(t, dij) > κ(k, dij) > 1 for all goods. The last inequality implies that for a multinational
corporation, the cost of selling 1 unit of a good through a foreign affiliate is κ(k, dij).
The cost of knowledge transmission in knowledge intensive sectors being higher is
justified given that these sectors require higher interaction and communication among their
workers. Thus, firms pay for business travel and communication services that occur more
often within these sectors. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, knowledge intensive
activities usually encompass tasks with higher probability of failure and thus requiring
trained and experienced workers. This too raises operational costs.
Assuming that knowledge transmission costs are increasing in distance is consistent
with empirical evidence (e.g., Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson 1993, Bottazi and Peri 2001,
Keller 2002, Keller 2004, Bahar et. al. 2014). This evidence is reviewed in the previous
section.
All the producers which serve a market engage in monopolistic competition. Consumer
preferences across varieties of a differentiated product h have the standard CES form,
with an elasticity of substitution ε = 11−α > 1. It is well known that these preferences
generate a demand function Ai p−ε for each product in the industry in country i, where
Ai = β∫
0
ni pi(s)1−εds
Ei, ni is the measure of firms active in the industry in country i, and pi(s) is
the consumer price for a product indexed s.
In this setting, an active producer with labor requirement of a optimally sets a price of
wia
α . Consequently, the price of a locally produced good is
wia
α , the price of a good which is
exported to country j is τ(t,dij)w
ja
α , and the price of a good that is sold by a foreign affiliate
in country j is κ(k,dij)w
ja
α , where a is the labor required for the producer to manufacture one
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unit of the product.
In what follows, it is shown that the balance of forces ruling the tradeoff of serving
a foreign market through exports or FDI is influenced by the knowledge intensity of the
product.
The assumption that the numeraire good is produced in each country simplifies the
analysis, as it implies that the wage rate is equalized across all countries and is equal to
1. Hence, the operating profit for a firm in country i with a labor coefficient of a from
serving the domestic market maybe expressed as piiD = a
1−εBi − fD, where Bi = (1− α) Aiα1−ε .
The additional profits from exporting to country j are piiX =
(
τ(t, dij) · a
)1−ε Bj − fX and
those from selling in country j through a foreign affiliate are piiI =
(
κ(k, dij) · a
)1−ε Bj − f I .
Bi represents demand parameters for country i and are considered exogenous to each
individual firm.
Hence, in this setting, the productivity parameter a will be critical for a firm’s decision
of whether to serve the local market only or to serve foreign markets, either through exports
or FDI. The sorting pattern is similar to the one in HMY and is based in the following
equations:
(aD)
1−ε · Bi = fD, ∀i (3.1)(
τ(t, dij) · aX
)1−ε · Bj = fX, ∀i, ∀j 6= i (3.2)[
κ(k, dij)1−ε − τ(t, dij)1−ε
]
· a1−εI · Bj = f I − fX, ∀i, ∀j 6= i (3.3)
Similar to HMY, the first two equations define the productivity thresholds after which
firms will sell domestically or export, respectively. The minimum productivity threshold
after which firms will engage in FDI is derived from Equation (3.3).12 This threshold is
defined as:
12Condition (3.3) will have a positive solution if we assume κ(k, dij)ε−1 f I > τ(t, dij)ε−1 fX > fD, which is
homologous to condition (1) in HMY (with equal wages across countries), but including κ.
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a1−εI =
f I − fX[(
κ(k, dij)
)1−ε − (τ(t, dij))1−ε] Bj , ∀i, ∀j 6= i (3.4)
Predictions derived from this model will serve as the basis for the empirical analysis.
The implications of the original HMY model are straightforward. An increase in τ(t, dij),
either through an increase in either t or dij, will result in lower piE making it more likely to
substitute exports with FDI. This is part of the mechanism of the concentration-proximity
tradeoff. However, with the inclusion of κ(k, d) into the model, some new predictions arise,
assuming full symmetry in fixed costs and demand variables for all sectors and countries.
The propositions are presented in terms of φ(aI) = a1−εI .
Proposition 1 As k increases, the profitable FDI threshold (a1−εI ) increases, implying fewer firms
will substitute exports towards FDI.
∂φ(aI)
∂k
=
∂φ(aI)
∂κ
· ∂κ
∂k
> 0 (3.5)
Proposition (1) is a direct consequence of adding κ into the model. Thus, ceteris paribus, FDI
will be less likely for sectors with higher k. The graphical representation of the model in
Figure 3.1 shows the case for two sectors that differ in their knowledge intensity, k and k
(where k > k). Notice that the profit functions for both sectors originate in the same fixed
cost value f I , but the function is flatter for the sector k (dashed line). Hence, the productivity
threshold required for a firm to substitute exports with FDI becomes higher for sectors with
higher levels of k. That is, (aij,kI )
1−ε > (aij,kI )
1−ε.
Proposition 2 As d increases, the change in a1−εI is ambiguous.
∂φ(aI)
∂d
=
∂φ(aI)
∂τ
· ∂τ
∂d
+
∂φ(aI)
∂κ
· ∂κ
∂d
=

≥ 0,
[
τ(t,d)
κ(k,d)
]ε−1 ≥ eτ,deκ,d
< 0, otherwise
(3.6)
To understand Proposition (2) suppose there are two foreign countries h and j such that
dij > dih. In the original HMY model, longer distances will reduce piE hence making it
always more profitable for a given level of a to engage in FDI instead of exports. However,
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Figure 3.1: Increase in k (knowledge intensity)
Graphical representation of the model, for a case considering two sectors with different levels of k, where k > k. The result
suggests that the threshold aI is an increasing function of k. Thus, FDI will be less likely for sectors with higher k.
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Figure 3.2: Increase in d (distance)
Graphical representation of the model, for a case considering a firm serving two foreign markets h and j, where dij > dih.
The left panel shows the case where the threshold aI is a decreasing function of d, while the right panel shows the case
where the threshold aI is an increasing function of d. The case in the left panel assumes that piE is more elastic to changes in
distance than piI , while the case in the right panel assumes otherwise.
with the inclusion of κ in the model, longer distances will reduce both piE and piI . Thus, the
equilibrium point can shift either way, depending on the elasticity of profits with respect to
distance. The left panel of Figure 3.2 shows the case when (aihI )
1−ε > (aijI )
1−ε. Intuitively this
happens whenever piE is more elastic to changes in distance than piI (or given the condition
stated in Equation (3.6), where e represents elasticity; see Appendix Section C.1 for more
details on this condition). This case is qualitatively the same result as in the HMY model.
The right panel of Figure 3.2, however, shows another possibility. In it (aihI )
1−ε < (aijI )
1−ε.
In this case, FDI will be less profitable for longer distances hence resulting in fewer firms
substituting exports with FDI.
The predictions coming out of the model following the inclusion of an intra-firm cost
of transferring knowledge (κ) have testable implications in the data. First, ceteris paribus,
industries with higher levels of knowledge intensity will be less likely to expand horizontally
to foreign destinations. Second, horizontal expansion will be less likely in foreign locations
that are located at longer distances under certain conditions. Regarding Proposition (2),
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given there are no empirical priors on whether the stated condition holds, letting the
data speak will provide guidance on the assumptions of the developed model. That is, if
horizontal FDI correlates negatively with longer distances, then there is empirical support
to assume that ∂κ/∂d > 0.
The next section presents the sample and the variables used to perform the empirical
analysis.
3.4 Data and Definitions of Variables
3.4.1 Worldbase dataset by Dun & Bradstreet
This paper uses the Worldbase dataset by Dun & Bradstreet (from May 2012) as its main
data source. The dataset has information on more than one hundred million establishments
worldwide. Each establishment is uniquely identified and linked to its global headquarters
(referred to as the “global ultimate”). For this study I focus on foreign plants engaged in
manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000 to 3999) owned by MNCs. As suggested by Caves
(1971), an MNC is “an enterprise that controls and manages production establishments –
plants – located in at least two countries.”13
Two different samples are obtained from the dataset. The first one, uses both domestic
and horizontal foreign subsidiaries of MNCs. The second one, exclusively uses the complete
portfolio of foreign subsidiaries of MNCs, which include horizontal and non-horizontal
subsidiaries.
The first sample includes about 64,462 subsidiaries, both domestic and foreign (the latter
defined as being in a different country than their global ultimate). The second sample
consists of 60,621 foreign subsidiaries. Overall, headquarters are scattered across 89 countries
while subsidiaries are in over 100 countries.
For the analysis I will use the reported main SIC code as the only indicator of a plant’s
13I exclude MNCs for which 99% of their subsidiaries or employees are in the home country, besides
them having plants in two or more countries. This drops a small number of Chinese MNCs with one or two
subsidiaries in Hong Kong and the rest in China.
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Figure 3.3: Unique locations of headquarters and subsidiaries
The figure shows a World map with the geocoded location of all the headquarters (triangles) and foreign subsidiaries (dots)
in the sample.
economic activity. There are about 450 unique SIC 4-digit codes (in manufacturing) reported
by subsidiaries as their main economic activity in the dataset (see Appendix Section C.2 for
more details on this).
In order to obtain the precise location of each plant I geocode the dataset using Google
Maps Geocoding API to find the exact latitude and longitude of its headquarters and
each one of its foreign subsidiaries. With this I computed the exact distance between each
headquarters and its foreign subsidiaries. Figure 3.3 maps the unique locations of all foreign
subsidiaries (dots) and headquarters (triangles) in the sample.
For instance, Figure 3.4 shows the headquarters and subsidiaries of an American car
manufacturing multinational firm. The firm, headquartered in the US, has a number of
foreign subsidiaries on different continents. The lines originating from the headquarters
represent the geographic distance to each subsidiary.
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Figure 3.4: Headquarters and foreign subsidiaries of an American MNC
The figure is an example of the resolution of the data. It shows a World map with the geocoded location of the headquarters
of an American car manufacturing firm and all of its subsidiaries.
3.4.2 Definitions of Variables
Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary
I define a foreign subsidiary as a horizontal expansion based on its SIC code vis-á-vis all
the SIC codes reported by the firm, in all of its domestic subsidiaries in the home country.
This resolves the data issues that arise when the economic activity of the headquarters does
not necessarily represent the main business of the firm. For instance, in the dataset, the
headquarters of a well known worldwide multinational in the cosmetic world is defined
under SIC code 6719 (“holding company”). However, many of its domestic subsidiaries are
classified under SIC code 2844 (perfumes, cosmetics, and other toiletries), which would be a
more natural classification for the firm as a whole. Hence, by limiting the definitions to the
global ultimate’s SIC category only, horizontal relationships would be underestimated.
Following the methodology used by Alfaro and Charlton (2009) I exclude from the
definition of horizontal expansions those foreign subsidiaries that fall in both horizontal
and vertical classification (see Appendix Section C.3 for more details).
When limiting the sample to domestic and foreign horizontal affiliates only, the latter
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are about 29% of all plants. When looking at the broader foreign affiliates portfolio of a
MNC, (which includes all types of foreign subsidiaries, and excludes domestic subsidiaries),
around 34% of all foreign subsidiaries are classified as horizontal expansions. Of the
remaining 64% of non-horizontal affiliates, only a handful can be classified as vertical
foreign subsidiaries,14 while the majority are subsidiaries classified in industries that are
unrelated to the firms’ core business, as measured by the sectors the firm is producing at
home.15
Knowledge Intensity Measures
In order to estimate the knowledge intensity of industries I construct indicators that measure
the accumulated experience and training required for optimal performance of the different
occupations associated with each industry. These measures attempt to proxy for the
knowledge parameter k referred to in the theoretical framework above.
Knowledge is defined as the set of information, skills and understanding that one
acquires through experience and education. The tacit component of knowledge is the one
that resides mostly in people’s brains, and cannot be codified. Thus, in order to quantify
the intensity of the tacit knowledge that characterizes an specific industry I compute the
average experience and training of that industry’s representative workforce. This differs
from other measures that would capture only the codified component of knowledge such as
patent counts or years of schooling of workers. To the best of my knowledge, these are the
first measures that attempt to capture the tacit knowledge intensity of an industry.
To construct the knowledge intensity measures I use data from the Occupational Em-
ployment Statistics (OES) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,16 and occupational profiles
143,062 observations can be classified as vertical foreign subsidiaries, while 8,108 are classified as “complex”,
implying they fall in both horizontal and vertical categories. These “complex” subsidiaries are considered
neither horizontal nor vertical. Appendix Section C.3 expands on this discussion.
15This is an interesting finding in and of itself, and is also noted by Alfaro and Charlton (2009). While
attempting to explain this finding is out of the scope of this paper, it is a part of the future research agenda.
16Data from 2011, downloadable from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/oes/oesm11in4.zip
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compiled by the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) project.17 OES breaks down
the composition of occupations for each industry code,18 based on a list of about 800 oc-
cupations. These occupations can be linked to occupational profiles generated by O*NET,
which includes results from a large number of survey questions on the characteristics of
each occupation.
The relevant questions in the survey that capture the learning component of the workers,
as mentioned above, are the ones related to experience and training. The exact form of the
questions from O*NET are:
• How much related experience (in months) would be required to be hired to perform
this job?
• How much “on-site” or “in-plant” training (in months) would be required to be hired
to perform this job?
• How much “on-the-job” training (in months) would be required to be hired to perform
this job?
Using these questions I generate the main knowledge intensity measure that I will be using
in the empirical analysis section.19 The measure, which I refer to it as “Experience plus
training” throughout the paper, is constructed by measuring the (wage-weighted) average
months of experience plus on-site and on-the-job training required to work in each industry.
Using this measure, industries related to legal, financial and engineering services rank
highly in the list among the knowledge intensive industries. In the manufacturing sector,
17O*NET is the successor of the US Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Oc-
cupational Titles (DOT). I use the O*NET database version 17, downloadable from
http://www.onetcenter.org/download/database?d=db_17_0.zip. Costinot et. al. (2011) also use O*NET to
create an industry level measure of task routineness for 77 sectors. Keller and Yeaple (2013) also present results
making use of knowledge intensity variables constructed with O*NET in the web appendix.
18I used Pierce & Schott (2012) concordance tables to convert industry codes from NAICS to 1987
SIC. The concordance table is downloadable from http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/files/research/
data/appendix_files_20111004.zip.
19Appendix Section C.6.2 presents robustness tests of the empirical analysis using a measure averaging the
experience indicators only (excluding the training indicators).
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Table 3.1: KI Measures Correlations
Variables Experience + Training R&D share (N&T) R&D share (K&Y)
Experience + Training 1.000
R&D share (N&T) 0.354 1.000
R&D share (K&Y) 0.420 0.682 1.000
The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the O*NET based measures of knowledge intensity and R&D
share in sales, used previously in the literature as proxies of knowledge intensity by Nunn and Trefler (2008) and Keller and
Yeaple (2013).
industries ranking highly are computer related (SIC 3573, 3571 and 3572), communications
equipment (SIC 3669, 3663 and 3661) and electronics and semiconductors (SIC 3672, 3674
and 3676). Appendix Section C.5 expands on this discussion.
One limitation of this measure is that it is based on US data. Full precision would
require to compute these weighted averages using data on occupations per industry for
each country separately. However, this data is unavailable, and I will assume the ranking in
the knowledge intensity of industries based on US data proxies that of the rest of the world.
I find that this measure correlates positively with other knowledge intensity measures
used in the literature, such as the average R&D share of sales per industry (e.g., Nunn &
Trefler 2008; Keller & Yeaple 2013), as evidenced in Table 3.1.20
The R&D based measures, however, have three main shortcomings that could generate
significant biases. First, these measures assign a zero value to about half of the industries,
because most firms within those industries have no R&D investment whatsoever. For
these industries in the lower end of the distribution, the intensity of their knowledge is
indistinguishable.21 Second, since these measures are computed by averaging across each
industry the R&D share of sales reported by a (random or not) sample of firms, they are
likely to favor industries in which larger firms are more prevalent. This might happen
20It also correlate positively with other measures that could proxy for knowledge intensity or complexity.
The correlation coefficient with the share of non-production workers in total employment, from the NBER-CES
Manufacturing Industry Database (Becker et. al. 2013), is 0.68. Similarly, the correlation coefficient with the
Product Complexity Index, developed by Hausmann et. al. (2011), is 0.49.
21See Appendix Section C.4.
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in industries for which the barriers to entry are higher, and not necessarily knowledge
intensive industries. Third, R&D investment might not be equally accounted for across all
industries.
The O*NET based measures solve these issues. Their distribution is smoother (see
Appendix Section C.5), they do not rely on a sampling of firms, and they use the same
standardized measure for all industries. Hence, I use these indicators as the main proxies
for knowledge intensity throughout the paper.
Unit shipping costs
Unit shipping costs for SIC manufacturing industries are computed using data from Bernard,
Jensen & Schott (2006).22 This industry-level measure aims to proxy for t, referred to in the
theoretical framework as the unit shipping cost variable, which accounts for how costly
it is to transport one unit of that good irrespective of industry. For instance, goods with
the highest unit shipping costs in the dataset include ready-mixed concrete and ice, which
require special forms of transportation.
The variable measures the amount of US dollars required to transport 1$ worth of a
good per every 100Km. It is computed by averaging the same measure per industry across
all countries exporting to the US in year 2005. To deal with long tails, this variable will be
used in a logarithmic scale in all the different empirical specifications.
Ease of Communication Proxies
In order to proxy for the ease of communication between a subsidiary and its headquarters,
I use three variables: non-stop flights, working hours overlap and common language.
The first variable is used because the existence of non-stop flights would proxy for the
ease of managers and workers to do more frequent business trips, given the convenience
of a direct flight. Business trips, by allowing face-to-face interaction, would facilitate the
22Downloadable from http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/files/research/
data/xm_sic87_72_105_20120424.zip
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transmission of tacit knowledge. However, it is important to note that business trips,
even if convenient, happen much less often than phone calls due to the elevated costs
associated with them. In order to compute the existence of a non-stop air route between a
headquarters and its subsidiary, I matched all the existing airports within a 100Km radius
(conditional on being in the same country), using the geocoded latitude and longitude.
The data for airports (with their respective coordinates) and active air routes come from
OpenFlight.com.23 Through this matching I create a dummy variable which takes the value
of 1 if there is a non-stop flight between the headquarters and its subsidiary.24
The second variable, overlap in working hours, aims to capture the “real-time” com-
munication ability between managers and workers in the two plants. Being in the same
time zone allows workers to use phone or videoconference communication more frequently
(substituting partially for means such as fax or email). This allows for better transmission of
tacit knowledge, which is valuable for troubleshooting or crisis solving. In order to compute
the overlap in working hours I use the geocoded longitude of each subsidiary to find its time
zone, and compare it to that of its headquarters. Assuming that working hours run from
8:00am to 6:00pm (10 hours in total), the variable measures, for a single day, the number of
hours that overlap in the working schedule of both the headquarters and its subsidiary.
Finally, a common language captures cultural proximity, and also better ability to
communicate between workers in both locations of the same firm. The common language
comes from CEPII’s GeoDist database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). Two countries have a
common language if at least 8% of the population in both countries speak such language.
The sample is merged with data that proxies for the ease of communication between
the headquarters and its foreign subsidiaries: the existence of a non-stop air route between
their nearby airports, the number of overlapping working hours in a given day and whether
there is a common language spoken in their respective countries.
23Data downloadable from http://openflights.org/data.html. Downloaded in June 2013.
24I also compute the minimum number of non-stop flights required to travel between two given airports by
using the shortest path algorithm. The results using this measure, however, are qualitatively the same as the
ones that use the non-stop flight dummy. Thus, this measure is omitted in the analysis.
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3.5 Empirical Analysis
This section first discusses the broad empirical strategy and then presents descriptive
statistics from the sample. The following subsection presents results of the empirical
analysis that test the propositions presented in the theoretical framework section. The
remaining subsections present additional evidence consistent with the assumption that the
barriers of transferring knowledge are higher for longer geographic distances.
3.5.1 Empirical Strategy
The conceptual framework outlined above is useful to understand the determinants of
horizontal expansion for MNCs. The empirical section focuses on understanding the role of
knowledge in particular.
In spite of the lack of firm-level export data in the sample, I test for the implications
of the model through reduced forms that look at the determinants of horizontal FDI, as
compared to both domestic subsidiaries and non-horizontal foreign subsidiaries.
The first empirical exercise will deal with testing Proposition (1) of the conceptual
framework: are knowledge intensive activities less likely to be replicated abroad? To do so,
I will look at a sample of domestic and foreign (horizontal) subsidiaries, and estimate the
likelihood of an industry being replicated abroad given its knowledge intensity.
In order to test Proposition (2), that is, whether longer distances makes the knowledge
transmission process more costly for firms, I rely on the complete portfolio of foreign
affiliates of the MNCs in the sample. Thus, the question the empirical specification asks is:
conditional on having a foreign plant in a given industry and location, is it likely to be an
horizontal one, given its distance to the headquarters and the knowledge intensity of its
economics activity? More broadly, the goal of the exercise is to test whether the patterns
for horizontal subsidiaries in the data are consistent with the mechanisms described in the
model. The underlying assumptions for this analysis to serve as proof of the raised question
are described in the next section.
Following this, I relax the assumptions of the previous analysis, and use only the
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horizontal foreign subsidiaries to test a deviation of the conceptual framework. More
specifically, I test for a negative correlation between distance and knowledge intensity, which
follows the model’s prediction.
It is important to clarify that this exercise does not substitute for, nor it intends to,
using firm-level export data as part of the identification strategy. Yet, the exercise adds
value by presenting stylized facts that are robust, and at the same time, consistent with the
mechanisms of the conceptual framework with respect to the role of knowledge transmission
in explaining the existence and location of horizontal subsidiaries of a MNC.
3.5.2 Descriptive statistics
This section provides descriptive details about the sample, in terms of the distribution of
foreign affiliates across regions of the world and developing vs. developed countries.
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statics which compare domestic to horizontal foreign sub-
sidiaries in the sample. This sample includes domestic subsidiaries and foreign subsidiaries
that replicate production abroad (i.e. an horizontal expansion). In total, there are 64,462
subsidiaries that are owed by 1540 MNCs. Domestic subsidiaries tend to be more numerous
than foreign ones (on average, 29% of these subsidiaries are foreign). The table also includes
the knowledge intensity variable measured in standard deviations from the mean (denoted
by KI), averaged over domestic and over foreign subsidiaries. The last column presents the
difference, with stars denoting the correspondent p-value level.
As it can be seen, on average, industries of the foreign subsidiaries are roughly as half
as knowledge-intensive as the industries manufactured by their domestic counterparts.
The same pattern holds for all presented cuts of the data, besides for few firms based on
non-OECD countries (with a p-value of 0.10), and for few firms based on Western Europe,
for which the difference is not statistically significant. This statistic is consistent with
Proposition (1) of the conceptual framework. I use this sample in the next subsection to
analyze this proposition further.
Table 3.3 summarizes the number of records in the sample that includes only foreign
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics (Domestic Vs. Foreign Subsidiaries)
MNC # Subs Foreign (%) KIForeign KIDomestic ∆
All Observations 1540 64462 .29 .19 .33 -.14∗∗∗
Non OECD 28 958 .12 .42 .34 .086∗
OECD 1512 63504 .29 .19 .33 -.14∗∗∗
East Asia & Pacific 306 17008 .11 .37 .46 -.087∗∗∗
Latin America & Caribbean 18 1920 .58 -.38 -.3 -.083∗∗∗
North America 508 24891 .2 .24 .33 -.089∗∗∗
South Asia 15 370 .16 .17 .29 -.12∗
Western Europe 693 20273 .51 .2 .18 .014
The table presents descriptive statistics from the sample. It presents for different cuts of the sample, based on the home
country of the MNC, the total number of MNC firms, the number of subsidiaries, the proportion of those subsidiaries that
are foreign (horizontal) subsidiaries, the average knowledge intensity of the foreign subsidiaries, the average knowledge
intensity for the domestic subsidiaries, and the difference between these averages, denoted by ∆. Stars represent statistical
significance of the difference: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
subsidiaries, both horizontal and non-horizontal. Overall, there are 8,266 MNC firms which
have 60,621 foreign subsidiaries. Of those subsidiaries, 34% are defined as horizontal
expansions, while the rest could be vertical subsidiaries or, simply, a foreign subsidiary
in a non-related industry25. The average distance in the sample between headquarters
and subsidiaries is 5,152Km. Regarding communication proxies, a subsidiary and its
headquarters overlap, on average, 7.3 working hours in a given day, and for about 25%
of subsidiaries there exists a commercial non-stop flight from their headquarters. The
following rows present the same statistics across different cuts of the sample, based on the
headquarters’ country. For instance, most of the foreign subsidiaries are located in OECD
countries (49,936 vs. 10,685). Similarly, the table shows that most of the foreign subsidiaries
in the sample are located in Western Europe and North America.
I also present results of the distribution of sectors among foreign affiliates, to understand
whether in the sample there are some sectors that are more likely to appear (i.e. be reported)
than others. In terms of industries, the distribution of different sectors in the sample is not
homogenous, as can be seen in Figure 3.5. Some sectors are more prevalent than others
in the data. The industries that appear the most in the data are Ready-Mixed Concrete
25For instance, this could be the result of a MNC diversifying its portfolio by acquiring foreign firms.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics (Foreign Subsidiaries)
MNC # Subs H % Dist WH DF
All Observations 8266 60621 34 5152 7.3 .25
Non OECD 2590 10685 32 7697 7.5 .2
OECD 6520 49936 35 4608 7.3 .27
East Asia & Pacific 2074 5560 26 7329 6.1 .24
Eastern Europe 68 125 30 1738 9.2 .2
Latin America & Caribbean 981 7394 36 8453 7.5 .093
Middle East & N. Africa 67 93 40 7549 7.6 .19
North America 2246 16944 37 6698 6.1 .02
South Asia 410 2405 45 7877 6.4 .2
Sub-Saharan Africa 33 51 65 7832 7.7 .098
Western Europe 4969 28049 33 2686 8.3 .44
The table presents descriptive statistics from the sample. It presents for different cuts of the sample the total number of MNC,
foreign subsidiaries (Sub), the percentage of subsidiaries classified as horizontal expansion (H%), the average distance in
kilometers between subsidiaries and headquarters (Dist), the average number of overlapping working hours between the
subsidiaries and the headquarters (WH) and the proportion of subsidiary-headquarter pairs that have a direct flight in
between them (DF).
(SIC 3273), Pharmaceutical Preparations (SIC 2834) and Motor Vehicles Parts (SIC 3714).
To alleviate concerns on how this distribution could affect the results, all the standard
deviations calculations allow for clustering at the industry level.
In addition, it is worth emphasizing that each foreign subsidiary in the sample manufac-
tures a specific product. Hence, if a MNC has several foreign subsidiaries, then each one of
those could be manufacturing a different product (in its 4 digit classification). The sample
that a single MNC that has more than one foreign subsidiary could be manufacturing more
than one product. Figure 3.6 shows that larger MNCs (as measured by number of affiliates)
tend to make a larger number of different products.
Notes on the Reliability of the Data
The Worldbase dataset collected by Dun & Bradstreet is sourced from a number of reliable
organizations all over the world, including public registries. According to Dun & Bradstreet’s
website, "the data undergoes a thorough quality assurance process to ensure that our
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Figure 3.5: Histogram of SIC codes in the sample
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The figure is an histogram of the SIC industries reported in the dataset. Each bin represents the frequency of a particular
SIC code within the manufacturing sector. Notice that the SIC classification is not fully continuos, what explains the zero
values in the figure.
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Figure 3.6: Number of different industries Vs. MNC size
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The figure plots the relationship between MNC size and total number of (different) industries the MNC is active in through
its foreign affiliates. The figure reveals that larger MNCs (measured in terms of number of subsidiaries) tend to make a
larger number of different products.
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customers receive the most up-to-date and comprehensive data available".26 However, it is
important to acknowledge that, given the lack of access to public registries for every country,
it is not possible to asses with full accuracy the representativeness of the data. Alfaro and
Charlton (2009) compare the dataset with the US multinational firms sample by the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis, and find consistencies between the two datasets. Moreover,
the regional breakdown of foreign subsidiaries presented in Table 3.3 below seems to be
consistent with aggregate figures of FDI inflows across world regions.
Some basic relationships drawn from the sample also behave as expected. For instance,
the number of countries in which an MNC has foreign affiliates is related to the overall
size of the MNC. Figure 3.7 presents the relationship between the size of firms (in number
of establishments in the left panel, and in total number of employees in the right panel27)
against the number of foreign countries in which their subsidiaries are located (on the
vertical axis). Each observation in the scatterplot is an MNC labeled with its headquarters’
country ISO3 code. The figure shows smaller MNCs are present in fewer countries, while
larger MNCs tend to be more spread out in terms of the number of countries they have a
presence in.
Focusing the analysis on the within-firm dimension significantly diminishes the sampling
concerns further. This is because, while methods for gathering information may not be
symmetric across countries, they would not systematically differ by firm or by industry.
The per-country likelihood of missing data would be the same for all firms and industries,
controlling for the location of the MNC. Thus, concerns regarding biases caused by possible
sampling asymmetries are not particularly large for the purpose of this empirical exercise.
3.5.3 Knowledge intensity as a determinant of horizontal expansion
The first empirical exercise deals with understanding the determinants of horizontal expan-
sion, with guidance of the theoretical model outlined above. It uses the sample that includes
26http://dnb.com.au/Credit_Reporting/The_quality_of_DandBs_data/index.aspx
27Including their domestic plants for both.
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Figure 3.7: MNC size vs. number of countries
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The figure shows the relationship between the size of MNC (horizontal axis) and the number of foreign countries they are
active in (vertical axis). In the scatterplots, each observation is an MNC, labeled with the ISO3 code of the country where
its headquarters is located. The left panel measures the firms’ size by the total number of subsidiaries it has (both domestic
and foreign), while the right panel uses the total employees (both in domestic and foreign plants).
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both domestic and foreign horizontal subsidiaries (described in Table 3.2). Thus, the unit
of analysis is a subsidiary. The empirical specification is a reduced form of the exports-FDI
tradeoff. That is, the analysis aims to understand the differential patterns between domestic
and foreign horizontal subsidiaries. In terms of the theory presented above, the underlying
assumption is that, whenever a firm sell a particular product to a foreign market, domestic
subsidiaries are associated with exports whereas foreign subsidiaries are associated with
FDI, and thus substitute for exports. The question asked in this exercise is, what characteris-
tics of an industry make it more likely to be replicated abroad (i.e. that exist as a foreign
subsidiary)?
According to Equation (3.3), a1−εI , which represents the productivity threshold after
which a firm engages in FDI, is a function of τ(t, d) and κ(t, d) as well as the fixed costs and
demand variables. It is important to clarify that industries may vary in their a1−εI threshold,
and its value will determine the likelihood of horizontal expansion for that industry (given
the distribution of productivity for firms within each sector). That is, controlling for demand
variables and fixed costs, industries with a lower a1−εI will be more likely to be horizontally
expanded, and vice-versa.
In this context, for a given firm and location, if a subsidiary is replicating production
abroad (i.e. foreign and horizontal), it implies that the productivity level of such MNC
goes beyond the minimum industry-specific threshold a1−εI for which FDI becomes more
profitable than exports, in that industry. Controlling for MNC productivity, thus, exploiting
variation in observed variables will shed light on the the determinants of the a1−εI value for
different industries, or alternatively, the likelihood of horizontal expansion28:
Foreigns = βk · ks + βt · log(ts) + controlsh,s + ϕh + eh,s (3.7)
Where the independent variable is a dummy which takes the value 1 if the subsidiary is
a foreign horizontal affiliate of the firm (and 0 if it is a domestic one). ks is a measure of
knowledge intensity of the economic activity (i.e., the manufactured good or product) of
28That is, Prob(a1−ε > a1−εI ).
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the foreign subsidiary. ts is the unit shipping cost for the good manufactured in the foreign
subsidiary. controlsh,s is a vector of variables that control for the size of the market and factor
endowments of the host country relative to that of the country of the headquarters,29 which
controls for aggregate demand and cost of producing in the host country. ϕh represents
MNC fixed effects, which controls for the productivity level a of the firm. It is worth
mentioning that subsidiaries within a single MNC might differ in their economic activity,
thus allowing for within-firm variation in the right hand side variables of the empirical
specification (see Figure 3.6). Finally, eh,s is the error term.
According to the theoretical framework presented above, we expect the following βk to
be negative (see Equation (3.5) and Figure 3.1).
The results are presented in Table 3.4. All the columns include the control variables. The
table uses the experience plus training measure discussed above as a proxy for k, which is
measured in standard deviations from the mean.
Column 1 presents the complete specification. The results suggest that, everything
else equal, industries that are one standard deviation above the mean in terms of their
knowledge intensity, are 3.6 percentage points less likely to be replicated abroad. This
represents a reduction of about 12% given the unconditional probability of being a foreign
affiliate in the sample (which is 29% as shown in Table 3.2). For instance, according to this
estimation, semiconductors (SIC 3674), which is characterized by having workers with an
average of over 80 months of required experience plus training30, is about 30 percentage
points less likely to be replicated abroad than a meat packing plant (SIC 2011), which its
workers have, on average, 37 months of experience plus training.
The estimator for βk is robust across all specifications. This result controls for the unit
shipping cost, and for the size of the market and factor endowments of the host country
relative to that of the country of the headquarters31. According to the theoretical framework
29i.e., yh,s = log(yh)− log(ys).
30see Appendix Section C.5
31This is 1 for all domestic subsidiaries, naturally.
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Table 3.4: Determinants of Foreign Replication of Production
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0359 -0.0349 -0.0230 -0.0348
(0.017)** (0.016)** (0.013)* (0.014)**
log(t) -0.0235 -0.0198
(0.023) (0.022)
GDP per capita ratio -0.3952 -0.4008 0.3863
(0.131)*** (0.128)*** (0.131)***
Population ratio 0.0848 0.0866 -0.0668
(0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.028)**
Capital per worker ratio 0.3299 0.3326 -0.2328
(0.080)*** (0.078)*** (0.069)***
Human Capital ratio 0.9534 0.9499 0.0294
(0.180)*** (0.176)*** (0.072)
Land per worker ratio -0.1029 -0.0994 0.1103
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.045)**
Constant 0.2220 0.2961 0.2614 0.9500
(0.046)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.104)***
N 61410 64462 64389 61410
R-squared 0.52 0.40 0.51 0.56
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N Y
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.7) using a sample of
domestic and foreign subsidiaries that replicate home production. The left hand side
variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the subsidiary is foreign. The
variables in the right hand side include the unit shipping cost associated with the industry,
knowledge intensity measures (in standard deviations from the mean) and other controls.
All specifications include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the
industry level are presented in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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above, this is a straightforward result from the assumption that ∂κ/∂k > 0
The inclusion of host country fixed effects in Column 4 rules out other potential stories
that could be driving the results. For instance, poor intellectual property regulation in
different countries.32 The estimate of βk is robust to the inclusion of this set of fixed effects
in terms of its magnitude, negative sign and its statistical significance.33
The analysis presented in Table 3.4 seems to support Proposition (1) of the model. The
next subsection focuses on Proposition (2).
3.5.4 Is the cost of knowledge transfer increasing in distance?
The previous sample is not useful to test the implications of distance, because there is no
information on where are the domestic subsidiaries exporting to, if at all. Thus, to test
the implications of Proposition (2), I will use a dataset that includes only foreign affiliates.
The idea is to understand whether there are differential patterns in the data for horizontal
affiliates (i.e. replication of production), using as a comparison group the non-horizontal
subsidiaries. The underlying assumption of using non-horizontal foreign subsidiaries as
a counterfactual is that the marginal cost of transferring knowledge is zero (or very little)
for non-horizontal subsidiaries. While there is likely a fixed cost of transferring knowledge
to non-horizontal subsidiaries when they are created or acquired, the assumption of zero
marginal costs for this type of subsidiaries relates to the intuition that there is less the
headquarters can do to offer ongoing troubleshooting or to train workers in these plants
when it comes to production lines that are essentially different from the ones that exist at
home. Therefore, controlling for variables that would explain the decision of a firm to locate
a foreign subsidiary in a given location (regardless of whether it is horizontal or not), the
residual differences could be attributed to the cost of transferring knowledge, and more
so if they are consistent with the conceptual framework. Yet, given the assumption is not
32Appendix Section C.6.4 presents results excluding China from the sample, to alleviate possible biases this
country might generate in the results due to IP concerns. The results are robust to the exclusion of China.
33The results are robust to using parent industry (2-digit) interacted with host country fixed effects, to allow
for differential policies at the country level for different types of industries.
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testable, Section 3.5.4 below relaxes it, and find consistent results.
The empirical specification for this exercise is described in equation 3.8:
HORs = βk · ks + βd · log(dh,s) + βt · log(ts) + controlsh,s + ϕh + eh,s (3.8)
Where the independent variable is a dummy which takes the value 1 if the subsidiary
(indexed by s) in that observation is a horizontal foreign affiliate, and 0 if, instead, is a
non-horizontal foreign subsidiary. Again, ks is a measure of knowledge intensity in standard
deviations from the mean, associated with the foreign subsidiary. dh,s is the distance
between the headquarters and the foreign subsidiary. ts is the unit shipping cost for the
good manufactured in the foreign subsidiary. controlsh,s is the same vector as in specification
3.7. Similarly to before, ϕh represents MNC fixed effects and eh,s is the error term. If the
mechanisms of the model are in place, we could expect a negative βd, which could only be
explained if κ increases with distance
The results are presented in Table 3.5. All the columns include the control variables. The
table uses the experience plus training measure discussed above as a proxy for k.
Column 1 presents the complete specification, while the other columns vary in the
number of variables used in the regression. The estimator for βk is negative and statistically
significant; the estimator for βd is also negative and statistically significant; and the estimator
for βt has the expected positive sign, but lacks statistical significance.
Before turning into the coefficient of interest for this exercise (βd), it should be noted
that the negative sign for the estimator of βk is consistent with the previous results in Table
3.4 and Equation (3.5) of the theoretical framework. More specifically, an industry with a
knowledge intensity measure one standard deviation above the mean is about 8.7 percentage
points less likely to be horizontally expanded, compared to non-horizontal affiliates. Hence,
once again, the data suggests that the barriers associated with the transmission of knowledge
from the headquarters to the subsidiaries are an important determinant of horizontal
expansion.
Across all specifications that include log(d), the estimator for βd remains negative and
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Table 3.5: Determinants of Horizontal FDI
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0877 -0.0872 -0.0898
(0.043)** (0.043)** (0.043)**
log(d) -0.0242 -0.0239 -0.0230
(0.009)** (0.009)** (0.010)**
log(t) 0.0233 0.0239 0.0611 0.0229
(0.066) (0.066) (0.056) (0.065)
GDP per capita ratio 0.1297 0.1311 0.1282 0.9039
(0.056)** (0.057)** (0.056)** (0.243)***
Population ratio 0.0128 0.0210 0.0142 0.3127
(0.007)* (0.007)*** (0.007)** (0.077)***
Capital per worker ratio -0.0833 -0.1005 -0.0792 -0.6599
(0.045)* (0.047)** (0.046)* (0.182)***
Human Capital ratio -0.0052 0.0370 -0.0098 -0.4287
(0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.282)
Land per worker ratio -0.0131 -0.0106 -0.0131 0.0124
(0.007)* (0.008) (0.007)* (0.054)
Constant 0.6264 0.4426 0.6745 0.7577
(0.161)*** (0.135)*** (0.148)*** (0.226)***
N 55136 55137 55136 55136
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N Y
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.8) using a sample of foreign
subsidiaries of MNCs. The left hand side variable is a binary variable that takes the value
1 if the foreign subsidiary is classified as a horizontal expansion. The variables in the
right hand side include the distance from the MNC headquarters to the foreign subsidiary
(in logs), the unit shipping cost (in logs), knowledge intensity measures (in standard
deviations from the mean) and other controls. All specifications include MNC fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are presented in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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statistically significant. As explained above, in a model that ignores the cost of transferring
knowledge, an increase in distance will unequivocally increase the incentives for horizontal
FDI. However, only the inclusion of κ in the model as an increasing function of distance
would explain the obtained results, which suggests that an increase in d would reduce the
likelihood of horizontal FDI.34
What does βd < 0 imply? The theoretical model, as summarized in the right panel of
Figure 3.2, contemplates a case in which a firm serving a further away market would be
better-off by exporting than by setting up a foreign affiliate, because transmitting knowledge
to this remote location will significantly lower profits from FDI relative to profits from
exports. However, given that the empirical specification is a reduced-form of the theoretical
implications, it is not possible to distinguish between the case in which the firm effectively
substitutes FDI with exports, or alternatively, the case in which the firm reduces its horizontal
FDI in absolute terms, driven by a reduction of total sales (both through FDI and exports) in
a further away location. In both cases, though, the negative sign of βd implies that the cost
of transferring knowledge is increasing with distance. In fact, given that the control group
includes vertical subsidiaries, there are less reasons to expect this result. In theory, vertical
subsidiaries are located closer to the headquarters as compared to horizontal subsidiaries
(given the transportation costs associated with importing the intermediate goods from the
vertical subsidiary to the headquarters). Therefore, a negative estimator for βd is even more
striking.
Finally, the estimator for βt is positive in sign, though statistically insignificant across all
specifications. The positive sign is consistent with the proximity-concentration hypothesis:
firms will tend to serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates for goods with larger
trade costs (e.g., Brainard 1993, 1997; Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004).
Similarly to Table 3.4, Column 4 includes host country fixed effects, which would
control for poor intellectual property regulation in different countries. It is important to
acknowledge that the specification lacks variables that control for industry-specific fixed
34See Appendix Section C.1 for more details on the theoretical conditions for this to happen.
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costs of exporting and creating new plants. It can be argued that, as long as fixed costs are
not dependent on k or d, then the results are indicative of the explained mechanisms. If
fixed costs are the same across industries and countries, then their exclusion should not bias
the results. If the fixed costs are country-dependent, then the controls included in Column 4
would account for them.
A trade-off between distance and knowledge intensity
This subsection relaxes the underlying assumption which was required to compare horizon-
tal to non-horizontal foreign subsidiaries stated above, which is critical to correctly interpret
the estimation of βd.
The theoretical framework above provides guidance to address this question in a different
way. A firm’s total profit when it engages in FDI is pi = piD + piI . Given that piI is subject to
cost κ, and κ increases both in k and d, then ∂pi/∂k < 0 and ∂pi/∂d < 0. Figure 3.8 abstracts
from the model the expected relationship between d and k that drives a firm’s decision to
engage in FDI. The figure includes the case that assumes linear relationships. In it, each
line represents a profit function. The curve piD + piE represents total profits for an exporting
firm, while the curve piD + piI represent total profits for a firm engaging in FDI instead. The
profit for an exporting firm does not vary with the level of knowledge intensity (k) of the
good, whereas the profit for the same firm if it engages in FDI instead does vary with k.
Both profits functions decrease in distance, represented by d.
In all cases, however, it can be seen that for higher levels of k and d (i.e., knowledge
intensity and distance, respectively) firms would be better off by substituting exports with
FDI. The opposite happens for cases in which both k and d are low. Moreover, even when
firms engage in FDI, their profits decrease with both distance and knowledge intensity.
Thus, MNCs in knowledge intensive products would be better off by locating their foreign
subsidiaries at closer geographic distance.
I explore whether relationship between k and d described above is seen using only the
horizontal foreign subsidiaries in the data. That is, conditional on being an horizontal
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Figure 3.8: Profit curves, in the k and d dimension
The figure is a graphical representation of a firm’s profit as a function of k and d. The curve piD + piE represents total profits
for an exporting firm, while the curve piD + piI represent total profits for a firm engaging in FDI instead.
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foreign subsidiary, do we see a clear negative relationship between the knowledge intensity
of its sector, and the distance to its headquarters? The proper way to do this is to analyze
these variables after controlling for the regressors in Specification (3.8). Hence, this exercise
has two steps.
First, I decompose distance and knowledge intensity and keep the part that is not
explained by these other regressors (i.e., the residuals). That is, I define:
U [log(d)] = log(d)− γ1t log(t)− controls′h,sγ1c − ϕh
U [k] = k− γ2t log(t)− controls′h,sγ2c − ϕh
Where the γ coefficients are estimated by regressing log(d) and k on the regressors,
limiting the sample to horizontal foreign subsidiaries only. Notice that the inclusion of
MNC firm fixed effect, imply that the residuals will contain within firm variation only.
The second step is to estimate U [log(d)] and U[k] using the sample, and to find a
functional form that properly fits the relationship under consideration. As explained above,
we expect this relationship to be negative. Figure 3.9 presents the results of this exercise,
using the experience plus training indicator as a proxy for k. The left column performs a linear
fit between k and d while the right column performs a quadratic firm between the two.
The linear fit shows a monotonic decreasing relationship between k and d, as depicted in
Figure 3.8. In its linear form, the calculation suggests that the distance to the headquarters
is shorter by 7.8% for every standard deviation above the mean in knowledge intensity. This
implies that, for an American MNC, a meat packing subsidiary would be located in Turkey
(approximately, 10000Km from USA), while a semiconductor plant would be located in
Ireland (approximately 6500km from USA), ceteris paribus. The evidence hence suggests,
that, indeed, firms face a trade-off between distance and knowledge intensity, providing
further evidence on the fact that the cost of knowledge transmission is a function of both
these terms.
Interestingly, the quadratic fit suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship. That is, the
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Figure 3.9: Estimated relationship of U[k] and U[log(d)]
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The figure presents the empirical fit for the relationship between d and k (the latter proxied by the experience plus training
measure). The left column performs a linear fit between k and d while the right column performs a quadratic firm between
the two. The grey area represents the 95% confidence interval for the estimated relationship.
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estimated quadratic relationship does not seem to be monotonically decreasing for the
lower values of k (although a flat or even negative slope in that area cannot be rejected in
the data either). However, and perhaps more importantly, for higher levels of knowledge
intensity there is a clear negative relationship with distance. This result is qualitatively
important, given that it would be consistent with the idea that distance appears to matter
much more for higher levels of knowledge intensity. Intuitively, this means that after certain
level of knowledge intensity, the more sophisticated products are the closer the foreign
subsidiaries will be located to the headquarters. The negative second derivative implied
in the fit suggests that the documented negative relationship intensifies with the level of
knowledge intensity.
Overall, the data supports the existence of a trade-off between distance and knowledge
intensity for horizontal foreign subsidiaries. This implies that, if MNC do expand horizon-
tally, the foreign affiliates will tend to be geographically closer to the headquarters the more
knowledge intensive the product under consideration is.35
These results, in their reduced form, are consistent with the ones found by Keller and
Yeaple (2013). They find that distant foreign affiliates in knowledge intensive sectors perform
worse. The authors, however, attribute these results to additional trade costs due to the
substitution of transferring knowledge with intermediate goods. The framework and results
presented above present an alternative explanation to this finding, in which the performance
of subsidiaries is highly affected by the inefficiencies of transferring knowledge at longer
distances, and not higher intra-firm cost induced by intermediate goods. The next section
explores this issue further.
3.5.5 Ease of communication and knowledge transmission
The empirical results, while consistent with the theoretical framework, might be driven by
factors other than knowledge not accounted for, in the presence of omitted variable bias.
35Appendix Section C.6.5 replicates these results excluding foreign subsidiaries located in Western Europe
owned by a Europe-based MNC, given the relative shorter distances within the continent. Results are robust to
the exclusion of these firms.
105
For instance, a conventional explanation in the literature would be that knowledge intensive
sectors are associated with higher intra-firm trade of intermediate goods, making it less
profitable to locate those plants in far away locations (Irrazabal et. al. 2013; Keller and
Yeaple 2013).
Keller and Yeaple, in particular, assume that knowledge can be fully embedded in
intermediate goods, that are in turn shipped to remote locations. However, this assumption
is not feasible for tacit knowledge. Thus, it could well be that it is the cost of transmitting
tacit knowledge which drives the documented relationship.
This subsection performs a test that disentangles between both explanations. If the
cost of transferring knowledge is indeed an increasing function of distance – as argued
– and thus, a determinant in the location decisions of firms, then easier communication
between headquarters and subsidiaries would work as a cost-reducing mechanism for the
purpose of transmitting knowledge. This would be hard to explain with the intra-firm trade
mechanism, given that the ease of communication is orthogonal to the transportation costs
of intermediate goods.
I test for this hypothesis by estimating an extended version model (3.8) which includes
variables that proxy for the ease of communication within the firm. These variables, all
measured for each subsidiary and its headquarters, are (1) the existence of a commercial
non-stop air route (between airports within 100Km); (2) the number of overlapping working
hours in a business day; and (3) a binary variable indicating whether the countries of both
the headquarters and the subsidiary speak a common language36 (see Section 3.4.2 for more
details on the construction of these variables).
The purpose of utilizing these variables is to proxy for forms of communication that
allow for the transmission of tacit knowledge, though they are quite different between
themselves. As explained above, business travel provides the opportunity to work face-to-
face, though it occurs with less frequency, given the high costs of traveling.37 Being in the
36Defined as a language that is spoken by 8% or more of the population in both countries.
37Giroud (2012) finds that the existence of commercial air routes between subsidiaries and headquarters
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same time zone allows for convenient real-time, day-to-day, communication, significantly
reducing waiting time between the two ends for problem solving or consulting about specific
tasks.38 Lastly, if two countries speak a common language, it is more likely that the workers
in both the local and remote locations of the same firm can communicate more easily, either
in person or remotely, and better communicate (and more often) with each other.
The results are presented in Table 3.6. All columns use the experience plus training
indicator to proxy for k.
Column 3 of Table 3.6 shows that the estimator for βd is reduced in magnitude by two
thirds of its original value, and becomes statistically insignificant when using the number of
overlapping working hours as a control (as compared to Column 1, which replicates the
first specification of Table 3.5). This result suggests that being in the same time zone reduces
the barriers to transferring knowledge induced by the distance component (given that the
estimator for βk maintains its magnitude and negative sign in those specifications, implying
only the distance channel in κ(k, d) is affected). That is, real-time communication effectively
“reduces” the distance between the headquarters and its subsidiaries, by about two thirds.
For the average foreign subsidiary, being in the same time zone is equivalent to being
geographically closer to the headquarters by about 3500 Km. The ability to communicate
on real-time for troubleshooting or other purposes, avoiding long waiting times, seems
to ease knowledge transmission more than the ease of face-to-face interaction. The costs
associated with the knowledge intensity component still seem play a role, regardless of
communication.
An alternative explanation of the previous results that relies on shipping costs of
intermediate goods can be ruled out: transportation costs should be just as expensive north
to south as they are east to west.
In terms of the other variables, it can be seen in Column 2 that the existence of a non-stop
positively affects the profitability of the former.
38Stein and Daude (2007) find that time zone is an important determinant of aggregate FDI flows, which
they attribute to better monitoring.
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Table 3.6: Determinants of Horizontal FDI, Ease of Communication
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0877 -0.0878 -0.0868 -0.0875
(0.043)** (0.043)** (0.043)** (0.043)**
log(d) -0.0242 -0.0254 -0.0076 -0.0187
(0.009)** (0.009)*** (0.014) (0.008)**
log(t) 0.0233 0.0232 0.0239 0.0233
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Non-stop Flight -0.0084
(0.010)
Working hours overlap 0.0091
(0.005)*
Common Language 0.0497
(0.024)**
GDP per capita ratio 0.1297 0.1302 0.1271 0.1279
(0.056)** (0.056)** (0.056)** (0.055)**
Population ratio 0.0128 0.0131 0.0123 0.0139
(0.007)* (0.007)* (0.007)* (0.007)**
Capital per worker ratio -0.0833 -0.0841 -0.0892 -0.0800
(0.045)* (0.046)* (0.044)** (0.044)*
Human Capital ratio -0.0052 -0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0107
(0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064)
Land per worker ratio -0.0131 -0.0124 -0.0079 -0.0075
(0.007)* (0.007)* (0.007) (0.008)
Constant 0.6264 0.6383 0.4316 0.5718
(0.161)*** (0.160)*** (0.217)** (0.158)***
N 55136 55136 55136 55132
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N N
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.8) using a sample of
foreign subsidiaries of MNCs. The left hand side variable is a binary variable that
takes the value 1 if the foreign subsidiary is classified as a horizontal expansion. The
variables on the right hand side include the distance from the MNC headquarters to
the foreign subsidiary (in logs), the unit shipping cost (in logs), knowledge intensity
measures (in standard deviations from the mean), and other controls. The right hand side
also includes variables measuring the ease of communication between a headquarters
and its subsidiaries. All specifications include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the industry level are presented in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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commercial air route seems not to change the original results, thus hinting that face-to-face
interaction plays a lesser role in the stated mechanisms. However, Column 4 shows that
having a common language also effectively reduces the distance between a headquarters
and its subsidiary by less than half.
Figure 3.10 replicate Figure 3.9, this time adding as additional controls all the ease of
communication variables that are included in Table 3.6. The left panel shows the linear fit
with the original controls, while the right panel controls also for the ease of communication.
It can be seen that the slope that defines the relationship between k and d after controlling
for the ease of communications is about 33% flatter. While the negative relationship still
seems to hold, the reduction in the slope is consistent with the results presented in this
section.
These findings are insightful on their own. The results suggest that being in the
same time zone and speaking a common language seems to facilitate the transmission of
knowledge. The ability of managers in the headquarters to communicate with colleagues
in foreign locations, for troubleshooting or consulting on an open-ended range of issues,
is more efficient when communication happens in real time, without long waiting times.
This might be even more relevant for transmitting tacit knowledge, given that complicated
problems would require real-time interaction, and not just explanations being sent through
fax or email. Furthermore, this logic could also serve as an example for arguing that the
barriers of transmitting knowledge is increasing with distance: managers and workers in
the headquarters might require working extra hours to communicate with their peers in
foreign subsidiaries, incurring additional compensation and operational costs.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has provided evidence on the important role of knowledge, and the difficulties
associated with its transmission in the day-to-day activities of MNCs. Sizable costs of
transferring knowledge, even within firms, would have an impact on their strategies to
either export or undertake foreign investment, directly affecting the global economy in
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Figure 3.10: Estimated relationship of U[k] and U[log(d)]
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terms of trade and capital flows. Furthermore, the empirical analysis presents evidence of a
tradeoff firms face, which drives them to locate foreign subsidiaries producing knowledge
intensive goods in geographic locations that are closer to the headquarters. Thus, knowledge
is not lighter than air. Rather, its diffusion is difficult and costly, and hence it has implications
on economic activity.
These findings are not inconsistent with the mechanism of the proximity-concentration
hypothesis (e.g., Brainard 1997), yet they introduce a new and unexplored dimension. The
cost of transferring knowledge plays a role that counteracts the incentives to engage in FDI
driven by transportation costs. Hence, FDI does not necessarily become more profitable
than exports for all industries with high transportation costs.
More generally, the fact that geographic distance hinders the process of knowledge
transmission is a result that defies the traditional way economists have thought about FDI
and MNC activity. In most of the international economics research, it is taken as a given
that knowledge is fully transferrable without incurring any costs whatsoever – not even for
different types of technologies or goods. However, if one takes into account the large variety
of different industries that exist in the world, and how they can dramatically differ in almost
any dimension, it follows that we can expect each firm to set a strategy that is dependent
on the types of products they produce and sell. In a globalized economy, being able to sell
products at a global scale requires a minimum level of productivity, which firms achieve
by acquiring productive knowledge. The way firms acquire and maintain this knowledge
is through their workers in the headquarters and all of its relevant subsidiaries (domestic
and foreign). The finding that knowledge transmission incurs costs that are dependent on
distance would thus have a significant impact on the expansion decisions of MNCs.
Nonetheless, this paper has left open some other specific questions that will shed light on
our general understanding of knowledge. For instance, is the cost of knowledge transmission
a relevant determinant for service provider firms, as it is for manufacturing firms? Given the
difference in the nature of services vs. manufacturing industries in terms of their tradability,
we can expect different patterns in the data. Also, how does the knowledge intensity of
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the good relate to the existence of regional hubs, as opposed to different plants serving
every foreign market? What tools and means are at a firm’s disposal to enhance the process
through which it transfers knowledge to its subsidiaries and workers? These and other
questions are an essential part of the future research agenda.
Naturally, this research agenda also contains questions that have relevant policy impli-
cations. While governments intend to develop their private sectors by attracting foreign
investment, designing an effective policy should answer questions such as: is there enough
infrastructure in place to allow effective communication for foreign firms? Should the focus
be on specific types of firms and specific industries for which knowledge transmission will
be easier? Do all types of products have the potential to generate productivity spillovers to
domestic firms, or only those for which the cost of knowledge transmission is low?
All in all, despite the fact that productivity outweighs factor accumulation in growth
accounting exercises (Hall and Jones 1999, Caselli 2005), the process through which knowl-
edge is accumulated by economic agents is still an under-researched area. However, a better
understanding of this process is critical to answering open questions in economics. The
difficulties associated with transferring and acquiring knowledge, which translates into
productivity shifts, are not unique to MNCs. They can also relate to domestic firms (e.g.,
Bloom et. al. 2013; Kalnins and Lafontaine 2013), investors (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz 2001),
innovation (e.g., Kerr 2008) and even countries’ export baskets diversification (Bahar et. al.
2014). At a larger scale, the documented evidence reinforces the importance of knowledge
transmission in overall economic activity. Thus, understanding the ways knowledge affects
economic activity lies at the core of important and unanswered questions on convergence,
development and growth. Knowledge and its diffusion, after all, are significant phenomena
that can alter global economic patterns in as-of-yet unexplored ways.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 The Network of Export Similarity
The similarity in the export baskets of countries is strongly affected by variables that proxy
for distance and is robust to the inclusion of institutional, income and factor endowment
variables. In fact, one way to illustrate the strength of the similarity between neighboring
countries is to represent the matrix of export similarity as a network, where each country is
connected to the two other countries most similar to it. Figure A.1 presents export similarity
for year 2008 as a graphical network where each node represent a country, and each country
is connected to the two other countries with the most similar export baskets, as measured
by the Export Similarity Index Sc,c′ . Countries are colored according to geographic regions,
showing that the clusters defined by export similarity correlate strongly with physical
distance. The width of links is proportional to the similarity index and the color of the link
indicates whether the similarity is driven by Primary and Resource Based (PRB) products
(blue) or by NPRB products (red) (see Section A.4 of the web appendix for more details). We
note that, in a large number of cases, the country with the most similar export structure is
an immediate neighbor, such as in the case of France, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovakia or in the case of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. This visualization
illustrates the strong association between proximity and export structure that characterizes
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the world economy.
A.2 Bilateral Trade and Similarity in Exports
We pursue a more analytical approach to show that the similarity index among neighboring
countries is mostly driven by their exports to the rest of the world, and not by the bilateral
exports between themselves (see Figure 1.3). In order to do so, we decomposed the Export
Similarity Index in two measures: (1) a Similarity Index in Bilateral Exports, which uses
data on the bilateral exports among each pair of countries, and generates a similarity index
by computing the Pearson correlation of the RCA vectors, identical to the way in which
we computed the Export Similarity Index Sc,c′ ; (2) a Similarity Index on Rest of the World
(ROW) Exports, which uses data on exports to the rest of the world excluding bilateral
exports for every pair of countries and, similarly, computes the Pearson correlation of the
RCA vectors.
We use these two measures to show that the variation in the Export Similarity Index
(Sc,c′ ) is mostly driven by the ROW Export Similarity Index. To support this statement we
run a linear regression using the Export Similarity Index as the dependent variable and both
decompositions as the independent variables for year 2000. The results of such regression
are in Table A.1.
The first two columns of Table A.1 use the dataset for all the country pairs. In terms of
explaining the left-hand side variable, the ROW Similarity Index does a much better job, as
can be seen in the difference between the R-squared for columns 2 and 1: an increase of
0.65. Also, in terms of magnitude of the coefficients, in column 2, the ROW Similarity Index
coefficient is almost three times larger than the bilateral similarity index one. Columns 3 and
4 repeat the exercise, but limit the dataset to neighboring countries. In fact, in this case, the
Bilateral Similarity Index explains a larger portion of Sc,c′ , hinting that neighboring countries
do engage in more intra-industry trade, but still, the ROW Similarity Index explains much
more: the R-squared is increased by 0.55 from specification 3 to 4, and the magnitude of the
ROW Similarity Index estimator is roughly twice as large as the magnitude of the Bilateral
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Table A.1: Bilateral and ROW Similarity Index, Year 2000
All All Neighbors Neighbors
Bilateral Exp. Sim. Index 0.5757 0.2758 0.7316 0.4720
(0.068)*** (0.034)*** (0.063)*** (0.041)***
ROW Exp. Sim. Index 0.8304 0.8462
(0.007)*** (0.039)***
Constant 0.1617 0.0972 0.3392 0.0923
(0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)***
N 7260 7260 179 179
r2 0.07 0.71 0.32 0.87
This table uses the Export Similarity Index (not normalized, all products) as the dependent
variable. Columns 1, 2 use all country-pairs in the sample, columns 3, 4 limit the sample to
neighboring country pairs. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Similarity Index coefficient.
In all regressions, the similarity index as measured by exports to the ROW has a
larger explanatory power. This hints that most of the similarity among countries and their
neighbors is driven by exports to the ROW, and not by exports between themselves.
A.3 Robustness of the Stylized Facts
A.3.1 Variations in ε
In this section we address robustness concerns with regard to our choice of ε = 0.1 in the
calculation of Sc,c′ based on equation (1.2). Our original choice of ε = 0.1 allows us to deal
with values of RCAc,p = 0 in the log-transformation. However, this raises concerns that the
choice of ε might drive the results we presented in Table 1.3. Therefore, we recalculated Sc,c′
defining ε as 0.001, 0.01 and 0.25. Figure A.2 shows the correlation of these new measures
and the original Sc,c′ (using ε = 0.1). As can be seen, the different choices of ε are highly
correlated with our original choice.
To convince the readers of the robustness of our choice of ε, we reproduce Figures 1.1
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Figure A.2: Scatter of Sc,c′ (with ε = {0.001, 0.01, 0.25}) vs. Sc,c′ (with ε = 0.1)
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The figure contains three scatterplots comparing our original (BHH) Export Similarity Index and the recalcula-
tions of the Similarity Index using different values of ε (0.001, 0.01 and 0.25 from left to right) for all country
pairs in year 2000.
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Figure A.3: Stylized Facts Similarity Index (ε = 0.001)
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The left panel of the figure shows the distributions (in year 2000) of the Export Similarity Index (using ε = 0.001)
for All (not neighbors) Country Pairs, and for Neighbors Pairs only. The right panel shows the average Export
Similarity Index (using ε = 0.001) for country pairs in each bracket of distance between 250 km to 5000 km. The
upper figures use the Export Similarity Index (using ε = 0.001) for all products, and the lower figures use the
Export Similarity Index (using ε = 0.001) for NPRB products only.
and 1.2, along with Table 1.3, using this time Sc,c′ defined with each of the new ε values.
Results are presented in Figures A.3-A.5, and Tables A.2-A.4. For all variations of ε, the
results are qualitatively robust to our original measure.
A.3.2 Indexed RCA Export Similarity Index
To erase concerns regarding the log-transformation of the RCA vectors in computing Sc,c′
based on equation (1.2), we constructed a variation of our similarity index, which we call
the Indexed RCA Export Similarity Index, by substituting rc,p in equation (1.2), by:
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Figure A.4: Stylized Facts Similarity Index (ε = 0.01)
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The left panel of the figure shows the distributions (in year 2000) of the Export Similarity Index (using ε = 0.01)
for All (not neighbors) Country Pairs, and for Neighbors Pairs only. The right panel shows the average Export
Similarity Index (using ε = 0.01) for country pairs in each bracket of distance between 250 km to 5000 km. The
upper figures use the Export Similarity Index (using ε = 0.01) for all products, and the lower figures use the
Export Similarity Index (using ε = 0.01) for NPRB products only.
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Figure A.5: Stylized Facts Similarity Index (ε = 0.25)
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The left panel of the figure shows the distributions (in year 2000) of the Export Similarity Index (using ε = 0.25)
for All (not neighbors) Country Pairs, and for Neighbors Pairs only. The right panel shows the average Export
Similarity Index (using ε = 0.25) for country pairs in each bracket of distance between 250 km to 5000 km. The
upper figures use the Export Similarity Index (using ε = 0.25) for all products, and the lower figures use the
Export Similarity Index (using ε = 0.25) for NPRB products only.
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Figure A.6: Scatter of Indexed RCA Similarity Index vs. BHH Similarity Index
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The figure is a scatterplot comparing our original (BHH) Export Similarity Index and the Indexed RCA Export
Similarity Index for all country pairs, in year 2000.
rc,p =
RCAc,p − 1
RCAc,p + 1
Under this definition, rc,p = 1 if RCAc,p → ∞, and rc,p = −1 if RCAc,p = 0. This
transformation also deals with fat tails in the original distribution of RCAc,p and hence
eliminates the need to do a log-transformation.
Figure A.6 shows the high correlation between the original Sc,c′ and the Indexed RCA
Export Similarity Index.
Figure A.7 uses the Indexed-RCA Sc,c′ to replicate Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Our original Sc,c′
is robust to this new transformation in terms of its correlation with distance.
We also estimated model (1.3) using the Indexed-RCA Sc,c′ (standardized with mean
zero and unit standard deviation). The results are presented in Table A.5. Our static analysis
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Figure A.7: Stylized Facts Indexed RCA Similarity Index
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The left panel of the figure shows the distributions (in year 2000) of the Indexed-RCA Export Similarity Index for
All (not neighbors) Country Pairs, and for Neighbors Pairs only. The right panel shows the average Indexed-RCA
Export Similarity Index for country pairs in each bracket of distance between 250 km to 5000 km. The upper
figures use the Indexed-RCA Similarity Index for all products, and the lower figures use the Indexed-RCA
Similarity Index for NPRB products only.
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is robust to using this other methodology of measuring similarity in export baskets, in terms
of the signs and explanatory power of the variables.
A.3.3 The Finger & Kreinin Export Similarity
We replicate the results shown in the main body of the paper using the Finger & Kreinin
(F&K) Export Similarity Index (Finger & Kreinin, 1979). The F&K Similarity Index is
constructed using the formula:
SF&Kc,c′ =∑
p
min(scp, s
c′
p )
where p represents products, c and c′ represent any two countries and scp is the share of
product p exported by country c out of the total export baskets for country c. Hence, two
countries c and c′ that export the exact same products in the exact same proportion would
have SF&Kc,c′ = 1.
Figure A.8 shows the scatter of both export similarity indices—our own named BBH
Export Similarity Index and F&K’s one—showing a strong positive correlation between
them (ρ = 0.65). This implies that both indexes capture much of the same information.
Figure A.9 shows that our analysis presented in the main body of this paper is robust to
using the F&K Similarity Index. The upper panel of the figure presents the distribution of
the index for geographical neighbors and non neighbors, and the declining relationship of
the index with distance for all products. The lower panel replicates the graphs using the
F&K index computed with NPRB products only. We find that the results are robust to the
ones presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.
We also replicated the analysis presented in Table 1.3, which estimates model (1.3). This
time, we use a normalized version of the F&K Similarity Index as the dependent variable
with mean zero and unit standard deviation. The results are presented in Table A.6. Our
static analysis is robust to using this way of measuring similarity in export baskets.
133
Ta
bl
e
A
.5
:C
or
re
la
te
s
of
th
e
In
de
xe
d
R
C
A
Si
m
ila
ri
ty
In
de
x
A
ll
A
ll
A
ll
N
PR
B
N
PR
B
N
PR
B
Ln
Si
m
pl
e
D
is
ta
nc
e
(K
m
)
-0
.5
58
7
-0
.3
29
9
-0
.3
21
0
-0
.3
40
7
-0
.1
49
3
-0
.1
58
2
(0
.0
17
)*
**
(0
.0
22
)*
**
(0
.0
23
)*
**
(0
.0
16
)*
**
(0
.0
21
)*
**
(0
.0
23
)*
**
Sh
ar
e
a
Bo
rd
er
0.
80
09
0.
66
50
0.
54
62
0.
40
52
(0
.0
86
)*
**
(0
.0
87
)*
**
(0
.0
75
)*
**
(0
.0
78
)*
**
Sa
m
e
R
eg
io
n
0.
40
46
0.
11
50
0.
37
73
0.
12
89
(0
.0
39
)*
**
(0
.0
44
)*
**
(0
.0
34
)*
**
(0
.0
39
)*
**
Sa
m
e
La
ng
ua
ge
0.
09
64
0.
09
14
(0
.0
44
)*
*
(0
.0
41
)*
*
H
av
e/
H
ad
C
ol
on
ia
lR
el
at
io
ns
hi
p
0.
02
55
0.
13
77
(0
.0
90
)
(0
.0
87
)
C
om
m
on
C
ol
on
iz
er
0.
02
70
0.
07
70
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
54
)
A
bs
.D
if
.L
n
G
D
P
Pe
r
C
ap
it
a
(P
PP
)
-0
.3
06
5
-0
.3
46
5
(0
.0
28
)*
**
(0
.0
29
)*
**
A
bs
.D
if
.L
n
Po
pu
la
ti
on
-0
.0
88
7
-0
.0
60
2
(0
.0
12
)*
**
(0
.0
11
)*
**
Lo
g
To
ta
lB
ila
te
ra
lT
ra
de
(I
m
p
+
Ex
p)
-0
.0
31
1
-0
.0
25
0
(0
.0
02
)*
**
(0
.0
02
)*
**
A
bs
.D
if
.L
n
Py
si
ca
lC
ap
it
al
Pe
r
W
or
ke
r
-0
.0
56
3
0.
02
60
(0
.0
24
)*
*
(0
.0
25
)
A
bs
.D
if
.L
n
H
um
an
C
ap
it
al
Pe
r
W
or
ke
r
-0
.3
99
2
-0
.1
71
9
(0
.0
49
)*
**
(0
.0
49
)*
**
A
bs
.D
if
.L
n
La
nd
Pe
r
W
or
ke
r
-0
.2
22
4
-0
.1
31
6
(0
.0
33
)*
**
(0
.0
32
)*
**
N
75
03
75
03
54
60
75
03
75
03
54
60
r2
0.
34
0.
36
0.
53
0.
39
0.
40
0.
51
Th
is
ta
bl
e
us
es
a
no
rm
al
iz
ed
ve
rs
io
n
of
th
e
In
de
xe
d
R
C
A
Si
m
ila
ri
ty
In
de
x
(w
ith
m
ea
n
ze
ro
an
d
un
it
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n)
as
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
.C
ol
um
ns
1-
3
es
tim
at
es
m
od
el
(1
.3
)
us
in
g
th
e
In
de
xe
d
R
C
A
Ex
po
rt
Si
m
ila
ri
ty
In
de
x
w
ith
al
lp
ro
du
ct
s,
w
hi
le
co
lu
m
ns
4-
6
us
es
th
e
In
de
xe
d
R
C
A
Ex
po
rt
Si
m
ila
ri
ty
In
de
x
co
m
pu
te
d
w
ith
N
PR
B
pr
od
uc
ts
on
ly
.A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
co
un
tr
y
du
m
m
ie
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
co
un
tr
y-
pa
ir
le
ve
l.
∗ p
<
0.
10
,∗∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗∗
∗
p
<
0.
01
134
Figure A.8: Scatter of F&K Similarity Index vs. BHH Similarity Index
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The figure is a scatterplot comparing our original (BHH) Export Similarity Index and the F&K Export Similarity
Index for all country pairs, in year 2000.
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Figure A.9: Stylized Facts F&K Similarity Index
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The left panel of the figure shows the distributions (in year 2000) of the F&K Export Similarity Index for All
(not neighbors) Country Pairs, and for Neighbors Pairs only. The right panel shows the average F&K Export
Similarity Index for country pairs in each bracket of distance between 250 km. to 5000 km. The upper figures
use the F&K Similarity Index for all products, and the lower figures use the F&K Similarity Index for NPRB
products only.
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A.3.4 Proximity Weighted Similarity Index
Another possible way to compute a similarity index which takes into account not only the
intensity of exports for each product as measured by the RCA, but also being weighted by
the proximity matrix φ. In other words, the index would be as follows:
SPROXc,c′ ≡
∑p(rc,p − r¯c)(rc′,p − r¯c′)√
∑p(rc,p − r¯c)2 ∑p(rc′,p − r¯c′)2
(A.1)
where this time rc,p = ln(RCAPROXc,p + ε) and r¯c is the average of rc,p over all products
for country c. ε is defined as 0.1 in our calculations and,
RCAPROXc,p =
∑p′ RCAc,p × φp,p′
∑p′ φp,p′
(A.2)
RCAPROXc,p is basically a proximity-weighted RCA measure (similar to the "density"
measure developed by Hausmann and Klinger, 2007 and Hidalgo et. al. 2007). Proximity
(φp,p′), a product-product variable, measures the minimum conditional probability of two
products being co-exported by any two countries. Hausmann and Klinger (2007) and
Hidalgo et. al. (2007) interpret two products having a high proximity value as requiring
similar capabilities or technologies.
Hence, this modified similarity index, SPROXc,c′ , would measure not only the similarity in
the intensity of exports of every product for a pair of countries, but also whether these two
countries are similar in the technological bundle that surrounds every product (as measured
by the other products they export). This measure will give a higher weight to two countries
having the same product with similar surrounding bundles. At the same time, it will punish
the similarity among two countries when –even if they are exporting the same product–
they do not necessarily have the same technological bundle that surrounds such product.
Overall, there is still correlation between the simple and the proximity-weighted similar-
ity index (ρ = 0.54) as seen in Figure A.10
Figure A.11 replicates Figures 1.1 and 1.2 using the proximity weighted similarity index.
The upper panel uses all products, while the bottom panel uses NPRB products only. In both
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Figure A.10: Scatter of Proximity Weighted Similarity Index vs. BHH Similarity Index
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The figure is a scatterplot comparing our original (BHH) Export Similarity Index and the Proximity Weighted
Export Similarity Index for all country pairs, in year 2000.
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Figure A.11: Stylized Facts Proximity Weighted Similarity Index
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The left panel of the figure shows the distributions (in year 2000) of the Proximity Weighted Export Similarity
Index for All (not neighbors) Country Pairs, and for Neighbors Pairs only. The right panel shows the average
Proximity Weighted Export Similarity Index for country pairs in each bracket of distance between 250 km to
5000 km. The upper figures use the Proximity Weighted Similarity Index for all products, and the lower figures
use the Proximity Weighted Similarity Index for NPRB products only.
we can see how the distribution of the proximity weighted similarity index for neighboring
countries is shifted to the right. This shows that our analysis presented in the main body of
this paper is robust to using the Proximity Weighted Similarity Index. The figure presents the
distribution of the index for geographical neighbors and non neighbors, and the declining
relationship of the index with distance for all products and NPRB products. The lower
panel (NPRB products only) however, shows some discontinuity in the declining relation
with distance, but is declining overall.
We turn to study this more in detail by replicating model (1.3), using a normalized
version of the Proximity Weighted Similarity Index on the LHS (with mean zero and unit
standard deviation). The results are presented in Table A.7. Consistent with the results
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in the main body of the paper, longer distances are negatively correlated with similarity
in exports, while countries sharing a border and in the same region tend to have a larger
proximity weighted similarity index, as opposed to non-neighboring countries in different
regions.
A.4 Decomposing Similarity
The similarity observed in the network in Figure A.1 is based on the correlated export of
resource-based products for some country-pairs (blue links) and of non-resource-based
products for others (red links).
We created a measure to determine whether a pair of countries’ similarity is a reflection
of the export of primary and resource based (PRB) products or, on the contrary, non primary
nor resource based (NPRB) products. The measure is based on decomposing the relative
contribution of PRB and NPRB products to export similarity by separating products into
these categories and counting the fraction of PRB and NPRB products that both countries
export with an RCA above their respective means. We take the difference between these two
fractions as an estimate of the contribution of PRB and NPRB products to export similarity.
Formally, we define:
∆σc,c′ = σNPRBc,c′ − σPRBc,c′ (A.3)
where
σNPRBc,c′ =
1
NNPRB
∑
peNPRB
δc,c′,p (A.4)
and NNPRB is the total number of NPRB products and
δc,c′,p =

1 if RCAc,p ≥ RCAc and RCAc′,p ≥ RCAc′
0 otherwise
(A.5)
where RCAc is the average RCA of country c over all products.
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The definition for σPRBc,c′ can be obtained by changing NPRB for PRB in (A.4).
From equation (A.3), ∆σc,c′ > 0 if the major contributors to the export similarity between
c and c′ are NPRB products, such as manufactures and chemicals, and negative in the
opposite case. For example, Figure A.12 plots Japan and Koreas’ RCA in all products in
2008 and shows NRBP products in red and PRB products in blue. The horizontal flat line
represents the average RCA for all products for Korea, while the vertical flat line does so for
Japan. In this case σNPRBc,c′c = 0.6517, σ
PRB
c,c′ = 0.3471 and ∆σc,c′ = 0.3046, indicating that Japan
and Korea export 61.75% of all of their NPRB products with an RCA above their respective
means (in the upper right part of the graph), compared to only 34.71% for PRB products.
This shows that the similarity between Japan and Korea we are measuring comes mainly
from their correlated export of NPRB products.
By using these measures we are able to document for any pair of countries whether their
export similarity is driven by NPRB or by PRB products. Not all country similarity is driven
by the same kind of products. Figure (A.13) summarizes this information by showing,
within each region of the World, what proportion of country-pairs are similar due to NPRB
products or PRB products.
A.5 Robustness Tests: Dynamics of Export Similarity
The results for the dynamics of export similarity are robust to a number of different
specifications of model (1.4). Our results are robust in two main aspects: the role of
geographic neighbors in the likelihood of adding new products to the export basket of a
country is always statistically significant; and the coefficient is sharply reduced in magnitude
and is not statistically different from zero when using the control sample with a random set
of neighbors.
Table A.8 is analogous to Table 1.9 in the main body of the paper, but uses growth in
export value as the dependent variable, instead of growth in RCA value. Having a neighbor
that exports a product is correlated with an increase in the annual growth of exports for
that product 4% to 5%. The results are larger in magnitude (given that the export value is
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Figure A.12: Decomposition of Similarity Index for Korea and Japan in 2008
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The figure shows a scatterplot in which the vertical axis measures the RCA in a product for Korea, and the
horizontal axis measures the RCA in a product for Japan. Each dot is a product, and it is red if it is an NPRB
product, or blue otherwise. The data is from year 2008.
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Figure A.13: Category of Products Driving Similarities per Region (Year 2008)
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This figure shows a bar graph, which represents the share of country pairs, within region, for which their Export
Similarity Index is driven by NPRB products (red) or by PRB products (blue).The data is from year 2008.
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nominal) but are qualitatively the same.
Table A.9 replicates the results excluding the period 1980-1990 from the sample in order
to ensure our results are robust to the changes in the SITC classification in the year 1985.
Our results are also robust to our definition of "jumps": Table A.10 presents results
limiting the sample to those observations with a baseline RCA equal to zero (as opposed to
observations with RCA below 0.1).
Tables A.11 and A.12 redefine the left-hand side of model (1.4): here, "jumps" are
defined as an increase in the RCA from RCAc,p,t ≤ 0.1 (at the beginning of the period) to
RCAc,p,T ≥ 2 and to RCAc,p,T ≥ 5 (by the end of the period), respectively. As expected,
given that this definition of "jumps" is stricter, the coefficients for the role of neighbors in
the likelihood of adding a new product to the export basket becomes smaller, while still
statistically significant.
Our results are also robust to using a logit estimation. Given the computational diffi-
culties of estimating a non-linear model with fixed effects, we pursue this task by limiting
our sample to the last period available (2001-2008). Table A.13 present the results of this
estimation. Also, using non-linear estimation, we are able to considerably improve the
(pseudo) R-squared values, and still get consistency in our results.
Finally, we pursue the same analysis using a different dataset, in order to test whether
the results are being driven by the way the data is classified. Table A.14 uses data from
the Harmonized System classification, disaggregated at the 4-digit level. While we do not
present results here for NPRB products only, we find that in this classification we also get
consistency in our results as compared to the SITC4 dataset: the estimated coefficients are
highly similar in their magnitudes and statistical significance, and the coefficients become
statistically equal to zero when using the control sample.
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Table A.8: Dynamics of Exports Similarity (Export Value Growth)
Panel A: Continous Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Ln Max RCA Neighbors 2.4806 2.3731 -0.2059 2.5983
(0.148)*** (0.251)*** (1.186) (1.686)
Baseline Ln Exports -3.2959 -3.9931 -3.2105 -3.9462
(0.061)*** (0.090)*** (0.060)*** (0.089)***
Baseline Density 3.2031 -14.0180 22.8693 3.5617
(5.993) (9.677) (5.626)*** (8.653)
Growth Rate Exports (t-1) -0.0096 -0.0039 -0.0088 -0.0032
(0.005)* (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Zero Exports (t-1) -2.5476 0.1431 -3.1926 -0.1543
(0.434)*** (0.632) (0.450)*** (0.671)
N 262017 136929 262017 136929
r2 0.37 0.45 0.36 0.45
Panel B: Binary Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Neighbor Exports 5.5296 4.2085 -0.1668 0.3416
(0.374)*** (0.550)*** (0.358) (0.501)
Baseline Ln Exports -3.2445 -3.9633 -3.2103 -3.9490
(0.060)*** (0.089)*** (0.060)*** (0.090)***
Baseline Density 10.2808 -7.4406 22.8850 2.9340
(5.898)* (9.444) (5.609)*** (8.664)
Growth Rate Exports (t-1) -0.0091 -0.0030 -0.0087 -0.0036
(0.005)* (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Zero Exports (t-1) -2.8801 0.0000 -3.1950 -0.1378
(0.429)*** (0.634) (0.452)*** (0.672)
N 262017 136929 262017 136929
r2 0.37 0.45 0.36 0.45
This table presents results using the Compound Average Annual Growth for Export value
in the next period as the dependent variable. Panel A uses the maximum RCA among all
geographic neighbors of a country for a particular product, in natural logarithm, as the
independent variable. Panel B uses a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if at least
one of the neighbors of a country have an RCA above 1 in the product under consideration.
The control group uses a generated dataset in which neighbors are randomly assigned to
countries, keeping constant the amount of neighbors per country. All regressions include
country-neighbor-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the country-neighbor level.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Dynamics of Exports Similarity (Excluding 1980)
Panel A: Continous Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Ln Max RCA Neighbors 0.0026 0.0020 -0.0025 -0.0032
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.002) (0.004)
Baseline Ln RCA 0.0158 0.0093 0.0177 0.0095
(0.003)*** (0.005)* (0.003)*** (0.005)**
Baseline Density 0.2253 0.3869 0.2425 0.3993
(0.034)*** (0.062)*** (0.033)*** (0.059)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.0012 0.0026 0.0006 0.0022
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
N 123300 62866 123300 62866
r2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
Panel B: Binary Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Neighbor Exports 0.0080 0.0066 0.0011 0.0007
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.001)
Baseline Ln RCA 0.0163 0.0095 0.0177 0.0094
(0.003)*** (0.005)** (0.003)*** (0.005)**
Baseline Density 0.2288 0.3827 0.2425 0.3988
(0.034)*** (0.061)*** (0.033)*** (0.059)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.0011 0.0026 0.0006 0.0022
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
N 123300 62866 123300 62866
r2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
This table presents results when excluding period 1980-1990 from the sample. Panel A
uses the maximum RCA among all geographic neighbors of a country for a particular
product, in natural logarithm, as the independent variable. Panel B uses a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if at least one of the neighbors of a country have an RCA above 1
in the product under consideration. The control group uses a generated dataset in which
neighbors are randomly assigned to countries, keeping constant the amount of neighbors
per country. All regressions include country-neighbor-by-year and product-by-year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-neighbor level.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Dynamics of Exports Similarity (Baseline RCA=0)
Panel A: Continous Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Ln Max RCA Neighbors 0.0040 0.0043 -0.0041 -0.0122
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003) (0.008)
Baseline Ln RCA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Baseline Density 0.2560 0.4565 0.2816 0.4970
(0.049)*** (0.121)*** (0.049)*** (0.119)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0002
(0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.0020 0.0013 0.0016 0.0010
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
N 112783 57289 112783 57289
r2 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.15
Panel B: Binary Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Neighbor Exports 0.0138 0.0140 -0.0006 -0.0017
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002) (0.003)
Baseline Ln RCA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Baseline Density 0.2618 0.4608 0.2809 0.4954
(0.049)*** (0.120)*** (0.049)*** (0.119)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0002
(0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.0018 0.0013 0.0016 0.0010
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
N 112783 57289 112783 57289
r2 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.15
This table presents results limiting the observations to those having an initial RCA zero
at the beginning of each period. Panel A uses the maximum RCA among all geographic
neighbors of a country for a particular product, in natural logarithm, as the independent
variable. Panel B uses a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if at least one of the
neighbors of a country have an RCA above 1 in the product under consideration. The
control group uses a generated dataset in which neighbors are randomly assigned to
countries, keeping constant the amount of neighbors per country. All regressions include
country-neighbor-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the country-neighbor level.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.11: Dynamics of Exports Similarity (RCAc,p,T ≥ 2)
Panel A: Continous Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Ln Max RCA Neighbors 0.0026 0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0058
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.002) (0.005)
Baseline Ln RCA 0.0014 -0.0033 0.0029 -0.0025
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Baseline Density 0.0892 0.1900 0.1099 0.2069
(0.019)*** (0.042)*** (0.020)*** (0.049)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.0031 0.0056 0.0026 0.0051
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
N 173433 90811 173433 90811
r2 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07
Panel B: Binary Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Neighbor Exports 0.0073 0.0069 0.0000 -0.0012
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.002)
Baseline Ln RCA 0.0020 -0.0028 0.0029 -0.0024
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Baseline Density 0.0955 0.1972 0.1095 0.2058
(0.019)*** (0.042)*** (0.020)*** (0.049)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.0030 0.0056 0.0026 0.0051
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
N 173433 90811 173433 90811
r2 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07
This table presents results redefining the left-hand side variable to be 1 if RCAc,p,t ≤ 0.1
and RCAc,p,T ≥ 2 (instead of RCAc,p,T ≥ 1). Panel A uses the maximum RCA among all
geographic neighbors of a country for a particular product, in natural logarithm, as the
independent variable. Panel B uses a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if at least
one of the neighbors of a country have an RCA above 1 in the product under consideration.
The control group uses a generated dataset in which neighbors are randomly assigned to
countries, keeping constant the amount of neighbors per country. All regressions include
country-neighbor-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the country-neighbor level.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.12: Dynamics of Exports Similarity (RCAc,p,T ≥ 5)
Panel A: Continous Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Ln Max RCA Neighbors 0.0013 0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0023
(0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.001) (0.003)
Baseline Ln RCA 0.0014 0.0000 0.0021 0.0006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)* (0.002)
Baseline Density 0.0430 0.0974 0.0588 0.1105
(0.009)*** (0.020)*** (0.010)*** (0.022)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.000)*** (0.000)* (0.000)*** (0.000)**
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.0007 0.0009 0.0004 0.0008
(0.000)* (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
N 173433 90811 173433 90811
r2 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
Panel B: Binary Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Neighbor Exports 0.0035 0.0021 -0.0006 -0.0012
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001)
Baseline Ln RCA 0.0017 0.0002 0.0021 0.0006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)* (0.002)
Baseline Density 0.0468 0.1004 0.0586 0.1102
(0.009)*** (0.020)*** (0.010)*** (0.022)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.000)*** (0.000)* (0.000)*** (0.000)**
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.0006 0.0009 0.0004 0.0008
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
N 173433 90811 173433 90811
r2 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
This table presents results redefining the left-hand side variable to be 1 if RCAc,p,t ≤ 0.1
and RCAc,p,T ≥ 5 (instead of RCAc,p,T ≥ 1). Panel A uses the maximum RCA among all
geographic neighbors of a country for a particular product, in natural logarithm, as the
independent variable. Panel B uses a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if at least
one of the neighbors of a country have an RCA above 1 in the product under consideration.
The control group uses a generated dataset in which neighbors are randomly assigned to
countries, keeping constant the amount of neighbors per country. All regressions include
country-neighbor-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the country-neighbor level.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.13: Dynamics of Exports Similarity (Logit)
Panel A: Continous Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Ln Max RCA Neighbors 0.1279 0.1425 -0.0740 -0.6157
(0.034)*** (0.070)** (2.885) (4.262)
Baseline Ln RCA 1.0458 0.3783 1.0935 0.3460
(0.234)*** (0.420) (0.236)*** (0.385)
Baseline Density 11.9902 12.0677 14.1376 13.1071
(4.537)*** (7.918) (4.690)*** (8.794)
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0379 -0.0448 -0.0380 -0.0445
(0.007)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)***
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.3621 0.5512 0.3118 0.4870
(0.236) (0.420) (0.226) (0.362)
N 22792 10551 22792 10551
r2_p 0.19 0.26 0.19 0.26
Panel B: Binary Independent Variable
Real Control
All NPRB All NPRB
Neighbor Exports 0.3081 0.2148 -0.0523 -0.1043
(0.117)*** (0.200) (0.269) (0.435)
Baseline Ln RCA 1.0590 0.4017 1.0932 0.3311
(0.232)*** (0.420) (0.235)*** (0.380)
Baseline Density 12.7418 13.0036 14.1460 13.1778
(4.547)*** (8.006) (4.759)*** (8.566)
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0382 -0.0440 -0.0380 -0.0447
(0.007)*** (0.010)*** (0.007)*** (0.010)***
Zero RCA (t-1) 0.3534 0.5445 0.3117 0.4834
(0.236) (0.418) (0.221) (0.369)
N 22792 10551 22792 10551
r2_p 0.19 0.26 0.19 0.26
This table presents results using a logit estimation, limiting the sample to the last period in
our dataset (2001-2008). Panel A uses the maximum RCA among all geographic neighbors
of a country for a particular product, in natural logarithm, as the independent variable.
Panel B uses a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if at least one of the neighbors of a
country have an RCA above 1 in the product under consideration. The control group uses a
generated dataset in which neighbors are randomly assigned to countries, keeping constant
the amount of neighbors per country. All regressions include country-neighbor-by-year
and product-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-neighbor
level.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.14: Dynamics of Exports Similarity (HS4)
Real Control Real Control
Ln Max RCA Neighbors 0.0034 0.0054
(0.001)*** (0.005)
Neighbor Exports 0.0093 -0.0002
(0.002)*** (0.002)
Baseline Ln RCA 0.0254 0.0272 0.0262 0.0272
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Baseline Density 0.2752 0.3201 0.2750 0.3207
(0.050)*** (0.051)*** (0.050)*** (0.051)***
Growth Rate RCA (t-1) -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Zero RCA (t-1) -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 45589 45589 45589 45589
r2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
This table presents results using the Harmonized System classification disaggregated at
the 4-digit level. The first two columns use the maximum RCA among all geographic
neighbors of a country for a particular product, in natural logarithm, as the independent
variable. Columns 3 and 4 uses a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if at least one
of the neighbors of a country have an RCA above 1 in the product under consideration.
The control group uses a generated dataset in which neighbors are randomly assigned to
countries, keeping constant the amount of neighbors per country. All regressions include
country-neighbor-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the country-neighbor level.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 A Conceptual Framework
Consider a small open economy in a world with a fixed set ω of goods, each one, indexed
by i, with the same production function given by:
qi = ϕiLαI
Where 0 < α < 1, L is units of labor, the only factor of production (which is inelastically
supplied) and ϕi is product specific productivity. Prices are exogenously determined in
world markets, and defined by pi. Product specific productivity, ϕi, is an increasing function
of product-specific tacit knowledge which is equals the amount of non-workers people in
the economy, ηi, that have such product specific knowledge. Each economy has an initial
endowed vector of ηi (for each product in the set ω) determined exogenously.
Assume the following functional form:
ϕi = η
ρ
i where 0 < ρ <
1− α
1+ α
< 1 (B.1)
Each firm has to pay a fixed cost C(ϕ) = 1
ϕ
1
1−α
i
to enter the market. Hence, the total cost
of production is:
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TCi = w
[
qi
ϕi
]1/α
+ C(ϕi)
Where w is wage, which is set to 1 for simplicity. Hence, a firm will produce the product
only if it can achieve positive profits:
Πi = piqi −
[
qi
ϕi
]1/α
− C(ϕi) > 0
Hence, to have Πi > 0 we must have that:
ϕi >
[
q1/αi + 1
piqi
]α
(B.2)
Assuming equation (B.2) holds, we can compute the optimal amount qi that a firm will
produce given the exogenous price pi (by equating price to MC):
pi − 1
αϕi
[
qi
ϕi
] 1−α
α
= 0
Solving this results in:
q∗i = (αpi)
α
1−α ϕ
1+α
1−α
i = (αpi)
α
1−α η
ρ(1+α)
1−α
i (B.3)
It is easy to see that ∂qi∂ηi > 0, and
∂2qi
∂η2i
< 0 given the assumptions in (B.1). This brings us
to Proposition 1:
Proposition 3 A firm’s decision on the quantity of the product it produces, once such enters the
market, is increasing in the amount of knowledge specific to that product available in the country.
Thus, one testable implication based on Proposition 1, at the country level, is that a country
will increase the level of production/exports of certain product whenever it has acquired
more knowledge specific to that product.
With the equilibrium amount q∗i from (B.3), we can find the required amount of knowl-
edge needed for a firm in order to enter the market. Hence, plugging q∗i into (B.2) we
have:
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Γ(ηi) = ηi −

η
ρ
1−α
i (αpi)
α
1−α
[
1+
(
η
ρ
1−α
i (αpi)
α
1−α
) 1
α
]
pi

α
ρ
> 0
Therefore, it can be inferred:
qi > 0 i f Γ(ηi) > 0, with
∂Γ(ηi)
∂ηi
> 0
Proposition 4 A product will be produced by a firm in the country if the country has the minimum
required amount of specific product knowledge to make it profitable to the firm. The probability of a
product being produced by a firm in a country is an increasing function of the number of people in
the economy that have the product specific knowledge.
A second testable implication based on Proposition 2, at the country level, implies that
an increase in the amount of specific knowledge on certain product should be positively
correlated with the ability of that country to start producing/exporting such product.
∂qi
∂ηi
=
∂qi
∂ϕi
∂ϕi
∂ηi
(B.4)
The empirical section estimates changes in qi as a result of variation in ηi. Changes in ηi
specific to each product are proxied by exploiting the variation on bilateral relationships (i.e.
migration, trade and FDI) from and to countries that export intensively product i.
B.2 Robustness Tests
B.2.1 Excluding products pinned down from geology or climate
In order to limit the sample to products that are not pinned down by geology or climate, we
follow the classification provided by Lall (2000), shown in Table B.1. Lall’s classification is
used to create two categories of products: Primary and Resource Based (PRB) products and
Non-Primary or Non-Resource Based (NPRB) products. We consider as PRB products those
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Table B.1: Lall Classification
Lall Classification # Products
Gold 1
Primary Products 193
Resource Based Manufactures 1 (agro-based products) 130
Resource Based Manufactures 2 (others non-agro based products) 108
Low Technology Manufacture 1 (textiles, garments and footwear) 100
Low Technology Manufacture 2 (others) 97
Medium Technology Manufacture 1 (automotive) 15
Medium Technology Manufacture 2 (process) 109
Medium Technology Manufacture 3 (engineering) 135
High Technology Manufacture 1 (electronic and electrical) 49
High Technology Manufacture (others) 34
Special 12
Unclassified 22
that are classified as Gold, Primary Products and Resource Based Manufactures (categories
1 thru 4 in Table B.1), whereas NPRB products are the ones contained in all other categories.
The results, presented in Tables B.2, are consistent with the ones shown in the main body
of the paper. In the Table, the upper panel shows the results for the extensive margin while
the lower panel studies the intensive margin of trade. The results are qualitatively similar
to those in Table 2.4. While not robust to all specifications, in most of them immigrants
and emigrants correlate to the ability of countries to export new NPRB products. In
the intensive margin, immigrants and emigrants appear to have positive and statistically
significant coefficients when using the RCA ≥ 5 threshold, while the evidence is mixed for
the RCA ≥ 1 threshold.
B.2.2 Excluding Bilateral Exports
Kugler and Rapoport (2011) find evidence that migrants reduce transaction costs inducing
bilateral trade and capital flows. This section expand on the test presented in the main body
of the paper which discard the results being driven by this pattern, instead of a gain in
productivity.
As explained in the main body of the paper, we reconstruct the dataset such that the
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Table B.2: Fixed Effects, NPRB products
Panel A: Extensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0010 0.0019 -0.0004 0.0013
(0.000)** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)
Ln Emigrants 0.0029 0.0028 0.0022 0.0025
(0.001)** (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Ln FDI, total 0.0017 0.0016 0.0011 0.0009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001)
Ln Trade, total -0.0040 -0.0045 0.0007 0.0007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
N 41215 41215 41215 41215
r2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Panel B: Intensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0014 0.0041 0.0018 0.0017
(0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)*
Ln Emigrants 0.0048 -0.0031 0.0037 0.0036
(0.002)** (0.002) (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Ln FDI, total -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Trade, total 0.0175 0.0227 0.0009 0.0014
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.001) (0.001)*
Baseline Log Exports -0.0446 -0.0446 -0.0436 -0.0433
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Previous Exports Growth -0.0853 -0.0850 -0.0885 -0.0896
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
Previous Exports Zero -0.0310 -0.0310 -0.0266 -0.0258
(0.016)** (0.015)** (0.016)* (0.016)*
N 42737 42737 42737 42737
r2 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39
All specifications include country-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. SE clustered at
the country level presented in parenthesis
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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export value for each product and country to the rest of the world excludes exports to nations
where migrants are from/in. The number of minimum number of migrants (immigrants +
emigrants) used to exclude those bilateral flows are defined in thresholds. Tables B.3 to B.5
present results using as thresholds 1000, 2500 and 5000 migrants, to complement the result
in the main body of the paper that presented the 500 threshold (i.e., if there are more than
500 migrants between any two given countries, we exclude all bilateral trade between those
two countries, to construct the dependent variable).
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Table B.3: FE, excluding bilateral exports (1000 migrants threshold)
Panel A: Extensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0017 0.0028 0.0011 0.0012
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*
Ln Emigrants 0.0032 0.0024 0.0013 0.0008
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*
Ln FDI, total 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Trade, total -0.0061 -0.0063 0.0027 0.0028
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)** (0.001)**
N 114227 114227 114227 114227
r2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Panel B: Intensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0005 0.0034 0.0020 0.0015
(0.001) (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)
Ln Emigrants 0.0072 -0.0007 0.0031 0.0030
(0.002)*** (0.003) (0.001)*** (0.001)**
Ln FDI, total -0.0009 -0.0007 0.0010 0.0010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Ln Trade, total 0.0124 0.0175 0.0016 0.0022
(0.006)** (0.006)*** (0.001)* (0.001)**
Baseline Log Exports -0.0072 -0.0072 -0.0062 -0.0058
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Previous Exports Growth -0.1045 -0.1041 -0.1077 -0.1088
(0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
Previous Exports Zero -0.0691 -0.0695 -0.0639 -0.0635
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)***
N 57956 57956 57956 57956
r2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
All specifications include country-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. The dependent
variable in all specifications is constructed using exports of country c to the whole world
excluding to countries c′ where total migration between c and c′ exceeds 1000 people.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.4: FE, excluding bilateral exports (2500 migrants threshold)
Panel A: Extensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0018 0.0028 0.0009 0.0009
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)** (0.001)
Ln Emigrants 0.0029 0.0024 0.0013 0.0012
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.001)**
Ln FDI, total 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Trade, total -0.0063 -0.0065 0.0023 0.0023
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)* (0.001)*
N 106881 106881 106881 106881
r2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Panel B: Intensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0012 0.0029 0.0020 0.0014
(0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)
Ln Emigrants 0.0067 -0.0009 0.0034 0.0030
(0.002)*** (0.003) (0.001)*** (0.001)**
Ln FDI, total -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)* (0.000)**
Ln Trade, total 0.0094 0.0157 0.0017 0.0024
(0.006)* (0.006)*** (0.001)** (0.001)***
Baseline Log Exports -0.0126 -0.0124 -0.0118 -0.0114
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Previous Exports Growth -0.1070 -0.1072 -0.1096 -0.1109
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)***
Previous Exports Zero -0.0610 -0.0611 -0.0567 -0.0561
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
N 61476 61476 61476 61476
r2 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
All specifications include country-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. The dependent
variable in all specifications is constructed using exports of country c to the whole world
excluding to countries c′ where total migration between c and c′ exceeds 2500 people.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.5: FE, excluding bilateral exports (5000 migrants threshold)
Panel A: Extensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0020 0.0026 0.0009 0.0009
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)** (0.001)
Ln Emigrants 0.0026 0.0023 0.0016 0.0015
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Ln FDI, total 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Trade, total -0.0068 -0.0069 0.0020 0.0021
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
N 100988 100988 100988 100988
r2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Panel B: Intensive Margin
R1 R5
All Skilled All Skilled
Ln Immigrants 0.0017 0.0040 0.0020 0.0015
(0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)
Ln Emigrants 0.0062 -0.0025 0.0039 0.0035
(0.002)*** (0.003) (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Ln FDI, total -0.0009 -0.0007 0.0005 0.0005
(0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Trade, total 0.0087 0.0152 0.0017 0.0024
(0.005) (0.005)*** (0.001)** (0.001)***
Baseline Log Exports -0.0165 -0.0163 -0.0158 -0.0153
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Previous Exports Growth -0.1060 -0.1060 -0.1083 -0.1097
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)***
Previous Exports Zero -0.0549 -0.0551 -0.0508 -0.0503
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
N 64343 64343 64343 64343
r2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
All specifications include country-by-year and product-by-year fixed effects. The dependent
variable in all specifications is constructed using exports of country c to the whole world
excluding to countries c′ where total migration between c and c′ exceeds 5000 people.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Condition for ∂φ(aI)/∂d > 0
Horizontal FDI will be less profitable at longer distances if ∂φ(aI)/∂d > 0 (where φ(aI) = a1−εI ).
For simplicity, I compute the conditions for which ∂log(φ(aI))/∂d > 0 instead:
ε− 1
κ(k, d)1−ε − τ(t, d)1−ε ·
[
κ(k, d)−ε
∂κ
∂d
− τ(t, d)−ε ∂τ
∂d
]
> 0
Given that the left term will always be positive (given the assumption that τ(t, d) > κ(k, d)
and ε > 1, the conditions for the inequality to hold are derived from the right term only.
Hence, we have:
κ(k, d)−ε · ∂κ
∂d
> τ(t, d)−ε · ∂τ
∂d
1
κ(k, d)ε−1
· eκ,d > 1τ(t, d)1−ε · eτ,d
Where eκ,d and eτ,d are the elasticity of κ and τ with respect to distance d, respectively.
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Hence for the condition to hold it must be that:
[
τ(t, d)
κ(k, d)
]ε−1
>
eτ,d
eκ,d
There is no reason to believe that this condition is not economically feasible.
C.2 Heterogeneity in the number of reported SIC industries in
the dataset
While the dataset has information on up to six industries per plant (a main one plus five
other) the number of establishments that report more than one activity varies dramatically
per country. The left panel of Figure C.1 shows the average number of reported industries
across all subsidiaries per country, while the right panel shows, per country, the percentage
of firms reporting one, two, three, four, five or six industries. In most countries, the average
number of reported firms is below two; and the majority of firms in more than half the
countries report only one SIC code.
C.3 Using the input-output table to define vertical relationships
In order to filter out from the definition of horizontal those links that could also be defined
as vertical, either upstream or downstream, I use the US input-output provided by Fan
and Lang (2000). I follow the methodology suggested by Alfaro and Charlton (2009) and
Acemoglu et. al. (2009) to define vertical relationships.
More in general, the diagram in Figure C.2 is useful to understand how horizontal and
vertical links are defined in the dataset. Within a single MNC firm, an horizontal link is
defined as a foreign subsidiary that is classified under the same SIC code as any of its
domestic subsidiaries. Then I use the US I/O table by Fan & Lang (2000) to define vertical
relationships, both downstream and upstream. A subsidiary is defined as upstream vertical
if its main economic activity is an input of $0.05 or more per each dollar of output of any
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Figure C.1: Distribution of reported SIC codes by plant, per country
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The figure describe the distribution of number of industries reported by establishment in the sample. The left panel shows
the average number of reported industries across all subsidiaries per country, while the right panel shows, per country, the
percentage of firms reporting one, two, three, four, five or six industries.
165
Figure C.2: Definition of Horizontal and Vertical
The diagram describes the methodology used to classify foreign subsidiaries as horizontal expansions based on their reported
economic activity vis-a-vis the economic activity of the MNC in its home country.
of the domestic subsidiaries of the firm. Similarly, a subsidiary is defined as downstream
vertical if any of the domestic subsidiary provides an input to it of $0.05 or more per each
dollar of output.
After such classification, those subsidiaries that fall into both categories (horizontal and
vertical) are filtered out from the horizontal classification. This implies that the sample
classifies as horizontal only final goods, which is the matter of study of the theoretical
framework presented.
Appendix Section C.6.1 presents robustness tests of all tables using alternative thresholds
(0.01 and 0.10). The use of $0.05 in the main body of the paper follows the precedent set by
Alfaro & Charlton (2009).
A limitation of this methodology is that technologies might vary across countries, and
hence, the US I/O table would loss some validity in defining upstream or downstream
relationships. While acknowledging this limitation I assume that the US I/O table is a
good proxy for measuring vertical links, regardless of the country, in line with the previous
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literature.
C.4 Limitations of the R&D intensity measures
Nunn & Trefler (2008) and Keller & Yeaple (2013) use the average R&D share of firms’ sales
as their measure of knowledge intensity. Nunn & Trefler use firm-level data from Orbis,
while Keller & Yeaple use data from COMPUSTAT.
The two measures are skewed towards the few industries with large R&D investment,
while the zeros or very small values are highly abundant (see Figure C.3). In fact, for Nunn
& Trefler half of the industries have an R&D intensity measure below 0.2%, while the largest
industries have a value of 190%. In Keller & Yeaple’s measure the median is 0.7% while the
most knowledge intensive industry has a share of R&D over sales of over 1000%.
C.5 O*NET knowledge intensity measures
Figure C.4 presents the distribution of the knowledge intensity measure used in the paper:
experience plus training (based on experience plus on-site and on-the-job training figures
of workers in each industry). As opposed to the R&D investment based variables used in
the literature (see Section C.4), the distribution of the O*NET based variables is smoother,
and behaves more like a normal probability density function. Figure C.5 presents the same
graphs limiting the sample to manufacturing industries only.
Tables C.1 presents the top and bottom ten products in the manufacturing division (SIC
codes 2000 to 3999) ranked by the knowledge intensity measure.
C.6 Robustness Tests
C.6.1 Varying thresholds in the definition of horizontal subsidiaries
As explained in Section C.3, subsidiaries that classify both as horizontal and vertical
(according to the I/O table) are not considered horizontal. The intuition for such approach
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Figure C.3: Fitted distribution of R&D Measures
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The figure shows the fitted distribution for the industry level R&D investment as share of sales, compiled from firm level
datasets by Nunn & Trefler (2008) and Keller & Yeaple (2013) in the left and right panel respectively.
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Figure C.4: Histogram O*NET-based KI (All Industries)
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The figure shows the fitted distribution for the computed “experience plus training” O*NET-based knowledge intensity
measures for all industries. Industries are defined in SIC 1987 4-digit industries.
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Figure C.5: Histogram O*NET-based KI (Manufacturing Only)
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The figure shows the fitted distribution for the computed “experience plus training” O*NET-based knowledge intensity
measures for manufacturing industries only. Industries are defined in SIC 1987 4-digit industries.
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is to limit the analysis of horizontal to final goods only.
To do so, a threshold of $0.05 per each $ of output, was selected in order to define
vertical relationships. This section presents the robustness test varying such threshold, for
all tables in the main body of the paper.
Tables C.2-C.4 replicate all results using threshold 0.01, while tables C.5-C.7 replicate all
results using the threshold 0.1.
Varying the input-output threshold is robust to the results presented in the main body
of the paper.
C.6.2 Additional measures of knowledge intensity
In the main body of the paper I perform the analysis using one constructed measure of
knowledge intensity denominated experience plus training. In this section I use instead a
modification of such measure which only takes into account the accumulated experience of
the workers in the industry (excluding the on-site and on-the-job training component). The
results are robust to this other measure as can be seen in Tables C.8, C.9 and C.10, as well as
in Figure C.6.
C.6.3 Non-linear effects of distance
Is the negative relationship between distance and the likelihood of a foreign subsidiary
being horizontal linear? I test for that substituting in the estimation of specification 3.8 the
continuos measure of distance (log(d)) by a set of dummies, each one representing a 500km
interval in the distance between the headquarters and the foreign subsidiary. The results
are presented in table C.11. As it can be seen, the negative correlation becomes larger in
magnitude the further away the headquarters is from the location of the foreign subsidiary.
The results suggest that up to 8000Km the correlation between distance and the existence
of an horizontal foreign subsidiary is negative and increasing in magnitude (besides the 3000-
4000km bucket, which present a positive, though non-statistically significant coefficient).
Only after 8000 km the coefficients are reduced in terms of magnitude, while still negative.
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Table C.2: Determinants of Foreign Replication of Production (threshold 0.01)
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0416 -0.0233 -0.0162 -0.0405
(0.016)** (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)***
log(t) -0.0553 -0.0512
(0.020)*** (0.017)***
GDP per capita ratio -0.4123 -0.3943 -0.0361
(0.177)** (0.173)** (0.061)
Population ratio 0.0621 0.0635 0.0641
(0.025)** (0.024)*** (0.016)***
Capital per worker ratio 0.2818 0.2769 0.0482
(0.076)*** (0.075)*** (0.035)
Human Capital ratio 1.1475 1.1184 0.0000
(0.237)*** (0.230)*** (.)
Land per worker ratio -0.1017 -0.0985 0.1951
(0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.039)***
Constant 0.1114 0.2419 0.2133 0.7139
(0.038)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.070)***
N 47657 50146 50096 47657
R-squared 0.52 0.41 0.52 0.57
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N Y
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.7) using a sample of
domestic and foreign subsidiaries that replicate home production. The left hand side
variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the subsidiary is foreign. The
variables in the right hand side include the unit shipping cost associated with the industry,
knowledge intensity measures (in standard deviations from the mean) and other controls.
All specifications include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the
industry level are presented in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.3: Determinants of Horizontal FDI (threshold 0.01)
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0859 -0.0855 -0.0870
(0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)***
log(d) -0.0202 -0.0199 -0.0190
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
log(t) -0.0308 -0.0302 0.0063 -0.0306
(0.043) (0.043) (0.037) (0.043)
GDP per capita ratio 0.0909 0.0920 0.0894 0.7052
(0.050)* (0.051)* (0.050)* (0.196)***
Population ratio -0.0072 -0.0004 -0.0058 0.2853
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.072)***
Capital per worker ratio -0.0733 -0.0876 -0.0693 -0.3497
(0.040)* (0.042)** (0.041)* (0.117)***
Human Capital ratio -0.0150 0.0202 -0.0195 -0.7377
(0.055) (0.053) (0.055) (0.303)**
Land per worker ratio -0.0177 -0.0157 -0.0178 0.0634
(0.007)*** (0.007)** (0.007)*** (0.035)*
Constant 0.3534 0.2002 0.4005 0.2565
(0.092)*** (0.080)** (0.085)*** (0.151)*
N 55136 55137 55136 55136
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N Y
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.8) using a sample of foreign
subsidiaries of MNCs. The left hand side variable is a binary variable that takes the value
1 if the foreign subsidiary is classified as an horizontal expansion. The variables in the
right hand side include the distance from the MNC headquarters to the foreign subsidiary,
the unit shipping cost, knowledge intensity measures (in standard deviations from the
mean) and other controls. All specifications include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the industry level are presented in parenthesis.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.4: Ease of Communication (threshold 0.01)
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0859 -0.0861 -0.0858 -0.0857
(0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)***
log(d) -0.0202 -0.0219 -0.0177 -0.0146
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)* (0.005)***
log(t) -0.0308 -0.0310 -0.0307 -0.0308
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Non-stop Flight -0.0122
(0.009)
Working hours overlap 0.0013
(0.004)
Common Language 0.0500
(0.024)**
GDP per capita ratio 0.0909 0.0916 0.0905 0.0890
(0.050)* (0.050)* (0.051)* (0.049)*
Population ratio -0.0072 -0.0068 -0.0073 -0.0062
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Capital per worker ratio -0.0733 -0.0745 -0.0742 -0.0700
(0.040)* (0.040)* (0.039)* (0.038)*
Human Capital ratio -0.0150 -0.0108 -0.0147 -0.0205
(0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055)
Land per worker ratio -0.0177 -0.0167 -0.0170 -0.0121
(0.007)*** (0.007)** (0.006)*** (0.007)*
Constant 0.3534 0.3705 0.3249 0.2985
(0.092)*** (0.093)*** (0.138)** (0.086)***
N 55136 55136 55136 55132
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N N
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.8) using a sample of foreign
subsidiaries of MNCs. The left hand side variable is a binary variable that takes the value
1 if the foreign subsidiary is classified as an horizontal expansion. The variables in the
right hand side include the distance from the MNC headquarters to the foreign subsidiary,
the unit shipping cost, knowledge intensity measures (in standard deviations from the
mean) and other controls. The right hand side also includes variables measuring the ease
of communication between a headquarters and its subsidiaries. All specifications include
MNC fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are presented in
parenthesis.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.5: Determinants of Foreign Replication of Production (threshold 0.1)
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0334 -0.0416 -0.0255 -0.0324
(0.016)** (0.015)*** (0.012)** (0.014)**
log(t) -0.0111 -0.0077
(0.021) (0.020)
GDP per capita ratio -0.3745 -0.3818 0.4705
(0.124)*** (0.122)*** (0.124)***
Population ratio 0.0894 0.0914 -0.0498
(0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.025)**
Capital per worker ratio 0.3138 0.3202 -0.2595
(0.077)*** (0.075)*** (0.066)***
Human Capital ratio 0.9593 0.9491 -0.0210
(0.167)*** (0.163)*** (0.069)
Land per worker ratio -0.0994 -0.0968 0.1379
(0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.041)***
Constant 0.2536 0.3079 0.2695 0.8667
(0.041)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.099)***
N 65058 68293 68207 65058
R-squared 0.52 0.39 0.51 0.55
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N Y
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.7) using a sample of
domestic and foreign subsidiaries that replicate home production. The left hand side
variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the subsidiary is foreign. The
variables in the right hand side include the unit shipping cost associated with the industry,
knowledge intensity measures (in standard deviations from the mean) and other controls.
All specifications include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the
industry level are presented in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.6: Determinants of Horizontal FDI (threshold 0.1)
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0937 -0.0932 -0.0957
(0.042)** (0.042)** (0.042)**
log(d) -0.0244 -0.0241 -0.0216
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)**
log(t) 0.0489 0.0496 0.0893 0.0484
(0.062) (0.062) (0.052)* (0.061)
GDP per capita ratio 0.1267 0.1281 0.1250 0.9220
(0.055)** (0.056)** (0.056)** (0.246)***
Population ratio 0.0153 0.0236 0.0169 0.3181
(0.007)** (0.007)*** (0.007)** (0.078)***
Capital per worker ratio -0.0837 -0.1010 -0.0794 -0.6704
(0.045)* (0.046)** (0.046)* (0.187)***
Human Capital ratio 0.0068 0.0494 0.0019 -0.4480
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.285)
Land per worker ratio -0.0169 -0.0144 -0.0169 0.0110
(0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.055)
Constant 0.7121 0.5271 0.7636 0.8320
(0.151)*** (0.127)*** (0.138)*** (0.222)***
N 55136 55137 55136 55136
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N Y
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.8) using a sample of foreign
subsidiaries of MNCs. The left hand side variable is a binary variable that takes the value
1 if the foreign subsidiary is classified as an horizontal expansion. The variables in the
right hand side include the distance from the MNC headquarters to the foreign subsidiary,
the unit shipping cost, knowledge intensity measures (in standard deviations from the
mean) and other controls. All specifications include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the industry level are presented in parenthesis.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.7: Ease of Communication (threshold 0.1)
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0937 -0.0938 -0.0928 -0.0935
(0.042)** (0.042)** (0.042)** (0.042)**
log(d) -0.0244 -0.0253 -0.0077 -0.0197
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.014) (0.008)**
log(t) 0.0489 0.0488 0.0495 0.0489
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Non-stop Flight -0.0063
(0.010)
Working hours overlap 0.0092
(0.005)**
Common Language 0.0420
(0.024)*
GDP per capita ratio 0.1267 0.1270 0.1240 0.1251
(0.055)** (0.056)** (0.055)** (0.054)**
Population ratio 0.0153 0.0155 0.0149 0.0162
(0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)**
Capital per worker ratio -0.0837 -0.0843 -0.0896 -0.0809
(0.045)* (0.045)* (0.044)** (0.044)*
Human Capital ratio 0.0068 0.0089 0.0087 0.0021
(0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.063)
Land per worker ratio -0.0169 -0.0164 -0.0117 -0.0121
(0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)* (0.007)*
Constant 0.7121 0.7210 0.5171 0.6661
(0.151)*** (0.150)*** (0.206)** (0.149)***
N 55136 55136 55136 55132
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N N
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.8) using a sample of
foreign subsidiaries of MNCs. The left hand side variable is a binary variable that takes
the value 1 if the foreign subsidiary is classified as an horizontal expansion. The variables
in the right hand side include the distance from the MNC headquarters to the foreign
subsidiary, the unit shipping cost, knowledge intensity measures (in standard deviations
from the mean) and other controls. The right hand side also includes variables measuring
the ease of communication between a headquarters and its subsidiaries. All specifications
include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are
presented in parenthesis.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.8: Determinants of Foreign Replication of Production (KI: experience)
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0300 -0.0291 -0.0186 -0.0291
(0.014)** (0.012)** (0.010)* (0.012)**
log(t) -0.0244 -0.0206
(0.024) (0.022)
GDP per capita ratio -0.3948 -0.4005 0.3856
(0.131)*** (0.128)*** (0.131)***
Population ratio 0.0849 0.0866 -0.0673
(0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.028)**
Capital per worker ratio 0.3295 0.3323 -0.2326
(0.080)*** (0.078)*** (0.069)***
Human Capital ratio 0.9535 0.9500 0.0290
(0.180)*** (0.176)*** (0.072)
Land per worker ratio -0.1030 -0.0995 0.1095
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.045)**
Constant 0.2214 0.2972 0.2620 0.9514
(0.046)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.103)***
N 61410 64462 64389 61410
R-squared 0.52 0.40 0.51 0.56
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N Y
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.7) using a sample of
domestic and foreign subsidiaries that replicate home production. It uses an O*NET-based
indicator for knowledge intensity based on workers’ accumulated experience (excluding
training). The left hand side variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the
subsidiary is foreign. The variables in the right hand side include the unit shipping
cost associated with the industry, knowledge intensity measures (in standard deviations
from the mean) and other controls. All specifications include MNC fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered at the industry level are presented in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.9: Determinants of Horizontal FDI (KI: experience)
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0628 -0.0625 -0.0645
(0.037)* (0.037)* (0.037)*
log(d) -0.0241 -0.0239 -0.0230
(0.009)** (0.009)** (0.010)**
log(t) 0.0275 0.0281 0.0611 0.0271
(0.067) (0.067) (0.056) (0.066)
GDP per capita ratio 0.1309 0.1323 0.1282 0.8952
(0.056)** (0.057)** (0.056)** (0.241)***
Population ratio 0.0131 0.0212 0.0142 0.3121
(0.007)* (0.007)*** (0.007)** (0.077)***
Capital per worker ratio -0.0836 -0.1007 -0.0792 -0.6494
(0.046)* (0.047)** (0.046)* (0.180)***
Human Capital ratio -0.0071 0.0350 -0.0098 -0.4310
(0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.283)
Land per worker ratio -0.0132 -0.0107 -0.0131 0.0122
(0.007)* (0.008) (0.007)* (0.053)
Constant 0.6318 0.4487 0.6745 0.7556
(0.162)*** (0.136)*** (0.148)*** (0.227)***
N 55136 55137 55136 55136
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N Y
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.8) using a sample of foreign
subsidiaries of MNCs. It uses an O*NET-based indicator for knowledge intensity based
on workers’ accumulated experience (excluding training). The left hand side variable
is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the foreign subsidiary is classified as an
horizontal expansion. The variables in the right hand side include the distance from the
MNC headquarters to the foreign subsidiary, the unit shipping cost, knowledge intensity
measures (in standard deviations from the mean) and other controls. All specifications
include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are
presented in parenthesis.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure C.6: U[k] vs. U[log(d)], (KI: experience)
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Experience
The figure presents the empirical fit for the relationship between d and k (the latter proxied
by the experience measure). The left column performs a linear fit between k and d while the
right column performs a quadratic firm between the two. The grey area represents the 95%
confidence interval for the estimated relationship. The sample excludes foreign subsidiaries
located in Europe owned by a European firm.
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Table C.10: Ease of Communication (KI: experience)
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0628 -0.0629 -0.0621 -0.0629
(0.037)* (0.037)* (0.037)* (0.037)*
log(d) -0.0241 -0.0252 -0.0072 -0.0185
(0.009)** (0.009)*** (0.014) (0.008)**
log(t) 0.0275 0.0274 0.0281 0.0273
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
Non-stop Flight -0.0080
(0.010)
Working hours overlap 0.0093
(0.005)**
Common Language 0.0503
(0.024)**
GDP per capita ratio 0.1309 0.1314 0.1282 0.1290
(0.056)** (0.056)** (0.056)** (0.055)**
Population ratio 0.0131 0.0133 0.0126 0.0142
(0.007)* (0.007)* (0.007)* (0.007)**
Capital per worker ratio -0.0836 -0.0844 -0.0895 -0.0803
(0.046)* (0.046)* (0.044)** (0.044)*
Human Capital ratio -0.0071 -0.0043 -0.0051 -0.0126
(0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.064)
Land per worker ratio -0.0132 -0.0126 -0.0079 -0.0075
(0.007)* (0.007)* (0.007) (0.008)
Constant 0.6318 0.6431 0.4340 0.5765
(0.162)*** (0.161)*** (0.219)** (0.160)***
N 55136 55136 55136 55132
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N N
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.8) using a sample of
foreign subsidiaries of MNCs. It uses an O*NET-based indicator for knowledge intensity
based on workers’ accumulated experience (excluding training). The left hand side
variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the foreign subsidiary is classified as
an horizontal expansion. The variables in the right hand side include the distance from the
MNC headquarters to the foreign subsidiary, the unit shipping cost, knowledge intensity
measures (in standard deviations from the mean) and other controls. The right hand side
also includes variables measuring the ease of communication between a headquarters
and its subsidiaries. All specifications include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the industry level are presented in parenthesis.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure C.7: Distance Intervals Estimators
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Estimated Coefficients Distance Dummies
The figure presents the empirical estimation for the distance intervals coefficients from Table C.11. The grey area represents
95% confidence intervals.
Figure C.7 looks at the non-linearity of the distance effect. The Figure reflects a mono-
tonically decreasing relationship between distance and the likelihood of horizontal foreign
subsidiaries, in general, up to 8000Km. This is consistent with the linear fit shown in the
main body of the paper. Given the standard errors, however, there is little we can say about
a U-shaped non-linear form. Yet, for longer distances, the coefficients are strictly negative.
It is important to note that after 8000Km there are considerably less observations in each
one of those buckets.
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Table C.11: Determinants of Horizontal FDI, Distance Dummies
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3)
k -0.0868 -0.0894
(0.043)** (0.043)**
log(t) 0.0225 0.0598 0.0217
(0.066) (0.056) (0.065)
500-1000Km -0.0249 -0.0246 -0.0234
(0.012)** (0.012)** (0.013)*
1000-1500Km -0.0321 -0.0310 -0.0230
(0.023) (0.024) (0.021)
1500-2000Km -0.0569 -0.0570 -0.0411
(0.029)** (0.028)** (0.024)*
2000-2500Km -0.0554 -0.0546 -0.0309
(0.033)* (0.033)* (0.029)
2500-3000Km -0.0724 -0.0728 -0.0391
(0.035)** (0.035)** (0.031)
3000-3500Km 0.0641 0.0636 0.0907
(0.067) (0.066) (0.060)
3500-4000Km 0.0531 0.0502 0.0830
(0.073) (0.073) (0.067)
4000-4500Km -0.1029 -0.1031 -0.0707
(0.045)** (0.045)** (0.048)
4500-5000Km -0.0982 -0.1009 -0.0867
(0.038)*** (0.037)*** (0.036)**
5000-5500Km -0.0627 -0.0661 -0.0604
(0.037)* (0.037)* (0.036)*
5500-6000Km -0.0987 -0.1008 -0.0951
(0.027)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)***
6000-6500Km -0.1034 -0.1037 -0.0994
(0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)***
6500-7000Km -0.1031 -0.1037 -0.0957
(0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.030)***
7000-7500Km -0.1191 -0.1190 -0.1068
(0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)***
7500-8000Km -0.1289 -0.1284 -0.1097
(0.035)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)***
8000-8500Km -0.0853 -0.0863 -0.0653
(0.032)*** (0.031)*** (0.034)*
8500-9000Km -0.0710 -0.0705 -0.0475
(0.033)** (0.033)** (0.037)
9000-9500Km -0.0775 -0.0766 -0.0528
(0.036)** (0.036)** (0.037)
9500-10000Km -0.0647 -0.0596 -0.0350
(0.035)* (0.036)* (0.036)
10000Km+ -0.0362 -0.0349 -0.0087
(0.029) (0.029) (0.033)
Constant 0.4849 0.5342 0.5921
(0.140)*** (0.127)*** (0.218)***
N 55137 55137 55137
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47
MNC FE Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N Y
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.8) using a sample of
foreign subsidiaries of MNCs. The left hand side variable is a binary variable that
takes the value 1 if the foreign subsidiary is classified as an horizontal expansion. The
variables in the right hand side include the distance from the MNC headquarters to the
foreign subsidiary in dummies each representing a 500km interval, the unit shipping
cost, knowledge intensity measures. All specifications include a vector of controls
which include the ratio of GDP per capita, population, human capital, physical capital
and land between the home and recipient country of the investment. All columns also
include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are
presented in parenthesis.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.6.4 Intellectual Property Rights: Excluding China
To alleviate concerns that the results are driven by the lack of intellectual property rights in
China, I replicate Table 3.5 excluding China from the sample. When excluding China from
the sample, however, the results are robust to the ones presented in the main body of the
paper, as can be seen in Table C.12.
C.6.5 Excluding European Firms
Given the large number of European firms in the sample, and the short distances in the
continent, this raises concerns about the validity of the analysis in terms of the tradeoff
MNC face in locating their knowledge intensive subsidiaries at shorter distances. Hence,
I repeat the corresponding analysis excluding all foreign subsidiaries located in Western
Europe that belong to a European MNC (i.e., for which its headquarters is located in Western
Europe). The results can be seen in in Figure C.8. As can be seen, the results are robust to
the exclusion of these observations from the sample.
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Table C.12: Determinants of Horizontal FDI, excluding China
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.0869 -0.0864 -0.0890
(0.044)** (0.044)** (0.044)**
log(d) -0.0257 -0.0254 -0.0249
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)**
log(t) 0.0256 0.0261 0.0625 0.0253
(0.066) (0.067) (0.057) (0.065)
GDP per capita ratio 0.1303 0.1269 0.1287 0.9143
(0.055)** (0.055)** (0.055)** (0.243)***
Population ratio 0.0127 0.0219 0.0141 0.3109
(0.007)* (0.007)*** (0.007)** (0.077)***
Capital per worker ratio -0.0834 -0.1030 -0.0793 -0.6143
(0.047)* (0.048)** (0.048)* (0.182)***
Human Capital ratio -0.0064 0.0531 -0.0106 -0.5025
(0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.292)*
Land per worker ratio -0.0131 -0.0120 -0.0132 -0.0179
(0.007)* (0.008) (0.007)* (0.052)
Constant 0.6420 0.4466 0.6891 0.6876
(0.161)*** (0.135)*** (0.149)*** (0.214)***
N 54259 54260 54259 54259
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48
MNC FE Y Y Y Y
Host Cntry FE N N N Y
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3.8) using a sample of
foreign subsidiaries of MNCs, excluding subsidiaries in China. The left hand side variable
is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the foreign subsidiary is classified as an
horizontal expansion. The variables in the right hand side include the distance from the
MNC headquarters to the foreign subsidiary, the unit shipping cost, knowledge intensity
measures and other controls. All specifications include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the industry level are presented in parenthesis.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure C.8: U[k] vs. U[log(d)], excluding Europe
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Experience + Training
The figure presents the empirical fit for the relationship between d and k (the latter proxied by the experience plus training
measure). The left column performs a linear fit between k and d while the right column performs a quadratic firm between
the two. The grey area represents the 95% confidence interval for the estimated relationship. The sample excludes foreign
subsidiaries located in Europe owned by a European firm.
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